Introduction

We have heard the accounts for decades – stories of harm, conflict and fear resulting from anti-Black racism in policing. Some incidents received local, national or global media attention. Others, perhaps more damaging, did not capture the headlines, but are simply shared between friends or within communities.

For all members of society, these accounts can bring sadness, anger or shame. But for Black communities, the impact and pain caused by discriminatory policing run deeper. These are not stories – they are lived experiences.

The impacts of discriminatory policing are exponential in their effects. Racial profiling leads to a police stop. The police stop leads to a record. The record affects an employment opportunity. The stops compound, as the person slowly becomes someone who is “known to police.” The threat of physical harm looms, while every stop increases the chance of a charge, then an arrest. Every charge is a potential conviction, every conviction is potential incarceration. Another life turned upside-down. Another family broken. Another community ravaged.

These are the systemic effects of anti-Black racism.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) launched its Inquiry into anti-Black racism by the Toronto Police Service (TPS) in response to these experiences that Black communities have repeatedly identified over many decades.

In Ontario’s human rights system, the OHRC does not make legally binding determinations of Human Rights Code (Code) violations or liability – only the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) can do that. But s. 31 of the Code gives the OHRC the power to initiate inquiries such as this one, to help identify and promote the elimination of discriminatory practices in Ontario.

To fulfill its statutory mandate, the OHRC must identify circumstances that, in its view, amount to discrimination, and make recommendations to help organizations eliminate those practices.

Through this Inquiry, the OHRC has sought to determine how anti-Black racism in society – a fact recognized by the courts and the police – has expressed itself in the policing of Black lives in Toronto. The Inquiry undertook a detailed examination of the experiences of Black people interacting with police in Toronto, and has been unique in gathering hard data together with the lived experiences of Black communities.

Based on the OHRC’s review of the facts, including the data, the lived experiences of Black communities, and case law, the OHRC finds that Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism. Interviews with the TPS and Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) and a review of thousands of pages of documents revealed gaps in TPS and TPSB policies, procedures, training, and accountability mechanisms that have helped perpetuate discrimination and contributed to mistrust of police among Black people.

As our consultations made clear, Black communities do not simply need another report with recommendations. The OHRC’s final report on its Inquiry into anti-Black racism by the TPS sets out a path to move From Impact to Action – a path of meaningful actions aimed at changing outcomes for Black communities.

Systemic discrimination

What does systemic discrimination mean?

Systemic discrimination is about the systems that organizations have in place which, while they may appear to be neutral on their face, create impacts that perpetuate and exacerbate disadvantage experienced by a historically marginalized group. Systemic discrimination is sometimes hard to see – but the impacts are real.

Systemic discrimination occurs in the context of broader societal forces. An organization such as the TPS or TPSB is unlikely to be the only source of the disadvantage experienced by a group. However, the Code requires those organizations to take steps to ensure their conduct is not perpetuating the disadvantage.

In some instances, discriminatory police conduct experienced by Black persons may be individualized and direct – motivated by explicit racial animus or implicit, subconscious racial bias. In these cases, the TPS and TPSB have a legal obligation under the Code to establish systems – training, accountability, oversight – to address this conduct when it occurs and/or prevent it from occurring in the future.

In other cases, systemic discrimination can arise not from an individual act, but from the structure of the system itself – for example, by deploying greater policing resources to an area marked as “high crime” when those crime statistics were themselves a product of racial profiling and anti-Black racism.

Whether through overt actions of officers, or through systemic over-policing of a community, in these cases there may not be a “bad apple” at whom to point fingers. It is simply how the system works. But that does not make the impact any less harmful to the Black people who experience it. Nor does it remove the Code obligation of the TPS or TPSB to address it.

Individual and systemic racial discrimination are also linked. Discrimination arising from an individual’s bias can have a broader, systemic impact, and may contribute to racial disproportionalities.   

There does not need to be any explicit or implicit racial bias for systemic discrimination to exist. If providing policing services exacerbates the disadvantage faced by Black people in Toronto, then it is discriminatory. And once discriminatory impacts have been identified, as they have been here, the Code requires organizations to take immediate steps to address and remedy those failings.

Background to the Inquiry

The OHRC is the provincial statutory agency responsible for advancing human rights and preventing systemic discrimination in Ontario.

In 2017, the OHRC launched its Inquiry into anti-Black racism by the TPS. The Inquiry’s terms of reference directed staff to examine TPS policing practices and activities between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2017 to assess whether those practices disproportionately affect Black people, and whether the conduct is consistent with racial profiling and racial discrimination against Black people.

The Inquiry examined TPS and TPSB culture, training, policies, programs, procedures, and accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and racial discrimination. Finally, the Inquiry examined how the TPS and TPSB respond to findings by the HRTO, civil and criminal courts that police officers engaged in racial discrimination or racial profiling, or where such inferences reasonably flowed from the findings. This aspect of the Inquiry extended beyond 2017, and references in this report to TPS and TPSB initiatives and materials are current as of time of writing, i.e., July 2023.

The OHRC retained Dr. Scot Wortley, PhD (Professor and Graduate Coordinator, Centre for Criminology & Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto) to provide expert assistance with the Inquiry. His role included analyzing data obtained by the OHRC from the TPS and Special Investigations Unit (SIU), as well as survey data.

On December 10, 2018, the OHRC released its first interim report, A Collective Impact, which included Dr. Wortley’s findings from SIU data, case-law review, review of the SIU Director Reports, and the results of the OHRC’s consultation with 130 members of Black communities across Toronto.

On August 10, 2020, the OHRC released A Disparate Impact, which included two reports from Dr. Wortley analyzing TPS data related to charges, arrests and releases, and police use of force.

From Impact to Action, the OHRC’s final Inquiry report, reflects our work with Black communities and the TPS and TPSB. It sets out a path to meaningful actions aimed at changing outcomes for Black communities. It is also a culmination of the work reported in A Collective Impact and A Disparate Impact.

From the outset, From Impact to Action makes the finding that Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism by the TPS. This finding is supported by the evidence gathered throughout the Inquiry, which clearly establishes that services provided by the TPS have a disproportionate negative impact¹ on Black communities. The evidence includes:

• voices from Black communities
• reports on anti-Black racism 
• OHRC and TPS statistical analyses
• voices of TPS officers
• the courts
• acknowledgement by the TPS of anti-Black racism.

The report describes the results of consultations, including a policy roundtable of policing experts and community representatives, a TPS officer survey, and direct engagement with Black communities. The OHRC also conducted interviews with members of the TPS senior command, including the Chief of the TPS, the Chair of the TPSB, and the Executive Director of the TPSB.

The report also identifies gaps in TPS and TPSB policies and procedures in:

• stops and searches
• charges and arrests
• use of force
• anti-racism initiatives and training, and
• monitoring and accountability.

Finally, the report identifies recommendations to fill these gaps and address systemic anti-Black racism.

The OHRC is grateful for the time, patience, participation, strength, and courage of members of Black communities. Despite decades of frustration and trauma, Black communities remained engaged in this process. We heard personal stories, insightful critiques, and forward-thinking ideas that were shared with the expectation that this Inquiry will lead to meaningful change. We are immensely thankful for each of these engagements, which have greatly informed this report.

We also express gratitude to the rank-and-file officers, including Black officers, who spoke to us and are committed to ensuring this report will result in concrete change and not be “just another report.”

The OHRC extends sincere thanks to the TPS, TPSB and Toronto Police Association (TPA) leadership, and the volunteers who make up their advisory committees, including the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP) and Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Committee (MHAAP), for their time and co-operation.

The OHRC acknowledges that policing is a complex and difficult endeavour. The situations and circumstances front-line officers face daily can result in tremendous pressure and strain.

This report is intended to shed light on critical flaws in our public safety and policing systems. However, it should not be perceived as condemnation of all officers. Indeed, in many circumstances, officers are asked to deal with matters for which they are not equipped or qualified – leading to various unfortunate results.

In a recent report on the review of the TPS, the City of Toronto’s then-Auditor General, Beverly Romeo-Beehler, observed:²

[TPS] plays a key role in ensuring the safety and well-being of the people of Toronto through its delivery of policing services. As first responders, TPS officers are on the front lines and respond to a variety of situations. However, not all of the calls for service that TPS has historically responded to are police matters.

In responding to these calls for service, TPS has effectively become the default response in some situations when alternative non-police responses are not in place or not available when needed.

Anti-Black racism in policing in Toronto

The OHRC finds that Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in TPS policing services.

The OHRC has identified six cornerstones that support our finding that TPS policing services have a disproportionate negative impact³ on Black communities.

Voices from Black communities

The OHRC met with approximately 190 individuals from Black communities. They told the OHRC about their negative lived experiences with TPS officers, across the spectrum of interactions including stops, searches, charges, arrests, and use of force.

After the release of A Collective Impact and A Disparate Impact, the OHRC continued to document experiences of Black people involving unnecessary stops, questioning, searches, charges, arrests, and excessive force.

Findings related to intersecting identities

Black communities with intersecting identities and experiences (e.g., people living with mental health disabilities and/or belonging to LGBTQ2S+ communities) have had unique and often difficult relationships with the TPS for decades.

The OHRC acknowledges that multiple and intersecting identities can compound the causes, frequency, and intensity of anti-Black racism for the people who experience it. This report touches on some of these intersections and highlights the unique nature of these experiences.

Reports on anti-Black racism

International and Canadian reports confirm systemic anti-Black racism in policing in Canada.⁴

There are also reports commissioned by the TPS and TPSB that confirm Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in policing services provided by the TPS.⁵

These reports have confirmed the adverse experiences of Black people in their interactions with Toronto police over many years, and echo repeated calls for change.⁶

OHRC and TPS statistical analysis

Racial disparities in data gathered by the OHRC in TPS charges, arrests, and use of force were thoroughly analyzed by Dr. Wortley and his team in the Inquiry’s interim reports, A Collective Impact⁷ and A Disparate Impact.⁸ This current report From Impact to Action includes:

• analysis of TPS street check data and qualitative research and survey data on stops and searches,⁹ and
• analysis of additional benchmarking of TPS charge, arrest, and use-of-force data in an addendum to the expert report featured in A Disparate Impact.¹⁰

These reports affirm that Black people are significantly overrepresented across the spectrum of policing interactions in TPS data gathered by the OHRC, specifically including street checks, charges, arrests, and use of force. Black people are also significantly overrepresented in qualitative and survey data on police stops and searches in Toronto.

The TPS’s analysis of more recent data also revealed that Black people are overrepresented in TPS “enforcement actions,” use of force, and strip searches.¹¹   

While there may be other contributing factors to the OHRC’s and TPS’s findings, many racial disparities are particularly indicative of systemic racism, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in TPS policing services, such as racial disparities that result from proactive police activity or highly discretionary charges.¹²

Indeed, “regardless of the confluence of factors, police services – and other actors in the justice system and government – have an obligation to proactively tackle systemic inequalities that impact” Black people.¹³

Voices of TPS officers

The OHRC reached out to officers through interviews and a public call at the Inquiry’s launch, and a service-wide communication sent to all officers. We received feedback on topics including but not limited to: police culture, training, policies, procedures, accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and discrimination, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities.

Several recurring issues emerged, centred on two broad themes, which support the OHRC’s finding:

• a culture of racism and racial discrimination
• anti-Black racism and racial discrimination in providing services to the public and in employment.

A Black officer summarized TPS culture as: “… if you are pro diversity, equity and inclusion – it means you are anti-White … Our biggest problem is our culture. There’s no sense of urgency for the culture to be different.”

The courts

Case law analyzed by the OHRC confirms systemic racial discrimination, anti-Black racism, and individual racial discrimination of Black people in policing.

The Supreme Court of Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal, and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice have all acknowledged the existence of anti-Black racism in our criminal justice system, including within the TPS. Multiple trial courts and human rights tribunals have also found instances of racial discrimination and/or profiling by the TPS.¹⁴

Acknowledgement by the TPS of anti-Black racism

Over the past five years, the TPS, TPSB, and City of Toronto have acknowledged that racism exists in policing. These acknowledgements confirm the OHRC’s finding.

In June 2022, then-Interim Police Chief James Ramer acknowledged and apologized for systemic racism. Chief Ramer stated that the results of the TPS’s analysis of 2020 data on use of force and strip searches confirmed what Black communities have been telling the TPS:¹⁵ 

That they are disproportionately over-policed. This data demonstrates the unfortunate realities of those experiences. As an organization, we have not done enough to ensure that every person in our city receives fair and unbiased policing. For this, as Chief of Police and on behalf of the Service, I am sorry and I apologize unreservedly.

…

With the release of the initial results of this report and ongoing work, I recognize that today will be a difficult day for many within the Service and within the communities we serve.

It is difficult for the Toronto Police Service because our own analysis of our data from 2020 discloses that there is systemic discrimination in our policing in these areas. That is that there is a disproportionate impact experienced by racialized people and, particularly those from Black communities when there is a use-of-force interaction with the Toronto Police Service.

Gaps in TPS and TPSB policies, procedures, training, and accountability mechanisms

There are significant issues with TPS and TPSB policies, procedures, training, and accountability mechanisms that helped perpetuate systemic racial discrimination, and contributed to mistrust of police among Black people. They include:

• TPSB policies and TPS procedures do not adequately guide officer discretion to stop and search people.

• The TPS and TPSB did not purge historical street check data, much of which is the product of racial profiling.

• TPSB policies and TPS procedures do not provide sufficient guidance to officers to determine whether to lay charges, arrest, or use alternatives.

• The TPSB and TPS did not develop a distinct policy or procedure on racial profiling.

• Anti-Black racism training is not sufficiently integrated into other TPS training programs using scenario-driven, experiential learning modules, and is not effectively evaluated.

• Race-based data is not being collected, analyzed, or reported on:
  
  • all stops, including investigative detentions, protective searches (formerly Level 1 searches), and frisk searches (formerly Level 2)
  • use of force that results in physical injury that does not require medical attention.

• The TPSB’s policy on race-based data prohibits race-based data from being used in officer performance management. The TPS’s early intervention system does not include race-based data.

• Findings in cases were not treated adequately by the TPS and TPSB from a disciplinary perspective, including:
  
  • cases where racial profiling or racial discrimination was found by the HRTO and courts
  • cases where an inference may be drawn that there was racial profiling or racial discrimination in criminal cases with Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) violations that did not assess whether there was racial profiling or racial discrimination.

• Recommendations of the Auditor General and Ombudsman Toronto – including in a review of the implementation of 81 recommendations of the Police Reform Report – are not legally enforceable.

Recent steps taken by the TPS and TPSB to build trust with Black communities and address systemic racial discrimination

The OHRC recognizes that the TPSB and the TPS have taken important steps since the Inquiry was launched to build trust with Black communities and address systemic racial discrimination and its intersections in policing services. For example:

• Then-interim Chief Ramer apologized for systemic racism in 2022.¹⁶

• The TPSB passed its Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting in 2019, which requires race-based data collection, analysis, and reporting on a wide variety of interactions.¹⁷

• The TPS analyzed 2020 race-based data on use of force and strip searches, and committed to the implementation of 38 resulting action items. The TPS’s analysis went beyond the requirements of the regulation under the Anti-Racism Act.¹⁸

• The TPS’s new use-of-force procedure and the TPSB’s draft use-of-force policy, both of which were developed in 2022, require that, among other things:
  
  • de-escalation be continuously considered and used where possible, and
  • officers intervene where they witness inappropriate or excessive force used by another officer, and report it to their supervisor.¹⁹

• The TPSB adopted the 81 recommendations from its 2020 report on Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (Police Reform Report).²⁰

• The TPSB’s new collaborative and consultative approach to policy development, which was used to inform the development of the TPSB’s body-worn and race-based data collection policies.

• The TPS and TPSB’s  consultation and cooperation with the OHRC.

These steps represent genuine progress by the TPS and TPSB toward positive change. It is important to note that such progress was made possible by sustained pressure from Black communities and a social movement demanding change. It also reflects pressure from the OHRC’s two interim Inquiry reports, years of previous recommendations made by the OHRC, and above-mentioned collaboration with the OHRC.  

Remedying systemic discrimination requires systemic change

Sometimes systemic change can be achieved through better anti-discrimination training or policies.

But in some cases, the structure as a whole must be questioned because it is flawed in a way that must be remedied to ensure the cycle of systemic discrimination is broken.

Reimagining the police is at the heart of community calls for “de-tasking and defunding.” It asks: if current systems keep harming Black people, is it not fair to consider whether the structure of the system itself is broken?

As explained by experts, these concepts are about recognizing that many social problems are better addressed by non-policing methods, and ensuring police officers are encouraged and permitted to respond to and address issues for which they are adequately trained.

The OHRC has developed 107 recommendations to address systemic anti-Black racism. The OHRC is committed to holding the TPS and TPSB accountable for implementing them through independent monitoring and legal enforceability.²¹

The OHRC’s recommendations include:

• destroying historical street check data

• providing guidance in policies and procedures on alternatives to charges and arrests
  
  • this includes and builds on an officer’s discretion to use informal warnings, cautions, or diversion programs

• requiring supervisory approval and/or equity audits of charges

• expanding circumstances where officers should not use deadly force or shoot

• expanding the collection, analysis, and reporting of race-based data on stop, searches, charges, arrests, and use of force

• enhancing the early intervention system to include, among other things, race-based data

• providing greater transparency on officer discipline

• taking proactive investigative steps following decisions of the HRTO and courts of racial profiling, racial discrimination, or violations of the Charter

• integrating scenario-based training on anti-Black racism into other training programs with effective evaluation

• developing a distinct policy or procedure on racial profiling.

Some of the OHRC’s recommendations require provincewide action, such as:

• Recommendation 87 on limiting officer discretion to approach individuals in non-arrest scenarios)

• Recommendation 88 on Crown pre-charge screening

• Recommendation 91 on a public review of whether there are situations where officers can be deployed with non-lethal weapons instead of guns.

Other recommendations can be acted upon by the TPS and TPSB, although Ontario would benefit if similar actions were taken across the province, such as:

• Recommendations 40–49 on training
• Recommendations 53–60 on data collection.

The OHRC recommends that the TPSB engage with the provincial government accordingly. 

Conclusion

This report is the first of its kind. It combines quantitative analysis of hard data with the experiences of Black people, chronicling the extensive and long-standing harm suffered by Black communities as a result of discriminatory policing over many decades. The impacts of such harm at a societal level are incalculable. The evidence of systemic racial discrimination and anti-Black racism cannot be ignored.

To ensure real change, the TPS and TPSB must commit to specific, systemic, and concrete actions that are legally enforceable. The decades of reports and calls for action from Black communities show that if the TPSB and TPS are committed to change, they must legally bind themselves to that change.

The TPS and TPSB can take decisive action to end this cycle. They can build trust with the communities they serve and move From Impact to Action.

Endnotes

[1] See Chapter 4 – Consultations with Black communities, community agencies, and police.

The evidence collected by the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) proves conclusively that Black people in Toronto are subjected to systemic anti-Black racism by the Toronto Police Service (TPS).

Concerns have persisted for decades. Members of Toronto’s Black community have repeatedly been the victims of discrimination by the TPS, including but not limited to over-policing, arbitrary stops and detention, carding, unlawful searches and seizures, overcharging, and the disproportionate use of force that in some cases resulted in the deaths of Black people.¹

Over the years, the OHRC has challenged anti-Black racism in policing and advocated for fair and equal treatment of everyone by the TPS.²

Until recently, few people were willing to listen, including the TPS and the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB). 

In 2017, using its unique public inquiry powers, the OHRC launched what it titled “An inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (Inquiry) – the first of its kind in Canada.

At the outset, the TPS, the TPSB and their leaders continued to deny there was racial profiling and racial discrimination in policing – dismissing these long-held concerns with “a few bad apples” excuse. This was also at a time when there was little or no race-based data collection to measure disparities and hold police services accountable.

The OHRC used its powers to obtain and analyze quantitative and qualitative data from the TPS, TPSB, and the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (SIU). This data was assessed together with the lived experiences of Black communities, information from roundtables, interviews and surveys, previous reviews and reports, and court and tribunal decisions.

The OHRC issued two interim reports, A Collective Impact (2018) and A Disparate Impact (2020). These reports proved overwhelmingly that Black people were more likely than others to be stopped, searched, arrested, charged, overcharged, struck, shot, and killed by the TPS. The existence of anti-Black racism by the TPS could no longer be denied.

In June 2022, following the interim reports and a TPS internal review, the TPS acknowledged that systemic racism has led to differential treatment and over-policing of racialized communities, particularly Black and Indigenous communities. Speaking at a news conference, then-Interim Police Chief James Ramer apologized and acknowledged the TPS must act to address this problem:

We must improve and we will do better … As challenging as our findings are, this day presents an opportunity for us to be better and to do better. In fact, because our legitimacy is tied to public trust, it tells us that we must be better. On behalf of my Command as the leaders of this organization, we take full responsibility.³

The TPS and TPSB have already taken some positive steps. They consulted with the OHRC on specific initiatives to begin to act on the Inquiry’s earlier findings. This includes passing a Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting in 2019 (TPSB), analyzing and publishing data on use of force and strip searches in 2022 (TPS), and developing a new draft use-of-force policy (TPSB) and new use-of-force procedure (TPS) in 2022 that will emphasize de-escalation, require officers to intervene when they see other officers use inappropriate or excessive force, and prohibit chokeholds among other things.

The TPS and TPSB have also committed to and made progress on other reforms. These include mandatory training and education on anti-Black racism, expanding alternative responses to calls for service such as Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITS), accepting the Auditor General of Toronto’s recommendations from its 2022 review of calls for service,⁴ and making the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP) a permanent advisory committee. The TPS and TPSB have also made further efforts to engage and consult with the OHRC.

While these reforms are welcome, more can and must be done to effect long-term, sustainable change. This final report, From Impact to Action, builds on our previous findings and identifies the ways in which current TPS culture, gaps in policies, procedures, training and education, and lack of accountability mechanisms contribute to systemic anti-Black racism. It identifies 107 recommendations for additional actions the TPS, TPSB and, in some cases, the Province of Ontario must take to address systemic anti-Black racism, ensure accountability, and ultimately improve outcomes for Black communities.

Policing is complex. The police are often called upon to deal with situations for which they are not equipped. The OHRC recognizes the TPS has “become the default response in some situations when alternative non-police responses are not in place or not available when needed.”⁵ The situations and circumstances faced by front-line officers daily can result in tremendous pressure and strain.

From Impact to Action identifies ways the police can be better prepared and supported in policies, procedures, training, education, and resources to protect against anti-Black racism in policing. It also recognizes the widespread consensus that some of the tasks that currently fall on TPS officers should be done by others with appropriate funding for these non-police responses.

This report builds on previous findings and recommendations by the OHRC and others. It reflects Black communities’ demands for change. It recognizes recent steps the TPS and TPSB have taken to begin addressing systemic racism and improving accountability. Most importantly, however, this report identifies where gaps still exist and what remains to be done by the TPS and TPSB to act on their promise to take full responsibility, do better, and move From Impact to Action.

Chapter 1 - Endnotes

OHRC’s mandate, past findings, and rationale for an inquiry into anti-Black racism in Toronto policing

The OHRC is mandated to promote and enforce human rights compliance and accountability, expose and challenge systemic discrimination, and examine incidents or conditions of tension or conflict from a human rights perspective. The OHRC does this through education, policy development, public inquiries, and strategic litigation.¹

The OHRC has a unique power to hold systemic inquiries in the public interest under section 31 of the Human Rights Code. This includes the power to request documents and data, question people on matters that may be relevant to an inquiry, and use the help of experts to analyze the information and issue findings and recommendations.²

The information obtained in a section 31 inquiry may be used as evidence in a proceeding before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO). However, the OHRC does not have the same power as the HRTO to make legally binding findings of discrimination or to order remedies.

Combatting racial profiling and discrimination in policing has been at the core of the OHRC’s work for almost 20 years. The OHRC has issued multiple reports identifying and seeking to eliminate racial discrimination in policing. They include:

2003: Paying the Price, a report that defined racial profiling and described its effects³

2017: Under Suspicion, a research and consultation report on racial profiling⁴ 

2019: Policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement⁵ 

2021: Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing,⁶ which calls on Ontario to establish a legislative and regulatory framework to directly address systemic racial discrimination in policing across the province.⁷

The OHRC has created resources to help police services identify, monitor, and reduce racial discrimination, including guides to collecting human rights-based data and creating organizational change.

The OHRC has made submissions to the government and independent reviewers advocating for changes in laws to promote accountability for systemic discrimination in policing, address street checks (also known as carding), and make communities safer.⁸ In 2022, the OHRC provided a submission to the Solicitor General on human rights-based data collection, analysis, and reporting on use of force.⁹ Over the years, the OHRC has also engaged in strategic litigation challenging racial discrimination in policing.¹⁰

The OHRC has worked directly with the TPS and TPSB on issues of discrimination. In 2007, the OHRC entered into a three-year Human Rights Project Charter (Project Charter) with the TPS and TPSB, which aimed to embed human rights in all aspects of police operations.¹¹ The OHRC’s role was to “provide advice to the TPSB and TPS regarding their ongoing change initiatives, assist in the development of target change objectives, and to report on the progress of the TPSB and the TPS in relation to these initiatives.”¹²

The OHRC did not have control over developing, prioritizing, or implementing the recommendations. As a result, the Project Charter did not enhance independent monitoring or accountability for systemic racial discrimination.

The OHRC was involved with the TPS throughout various stages of the Police and Community Engagement Review (PACER), which began in 2012 and led to a 2013 report that identified 31 recommendations intended to ensure fair and bias-free policing.¹³ When the report was released, the OHRC took part in a community consultation committee to support implementing the report’s recommendations, and provided direct input into specific initiatives that emerged. The OHRC’s participation on the committee continued until 2018. Before and during the Inquiry, the OHRC made deputations urging the TPSB to address racial discrimination.¹⁴

In 2017, the OHRC launched this extensive Inquiry into racial discrimination and racial profiling by the Toronto police because, despite previous efforts by the OHRC and sustained pressure from Black communities, the TPS had failed to make substantial progress.¹⁵

The Inquiry focused on the TPS because it is the largest municipal police service in Canada,¹⁶ and Toronto is home to the largest Black population in Canada.¹⁷ However, the OHRC recognizes there is systemic racism in policing across Ontario¹⁸ affecting more than just Black communities, and that the TPS and TPSB have pledged to be leaders in change.¹⁹ This is noteworthy because the OHRC expects that this report will have an impact on policing beyond Toronto and Black communities.

The TPS and TPSB have taken important steps since the Inquiry was launched to implement many of the policies and procedures recommended by the OHRC and others to eliminate anti-Black racism in policing. This report provides additional recommendations to the police to further guide and support them in making the necessary changes.

The Inquiry experts

The OHRC retained Dr. Scot Wortley (Professor and Graduate Coordinator, Centre for Criminology & Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto) to provide expert assistance with the Inquiry.

Dr. Wortley’s expertise includes racial profiling and social science methodology. His research on race and policing has been published extensively, including in peer-reviewed journals.²⁰ He has worked with public sector institutions, including the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, the Ontario Roots of Youth Violence Inquiry, the Ontario Anti-Racism Directorate, and the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission.²¹ Dr. Wortley has worked with the Halifax police and police services to study racial disparities. Dr. Wortley has also been qualified as an expert witness by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, and HRTO.²²

Dr. Wortley was assisted by Dr. Ayobami Laniyonu²³ (Assistant Professor, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto) and Erick Laming²⁴ (PhD student, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto) in analyzing use-of-force data, and by Dr. Maria Jung²⁵ (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Criminology, Toronto Metropolitan University) in analyzing arrest, charge, and release data. The OHRC also independently retained Dr. Jung to review a coding error that affected the multivariate analysis of use of force in A Disparate Impact, which has since been corrected – see link in footnote.²⁶

Information-gathering from the police and Special Investigations Unit

The OHRC requested a broad range of documents and data from the TPS, TPSB, and Special Investigations Unit (SIU) for the period between January 1, 2010 and June 30, 2017.²⁷ The Inquiry focused on particular activities during this period to determine their impact on Black communities, including stop-and-search practices, use of force, arrests and charges, and forms and conditions of release for various offence categories. The OHRC also examined post-2017 data on TPS stop-and-question practices, as well as the TPS’s analysis of 2020 race-based data on use of force and strip searches. 

The OHRC reviewed case law, policies, procedures, training documents, anti-racism initiatives, accountability mechanisms, and TPS and TPSB reports. This included thousands of pages of TPS and TPSB documents. The references to TPS and TPSB initiatives and materials in this report are current at time of writing (July 2023). However, we recognize that the TPS or TPSB may have updated relevant initiatives or undertaken new ones that are not reflected in this report.

The OHRC interviewed members of TPS senior command, including former Chief of Police Mark Saunders, former Interim Chief James Ramer, and current Chief Myron Demkiw (who at the time was Staff Superintendent of Corporate Risk Management), a former member of the TPSB, and the Chair and Executive Director of the TPSB. The TPSB also provided written responses to OHRC questions. The OHRC interviewed the civilian Co-Chairs of the TPSB’s Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel (MHAAC) and the former Community Co-Chair of the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP). 

In December 2019 and March 2021, the OHRC invited TPS officers to share their thoughts on the Inquiry and related areas. Only five officers agreed to be interviewed or provided detailed feedback. The OHRC also interviewed two former officers and one current officer who responded to the OHRC’s public call at the Inquiry launch in 2017.

In 2022, the OHRC sent the TPA – the organization that represents “almost 8,000 uniform and civilian members of the TPS”[28]  – a series of questions and received a written response. The OHRC then held a roundtable interview with senior TPA leadership. 

The OHRC conducted a confidential and voluntary online survey of TPS uniform officers below the rank of inspector. The survey was open between October 12 and 26, 2022. Officers were invited to share their perspectives on issues of racism, particularly anti-Black racism, both within the TPS and in officer interactions with civilians. One hundred and thirteen officers provided complete responses to the survey.

Uniform and civilian members of the Black Internal Support Network (BISN), an employee resource group of the TPS, were interviewed. Interviews explored BISN members’ experiences of anti-Black racism within the TPS, police culture, training, policies, procedures, accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and discrimination, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities.

The OHRC provided the TPS and TPSB with a confidential draft copy of this report for their review and response prior to its release.

The OHRC appreciates the participation of rank-and-file officers, including Black officers, who shared their perspectives. We would also like to thank the TPS, TPSB, and TPA leadership and the volunteers who make up their advisory committees, including the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP) and Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Committee (MHAAP), for their time and cooperation with the Inquiry. 

Outreach to Black communities and organizations

At the Inquiry launch, the OHRC committed to “receive information from affected individuals, interested groups and organizations.”²⁹ This included members of Black communities, Black community and advocacy groups, and Black police officers.³⁰

Working with several organizations across Toronto that serve Black communities and/or challenge anti-Black racism, the OHRC held focus groups and gathered Black persons’ lived experiences with the TPS that fell within the scope of the Inquiry. The OHRC met with approximately 190 individuals from Black communities. Their experiences and perspectives on how the Toronto police should address anti-Black racism are described throughout this report.

Organizations that assisted with outreach included:

• Across Boundaries
• Black Action Defence Committee
• Black Legal Action Centre
• Black Muslim Initiative
• Canadian Association of Black Lawyers (CABL)
• Canadian Civil Liberties Association
• Centre Francophone du Grand Toronto
• Colour of Poverty – Colour of Change
• Community Legal Aid Services Program of Osgoode Hall Law School
• For Youth Initiative
• Human Rights Legal Support Centre
• Jamaican Canadian Association
• Midaynta Community Services
• Ontario Justice Education Network
• Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth & HairStory (since discontinued)
• Rathburn Area Youth Program
• Rexdale Community Hub
• Rexdale Community Legal Clinic
• Success Beyond Limits
• Urban Alliance on Race Relations.

The OHRC also consulted with Black community leaders on its recommendations to the TPS and TPSB. The questions for each consultation were tailored to the knowledge and expertise of each community leader/organization. Leaders included:

• Fareeda Adam (Lawyer, Black Legal Action Centre)
• Brittany Amofah (Board member, Urban Alliance on Race Relations)
• Jacqueline Edwards (President, Association of Black Law Enforcers)
• Louis March (Founder, Zero Gun Violence)
• Samantha Peters (Lawyer, researcher and educator at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law)
• Aseefa Sarang (Across Boundaries)
• Dr. Sam Tecle (Jane-Finch Action Against Poverty/Toronto Metropolitan University
• Lori Anne Thomas (then-President, CABL, before being appointed to the Ontario Court of Justice) and Jaqueline Beckles (Secretary, CABL).

For some participants, recounting their experiences meant reliving trauma. And for many, the Inquiry represented yet another attempt to study anti-Black racism in policing, which contributes to “study fatigue.” The OHRC is grateful for the time, patience, participation, strength, and courage of members of Black communities who spoke to us, and is committed to ensuring this report results in real change.

Research and roundtable

In May 2022, the OHRC, TPS and TPSB held a policy roundtable to discuss important systemic issues identified during the Inquiry, and to consider recommendations for change.

Participants included community members, government, policing, other stakeholders, academics and additional experts. Issues explored included: discipline, data collection, training and education, the nature and extent of discriminatory exercise of discretion and the role of Crown counsel, use of force, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms. 

The OHRC also conducted follow-up interviews with some roundtable participants to gather additional information and perspectives. They included:

• Roy Austin Jr. (Vice President of Civil Rights, Deputy General Counsel and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice)
• Paul Bailey (Executive Director, Black Health Alliance)
• Nigel Barriffe (President, Urban Alliance on Race Relations)
• David Bosveld (Founder, Black Education Fund)
• Sarah Caldwell (then-Director of Community Safety and Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General)
• Jennifer Chambers (Executive Director, Empowerment Council)
• James Cornish (Strategic Advisor, TPS)
• Myron Demkiw (then-Acting Deputy Chief, TPS)
• Abby Deshman (Lawyer & Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association)
• Paula Di Nota, PhD (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Toronto)
• Danielle Dowdy (Senior Advisor, TPSB)
• Nishan Duraiappah (Chief, Peel Regional Police)
• Jacqueline Edwards (President, Association of Black Law Enforcers)
• Todd Foglesong (Fellow-in-Residence, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy)
• Nadia Gouveia (Acting Chief Operating Officer, Toronto Community Housing)
• Jim Hart (then-Chair, TPSB)
• Dan Kinsella (Chief, Halifax Regional Police)
• Patricia Kosseim (Ontario Information Privacy Commissioner)
• Bryan Larkin (then-Chief of Police, Waterloo Regional Police Service)
• Stephen Leach (Director, Ontario Independent Police Review)
• Andrew Locke (Director, Crown Operations, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General)
• Andy Marsh (Chief Constable and Chief Executive Officer, U.K. College of Policing)
• Stephen McCammon (Legal Counsel, Ontario Information Privacy Commission)
• Antje McNeely (Chief, Kingston Police Service)
• Stephen Menseh (Executive Director, Toronto Youth Council)
• Ainsworth Morgan (then- Co-Chair, TPS ARAP)
• Anthony Morgan (then- Co-Chair, TPS ARAP)
• Anthony Odoardi (Deputy Chief, Peel Regional Police)
• Kike Ojo-Thompson (EDI Consultant, Executive Director of KOJO Institute)
• James Ramer (then-Chief of Police, TPS)
• Clinton Reid (Founder, Collective Impact)
• Jon Reid (President, TPA)
• Declan Sullivan (Program Associate, Georgetown Law Center for Innovations in Community Safety)
• Dr. Sam Tecle (Assistant Professor of Sociology, Toronto Metropolitan University)
• Moya Teklu (then-Executive Director, Black Legal Action Centre)
• Ryan Teschner (then- Executive Director and Chief of Staff, TPSB)
• Matt Torigian (Distinguished Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs and former Chief of Police for Waterloo Regional Police Service)
• Larry Vieira (General Counsel, TPA)
• Ken Weatherill (Inspector of General Policing, Ministry of the Solicitor General)
• Ian Williams (Director of Information Management, TPS)
• Nana Yanful (Legal Director of Black Legal Action Centre).
• Prior to the roundtable, the OHRC also interviewed Joseph Martino, Director of the SIU.

The OHRC researched best practices from Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom to identify, monitor, and address racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism in policing. This included reviewing recommendations made by previous inquests and reports.

For more information about the Inquiry scope and process, see Appendices 5 (Methodology), 7 (Terms of reference), and 10 (Inquiry letters).

Progress during the Inquiry

In 2018, the OHRC released its interim report, A Collective Impact. It analyzed the data the OHRC had obtained from the SIU and found that Black people were overrepresented in use-of-force cases involving serious injury, shootings, deadly encounters, and fatal shootings.

A Collective Impact reviewed court and tribunal findings of racial discrimination by the TPS. It also reviewed SIU Director Reports that raised concerns of potential TPS officer misconduct such as illegal stops and/or detentions at the beginning of civilian encounters, inappropriate or unjustified searches, meritless charges, and lack of police cooperation during SIU investigations.

A Collective Impact also included the results of the OHRC’s consultation with 130 members of Black communities across Toronto. It documented Black communities’ fear, trauma, expectations of negative treatment, and lack of trust of the police.

The findings in this first report were very troubling and continue to garner public attention. In R v Le, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized A Collective Impact as credible and highly authoritative.³¹ In R v Morris, the Court of Appeal for Ontario cited A Collective Impact when recognizing anti-Black racism in the criminal justice system.³²

In response to A Collective Impact, the TPS and TPSB recognized that:

There are those within Toronto’s Black communities who feel that, because of the colour of their skin, the police, including when it comes to use of force, have at times, treated them differently.³³

The OHRC is pleased that the TPSB accepted the OHRC’s recommendation to collect and publicly report race-based data. The TPSB consulted with the OHRC and communities, and in 2019 passed its Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting, which requires race-based data collection, analysis, and reporting on a wide variety of interactions.³⁴

In August 2020, the OHRC released its second interim report. A Disparate Impact looked at racial disparities in charges and arrests between 2013 and 2017 for offences that involve significant police discretion. It found that Black people were grossly³⁵ overrepresented in discretionary, lower-level charges.

A Disparate Impact also analyzed lower-level uses of force between 2016 and 2017, and found that Black people were markedly more likely to experience all types of police use of force compared to their White counterparts. These gross racial disparities remained after controlling for patrol zone characteristics, including violent crime rate, median household income, and proportion of single-mother households.

When A Disparate Impact was released, there was broader momentum in acknowledging anti-Black racism in policing. The murder of George Floyd in the United States a few months prior had awakened public consciousness and forced many police services to acknowledge systemic racism.

In the face of those events, the TPSB conducted a series of town halls and adopted 81 recommendations from its 2020 report on Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (Police Reform Report).³⁶ 

In 2021, the TPSB also welcomed the OHRC’s release of its Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing, which called for urgent provincial leadership to address systemic racial discrimination in policing across the province. The TPSB “applaud[ed] the recognition by the OHRC that some of the systemic issues in policing require the engagement of other levels of governments that hold the required legislative levers.”³⁷

In 2022, the TPS released its analysis of its 2020 race-based data on use of force. The TPS went beyond what was required in the Anti-Racism Act and, as noted earlier, acknowledged and apologized for systemic racism and committed to do better.

The TPS introduced 38 new action items as “one part” of their commitment to reduce disparate outcomes. These include mandatory reviews of body-worn and in-car camera footage for all use-of-force incidents. Another initiative is incorporating anti-racism and unconscious bias elements into scenario-based and dynamic training that emphasize de-escalating a situation before resorting to force.³⁸

The TPS and TPSB have also adopted a more collaborative and consultative approach with communities and the OHRC. During the Inquiry, the TPS and/or the TPSB consulted the OHRC on, among other things:

• TPSB’s policy on race-based data collection, analysis and reporting

• TPS’s analysis of 2020 race-based data on use of force and strip searches, and the TPS’s resulting action items

• TPSB’s policy and TPS’s procedure on body-worn cameras

• TPSB’s policy on the use of artificial intelligence technology

• TPS’s new use-of-force procedure and TPSB’s draft-use-of-force policy.

The OHRC continues to monitor progress by the TPS and TPSB on the steps they have agreed to take to address systemic anti-Black racism in policing.

These developments are a positive beginning. This report identifies recommendations for many additional important changes that the TPS and TPSB must commit to if anti-Black racism in policing is to be demonstrably reduced or eliminated.

Chapter 2 Endnotes

This chapter summarizes the evidence gathered and analyzed during the Inquiry. The evidence involves the OHRC’s consultations with Black communities and policing experts, and the data analyzed by Dr. Scot Wortley and his team. It conclusively confirms the existence of anti-Black racism within the TPS.

The evidence includes:

• voices from Black communities
• reports on anti-Black racism
• OHRC and TPS statistical analyses
• voices of TPS officers
• the courts
• TPS acknowledgement of anti-Black racism.

The TPS has acknowledged anti-Black racism within the Service and apologized to the Black communities of Toronto. Acceptance of anti-Black racism as an established fact is the first step on the path from impact to action.

The Inquiry’s focus is not on individual TPS officers, but rather the effects of the policing system on Black communities. However, individual officer bias and stereotyping can be related to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism. The failure to properly account for and address racial profiling and racial discrimination arising from an individual’s bias can also have a broader, systemic impact.

Voices from Black communities

Members of Black communities in Toronto have long identified and protested anti-Black racism in policing. For decades, their voices were ignored when they should have been heard, respected, and acted upon.

As part of this Inquiry, the OHRC met with approximately 190 individuals from Black communities, as well as community and advocacy groups. They told the OHRC about their negative lived experiences with TPS officers, including discriminatory street checks, stops, searches, charges, arrests, and use of force. Their experiences echoed what Black communities have been saying for decades. They detailed stories of harm, conflict and/or fear resulting from anti-Black racism in policing. A full account of these voices can be found in A Collective Impact and in Chapter 4 of this report.

Prior reports on anti-Black racism, including reports commissioned by the TPS and TPSB

Decades of government, quasi-government, independent, and media reports have confirmed the existence of anti-Black racism at the TPS and/or made recommendations to address the issue.¹ These reports are summarized in Appendix 4.

Reports commissioned by the TPS and TPSB confirm that Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in policing services provided by the TPS:

• In a 2010 focus group, Black people described instances of being pulled over by TPS officers because they were Black, and shared negative perceptions of the TPS.²
• In a 2013 focus group, Black people described being unfairly targeted and beaten by TPS officers, and TPS officers abusing their authority.³
• The 2014 Report on the Evaluation of the Project Charter noted that racial profiling and carding were identified by “several internal and community participants,” and were “perceived as pervasively and negatively influencing the Service’s relationships with Black and other racialized communities.” Internal and external participants “favourably discussed [then]-Police Chief Blair’s 2009 acknowledgement of racial profiling in the Service,” but noted that racial profiling “was insufficiently addressed by the Project Charter and raised questions regarding its usefulness in combatting this issue.”⁴
• The 2014 Community-Based Assessment of Police Practices Contact Carding in 31 Division – Final Report (CAPP Report) found that people who live in 31 Division, including Black and White people, overwhelmingly believed that Toronto police officers engage in racial profiling.⁵
• The 2014–2015 Intercultural Development Inventory Assessment Project found that officers did not have sufficient intercultural competence. It also revealed a lack of trust between diverse communities and the TPS, and mistrust in the TPS about diversity initiatives and racial profiling.⁶
• The 2017 Understanding the Impact of Police Stops report highlighted research indicating that police stops and searches disproportionately targeted Black people and that Black people were disproportionately arrested.⁷
• The Way Forward, the 2017 final report of the Transformational Task Force, found that in public consultations, “concerns were expressed about individual and systemic bias, racism, discrimination, inappropriate use of force and escalation.”⁸
• The 2018 TPS Organizational Culture Assessment stated that 44% of community members from an online survey and town halls disagreed with the statement that “Members of the Toronto Police Service make ethical and bias-free decisions.”⁹
• The 2019 Perceptions of the Toronto Police and Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16 report found that most Black people surveyed did not agree that the TPS treated them fairly and did not agree that TPS officers were honest. Further, 50% of people surveyed (across all racial groups) believed that TPS officers were not impartial but instead favoured members of particular ethnic groups.¹⁰
• In 2021, in Missing and Missed, the Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations, the Honourable Gloria Epstein found that systemic discrimination contributed to deficiencies in many of the missing person investigations that she examined, and she noted that much work needed to be done to address systemic discrimination “head on.”¹¹
  
  • Justice Epstein noted that Black people have “personally experienced or are well aware of systemic racism in policing” and there is “demonstrated distrust of the police” among Black communities. “The Service has a long history of troubled relationships with the city’s Black communities.”¹²

These reports have confirmed the adverse experiences of Black people in their interactions with Toronto police over many years, and echo repeated calls for change.

OHRC’s data analysis

During the Inquiry, the OHRC retained Dr. Scot Wortley to analyze data from various sources on police interactions with the public.

The Inquiry’s two previous reports, A Collective Impact¹³ and A Disparate Impact,¹⁴ detailed the findings in his expert analysis. Dr. Wortley and his team found that Black people were significantly overrepresented in all areas of policing interactions with the public, including but not limited to:

• arbitrary street checks and stops
• arrests and charges, and
• use of force, including deadly force.¹⁵ 

Since A Disparate Impact was released, Dr. Wortley and his team have prepared two more reports that are included in this final report:

• Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences, and policy options (SQS Report) provided an analysis of data and research on stop, question, and search practices.
• Additional Benchmarking of TPS Use of Force and Charge Data (Addendum Report) is an addendum to a Use of Force report featured in A Disparate Impact.

The SQS Report

The aim of the SQS Report was to review empirical research on anti-Black racial profiling by the TPS – specifically in stop, question, and search practices.

It reviewed various definitions of racial profiling, including the concept of “carding,” followed by a theoretical discussion of the possible causes of racially biased policing.

The report reviewed documentation of racial profiling involving the TPS over the past 25 years, noting that “TPS stop, question and search practices … have had a hugely disproportionate impact on Toronto’s Black community.”¹⁶ 

The report examined street checks in detail, documented the impact of racially disproportionate policing, and looked at policy implications. The full report can be found at Appendix 2. Dr. Wortley’s findings are summarized below.

Understanding street checks

Community members tend to use the terms “street checks” or “carding”¹⁷ to describe being stopped, questioned, and searched by the police.¹⁸

Before January 1, 2017, street checks were unregulated and were:

Originally intended as an investigative tool to capture the information of people who police had reason to suspect of being involved in criminal activity. Over time, however, it grew into a much less focused practice. Some police services began collecting and storing personal identifying information of many citizens without any belief that they were involved in criminal activity, and without much evidence that such databases were particularly useful in solving crime.¹⁹

As of January 1, 2017, Ontario Regulation 58/16: Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibitions and Duties under the Police Services Act (O. Reg. 58/16) came into full effect. TPS 04-14 Regulated Interactions Procedure was revised to reflect the new terminology, and stated that a regulated interaction means an:

Attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information by asking an individual, in a face-to-face encounter, to identify himself or herself or to provide information for the purpose of identifying the individual, and includes such an attempt whether or not identifying information is collected

1. only if that attempt is done for the purpose of,
   
   1. inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed; and/or
   2. inquiring into suspicious activities to detect offences; and/or
   3. gathering information for intelligence purposes;
2. but does not include an attempted collection made by a police officer for the purpose of investigating an offence the officer reasonably suspects has been or will be committed;
3. and does not include an attempt by a police officer to collect identifying information from an individual if,

• the individual is legally required to provide the information to a police officer;
• the individual is under arrest or is being detained;
• the police officer is engaged in a covert operation;
• the police officer is executing a warrant, acting pursuant to a court order or performing related duties; or
• the individual from whom the police officer attempts to collect information is employed in the administration of justice or is carrying out duties or providing services that are otherwise relevant to the carrying out of the police officer’s duties. ²⁰

Michael Tulloch, then-Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, defined a street check as when “information is obtained by a police officer concerning an individual, outside of a police station, that is not part of an investigation.”²¹

He defined carding as “a small subset of street checks in which a police officer randomly asks an individual to provide identifying information when the individual is not suspected of any crime, nor is there any reason to believe that the individual has information about any crime. This information is then entered into a police database.”²²

Stops and searches: qualitative research and survey data in Toronto

In the SQS Report, Dr. Wortley examined research that explored racial profiling in Toronto. Highlighting studies since 1998, Dr. Wortley noted the observation that “little has changed” with respect to TPS stop-and-search practices since the street-checks regulation was enacted is:

Reinforced by a number of recent, smaller-scale qualitative studies. These studies, all conducted since 2017 and the imposition of Ontario’s Street Check Regulation, focus on Black youth from disadvantaged Toronto communities. All of these studies document negative encounters between Black youth and the TPS, including allegations of racially biased stop and search practices. All document how TPS stop and search activities contribute to community distrust of the police, reduce the likelihood that youth will report crime, and increase reliance on self-help strategies designed to ensure personal safety. (see Haag 2021; Samuels-Wortley 2021; Samuels-Wortley 2020; Nichols 2018). ²³

He found that qualitative research involving both Toronto residents and Toronto police officers has produced findings that “are highly consistent with the argument that the Toronto police engage in racial profiling. The nature of these qualitative results has not changed over the past three decades.”²⁴

He also discussed the use of survey methods to document the perceptions of racial profiling in Canada. While there are strengths and weaknesses to this method, he noted that “[t]he results of the … Toronto-area surveys are remarkably similar to the results produced by qualitative studies and studies that examine official statistics from the Toronto Police Service.”²⁵

Police statistics

One strategy for measuring stop-and-search activities is the use of official police statistics. Dr. Wortley examined TPS street-check data from pre-regulated street checks and regulated interactions from 2008 to 2019.²⁶

TPS pre-regulation street-check data, 2008–2014

Dr. Wortley found that Black people were significantly overrepresented in the TPS street-check data compared to their representation in Toronto’s population. For example:

• Black people made up 25% of street checks between 2008 and 2013, despite representing only 8.08% of Toronto’s population.²⁷
• Black people made up 26.5% of street checks in 2014, despite representing only 8.9% of Toronto’s population.²⁸

Between 2008 and 2013, Black Toronto residents were 3.47 times more likely to be subjected to a street check than White residents.²⁹ For every Black person in the city, the TPS conducted approximately 2.1 stops. For every White person, the street-check rate was significantly less than one stop.³⁰ Between 2008 and 2013, the TPS conducted street checks on approximately 61% of Toronto’s Black population, compared to 23% of the White population.³¹

There was a significant reduction in the number of reported street checks between 2012 and 2014. This reduction corresponded with “increased public concern about racially biased policing and community allegations of racial profiling,” the introduction of receipts,³² and the release of the PACER Report. The PACER Report recommended that, among other things, front-line officers no longer be evaluated on the number of street checks completed. However, significant racial disparities in street checks persisted into 2014.³³

Race, age and gender

Young Black men, aged 15 to 24, were particularly overrepresented in TPS street-check data. Although they represented only 0.5% of Toronto’s population, young Black men accounted for 10.3% of all street checks between 2008 and 2013. Young Black men were 20.6 times more likely to be street-checked than their representation in the general population would predict.³⁴

Community-level crime rates

Dr. Wortley found that racial disparities in street checks were not explained by differences in neighbourhood crime rates. Black people were overrepresented in street-check data in patrol zones with high-crime rates and low-crime rates. Black people were “even more highly overrepresented in contact cards collected in low-crime, predominantly White neighbourhoods.”³⁵

This finding directly contradicts a commonly offered explanation that overrepresentation occurs simply because the police are patrolling high-crime neighbourhoods with large Black populations.

Also, Black people were more likely than people from other racial groups to be street-checked both within the patrol zones they lived in and when they travelled outside of their immediate neighbourhood.³⁶

Types of street checks

Street-check data contain categories of reasons for conducting stops. These included: drug-related, biker gang, street gang, vehicle-related, suspicious activity, vulnerable persons check, and general investigation.

Black people were overrepresented in all categories, except for those related to biker gangs and vulnerable persons.³⁷ The 2014 data also confirms that street checks occurred through both pedestrian and vehicle stops.³⁸

Black people were overrepresented in street checks related to “general investigations.” Despite making up 8.9% of Toronto’s population, in 2014, Black people represented 25.8% of general investigation street checks.³⁹ These stops were not the result of a specific traffic violation, criminal investigation, or suspect description.

The overrepresentation of Black people in this category is consistent with racial profiling allegations – that “skin colour makes Black people more vulnerable to general police investigations that do not involve an articulable cause or individualized suspicion.”⁴⁰

Comparison to other Canadian cities

While Toronto is not the only urban Canadian police service that conducts street checks, Dr. Wortley noted that its street-check rate was notably higher than any other Canadian city, including Halifax, Calgary, Edmonton, Peel Region, Ottawa, and Hamilton.⁴¹

Toronto also had the greatest racial disparities for Black people in street checks.⁴²  

TPS post-regulation street-check data, 2015–2019

The TPS placed a moratorium on street checks in January 2015. No street checks were formally recorded in 2015 and 2016.⁴³ On January 1, 2017, restrictions on street checks came into force through the provincial government’s street-check regulation, i.e., O. Reg. 58/16. Under this regulation, the TPS recorded 25 regulated interactions in 2017, two in 2018, and only one in 2019.⁴⁴

However, qualitative and survey research shows that Black people are stopped by the TPS at a rate “far higher than people from other racial groups.”⁴⁵ The research also shows that Black people are more likely to be searched than White people.

Dr. Wortley pointed to three studies that suggest that despite street-check regulations, alarming racial differences still exist with respect to police stop, question, and search activities.

The Toronto Guns and Youth Violence Project involved “in-depth interviews [from 2018 and 2019] with 492 young people, 16 to 24 years of age, residing in economically disadvantaged, high-crime communities within the City of Toronto.” According to the data collected by Dr. Wortley and other researchers as part of that project:⁴⁶

Black respondents (44.6%) were much more likely to report being stopped by the police in the past year than respondents from other racial backgrounds (28%). Indeed, almost a third of Black respondents (31.9%) indicated that they had been stopped by the police on multiple occasions in the past year, compared to only 16.8% of respondents from other racial backgrounds. Furthermore, 27.9% of Black respondents indicated that they had been physically searched by the police in the past year, compared to only 14.6% of non-Black respondents. These racial differences are statistically significant.

Similar results were produced by a study commissioned by the TPSB. The Perceptions of the Toronto Police and the Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16: A Community Survey⁴⁷  described the results of a 2017 survey of 1,500 people. The survey and report stated that street checks or carding:

[…] refers to police officer stopping and asking you a series of questions e.g. your name, age, height, weight, names of your friends etc. and recording this information on a contact card. The information is subsequently entered into a database for possible use in future criminal investigations.⁴⁸

In this survey, 11.3% of survey respondents reported being street-checked by the TPS, and of this group, “21% indicated that they had been street- checked in 2017 – the year that the new street regulations came into play.”

There were also significant racial disparities. Black respondents were 3.5 times more likely to report being street-checked than White respondents, and 19.1% of Black respondents reported being street-checked compared to 5.5% of White respondents. “[A]fter controlling for gender, age, education, income and neighbourhood crime rate, Black respondents were still 2.2 times more likely to be subject to a street check than White people.”⁴⁹

In 2019, the Canadian Association of Black Lawyers (CABL), Legal Aid Ontario, and the Lincoln Alexander School of Law commissioned a survey. Race and Criminal Injustice: An examination of public perceptions of and experiences with the Ontario criminal justice system⁵⁰ described the results of a 2019 Environics survey of 1,450 residents, aged 18 or over, from the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).⁵¹

Dr. Wortley found that in the two years before the survey was administered (between 2017 and 2019):

• 40.4% of Black respondents reported being stopped by the police at least once, compared to only 24.7% of White and 24.9% of Asian respondents⁵²
• 26.2% of Black respondents reported being stopped two or more times, compared to only 11.8% of Asian and 9.8% of White respondents.⁵³

Consistent with the TPS street-check data, Black men were particularly overrepresented.⁵⁴

Racial differences persisted when controlling for “other theoretically relevant variables including respondent age, education, income, immigration status, driving frequency, late-night leisure activities, community crime and disorder, violent victimization, illegal drug use, and criminal history.”⁵⁵ When these variables are taken into account, Black people were:

• 1.9 times more likely to report one or more instances of being stopped by the police
• 2.8 times more likely to report two or more instances of being stopped
• 7.3 times more likely to report three or more instances of being stopped
• 9.0 times more likely to report four or more instances of being stopped
• 6.1 times more likely to be searched by the police during a stop incident.⁵⁶

Dr. Wortley said: “racial differences are much more pronounced among City of Toronto respondents than respondents who live elsewhere in the GTA (i.e., Peel, Durham, York, and Halton regions).” Black Toronto residents were also “particularly vulnerable to multiple police stops.”⁵⁷

For example, 32.8% of Black Toronto residents reported that they have been stopped by the police on multiple occasions in the two years before the survey was administered (between 2017 and 2019), compared to only 18.7% of Black respondents who live in other areas of the GTA. This is consistent with official TPS street-check data, described earlier, which shows that the TPS “historical street check rate is much higher than other Canadian police services.”⁵⁸

Dr. Wortley notes that the findings are particularly important given O. Reg. 58/16:

Thus, although the Ontario Street Check Regulation may have eliminated the formal documentation of street checks, it has not decreased racial disparities in police stop and question activities. Eliminating the street check paper trail has not eliminated all evidence of racial profiling. This finding also supports the argument that the police should be mandated to collect information on all police stops – not just those that result in a formal street check.⁵⁹

He concludes that qualitative research, involving both Toronto residents and Toronto police officers, has produced findings that are highly consistent with the argument that the Toronto police engage in racial profiling.

Correlation of racial disparities in TPS street checks, stops and searches with use of force, charges and arrests

Racial disparities in TPS street checks and qualitative research and survey data on stops and searches correspond with the racial disparities in use of force, charges and arrests reported in A Collective Impact and A Disparate Impact.

Dr. Wortley stated:

It is also likely that racial profiling and biased police surveillance practices directly contribute to the gross overrepresentation of Black people in TPS use of force incidents. The greater the overall exposure to police contact, the greater the likelihood that some police encounters will deteriorate into use of force. Furthermore, the results of the OHRC’s investigation reveal that, compared to incidents involving White people, use of force incidents involving Black people are more likely to result from proactive policing (i.e., police stops) than calls for service. ⁶⁰

 

Additional Benchmarking of TPS Use of Force and Charge Data (Addendum Report)

Findings from the Additional Benchmarking of TPS Use of Force and Charge Data (Addendum Report) incorporate data that were not available during the preparation of A Disparate Impact. Dr. Wortley and Dr. Ayobami Laniyonu supplement their previous work through additional analysis of use-of-force incidents, out-of-sight traffic charges, and failure-to-comply charges.

Use of force

In A Disparate Impact, Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu compared Black peoples’ representation in use-of-force cases against their presence in the general population, and found that they were grossly overrepresented. This is also known as census benchmarking or general population benchmarking.

While Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu strongly agreed with the reasoning underlying the use of census benchmarking, there are those who argue such a tool will not completely explain racial disparities. Some examples of this position include:

• “Racial groups with high levels of contact with the police are at greater risk of experiencing police violence than those with lower levels of contact.”
• “Those who have broken the law – and targeted for arrest – are at especially high risk of police use of force.”
• “Violent offenders (i.e., those involved in arrests for violent crime) are more likely to demonstrate ‘resistance’ to the police and are thus particularly vulnerable to police use of force incidents.” ⁶¹

To address these arguments, Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu supplemented the analysis of race-based data on use of force by using race-based arrest and street-check data as additional benchmarks in this Addendum Report.

When benchmarking use-of-force incidents against street checks between 2008 and 2013, the results indicate that Black people remain overrepresented in TPS use-of-force statistics.⁶²

Using street checks as a benchmark, Black people are in fact significantly overrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents, SIU shooting investigations, and TPS use-of-force incidents that resulted in civilian death. Black people are still grossly overrepresented in TPS shooting deaths.

Drs Wortley and Laniyonu explain overrepresentation in their report:

As discussed in our earlier report, there is no set standard for determining when racial disproportionality (i.e., the over- or under-representation of a particular racial group with respect to a specific social outcome) is cause for concern. However, for the purposes of this study, we have used a relatively high threshold of 50%. In other words, for the purposes of the present analysis, an Odds Ratio of 1.50 or higher will be used to determine whether the over-representation of Black people in TPS use of force cases is noteworthy or not. At times we will discuss the notion of “gross” racial disparity. For the purposes of this report, a gross racial disparity exists when the level of over-representation is 200% or greater (i.e., as indicated by an odds ratio of 3.00 or higher)…

Odds ratios were calculated by dividing the percentage of all use of force cases involving Black people by their percent representation within each benchmark. An odds ratio approaching 1.00 indicates that Black people are neither overrepresented nor under-represented in use of force cases. An odds ratio less than 1.00 indicates that Black people are underrepresented in use of force incidents. An OR greater than 1.00 indicates that Black people are overrepresented in use of force cases. For example, an OR of 2.00 would indicate that Black people are twice as involved in TPS use of force cases as they are in the population benchmark under consideration. By contrast, an odds ratio of 0.50 would indicates that Black people are 50% less represented in use of force cases than their proportion of the benchmark population would predict.

Street-check benchmarks did produce lower odds ratios than general-population benchmarks.

This finding suggests that higher rates of police contact may help explain the overrepresentation of Black people in TPS use of force statistics. These results are also consistent with other report findings which suggest that, compared to cases involving White people, use of force incidents involving Black people are more likely to involve proactive policing practices (i.e., traffic stops). Overall, these findings are consistent with the argument that racial profiling contributes to the overrepresentation of Black people in use of force incidents by increasing the number of negative, involuntary contacts between the police and Black residents. The higher the number of negative, involuntary contacts, the greater the likelihood that some cases will devolve into an incident involving police use of force. ⁶³

Using the arrest benchmark, Black people were still significantly overrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents, TPS use-of-force incidents that resulted in civilian death, and TPS shooting deaths. Black people were also overrepresented in TPS shootings and SIU use-of-force investigations, but below the 1.5 noteworthy threshold⁶⁴ for a disproportionality.⁶⁵ The results are very similar using the TPS arrests for property crime benchmark as they are for the total arrest benchmark.⁶⁶

Using TPS arrests for violent crime as a benchmark, Black people remain significantly overrepresented in use-of-force incidents that resulted in civilian death and TPS shooting deaths. Black people were also overrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents and SIU shooting investigations, but below the 1.5 noteworthy threshold for a disproportionality.⁶⁷

Using TPS arrests for “serious” violent crime⁶⁸ as a benchmark, Black people remain significantly overrepresented in TPS fatal shootings. However, when using firearms-related arrests as a benchmark, Black people were overrepresented in TPS fatal shootings, but below the 1.5 noteworthy threshold for a disproportionality. Black people were also underrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents and SIU use-of-force investigations. However, due to very small numbers,⁶⁹ the use of “serious violence” to benchmark use-of-force incidents may be statistically problematic.”⁷⁰

It is important to note that the analysis presented shows that using street-check and arrest benchmarking practices reduces – but does not eliminate – the overrepresentation of Black people in TPS use-of-force incidents.

In other words, even when we consider the proportion of arrests that involve Black suspects, Black people remain significantly overrepresented in TPS use of force incidents -- including police shootings and shooting deaths. These findings, in our opinion, provide further evidence that racial bias contributes to racial disparities in TPS use of force.⁷¹

According to Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu, some may interpret the findings that “the more serious the arrest category – the less significant the overrepresentation of Black people” as “‘evidence’ that it is ‘serious criminal behaviour,’ not race, that explains why Black people are more likely to be involved in TPS use of force incidents[.]”⁷²

However, such an interpretation “should only be considered with great caution. Indeed, aggregate-level associations between arrest statistics and use of force statistics diverge significantly from the information provided in individual case files.”⁷³ For example:

• The fact that Black people are overrepresented in TPS arrest statistics may be misinterpreted as evidence that the Black individuals involved in police use of force incidents have lengthy criminal records involving violent offences and are thus “known to be dangerous” during police encounters. However, between 2013 and 2017, 55.6% of the Black people involved in SIU use of force investigations had no previous criminal record.⁷⁴
• The fact that Black people are overrepresented in firearms arrests may give the impression that the Black individuals involved in TPS use of force cases were often usually armed with a gun at the time of the incident. This is not the case. The data indicate that, between 2013 and 2017, two-thirds of the Black individuals involved in SIU investigations were unarmed during the use of force incident. Only 8.3% were in possession of a firearm. 
• [In addition,] very few of the TPS use of force cases analyzed (lower-level and SIU cases) involved an attempt to arrest a suspect for a serious violent offence like homicide, attempted homicide, aggravated assault, or firearms possession.⁷⁵

The potential explanation for why Black people were overrepresented in TPS arrests for violent crime while most Black people involved in use-of- force incidents were unarmed and did not have a criminal record is that officers stereotype Black people “as potentially dangerous.”⁷⁶ This explanation is supported by the TPS’s analysis of its 2020 use-of-force data (see below), which found that this:

… overrepresentation cannot be explained by other factors including age, gender, nature of police contact, arrest statistics, or the presence of weapons. For example, consistent with the racialized fear or stereotype argument, the TPS analysis reveals that, in 2020, TPS officers were 2.3 times more likely to point a firearm at an unarmed Black person than an unarmed White person.⁷⁷

Finally, in the Addendum Report, Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu supplemented the multivariate analysis of use of force in A Disparate Impact by benchmarking using race-based arrests and street-check data. They noted that “benchmarking on street checks and arrests should be considered conservative estimates of racial disparities.”⁷⁸ Overall, the results of the multivariate analysis using these additional benchmarking techniques are consistent with the results presented in A Disparate Impact “with some important caveats:”⁷⁹

We find that Black Torontonians are still far more likely to experience force relative to White Torontonians, and that other racialized minorities are less likely to experience force than White Torontonians, even when race-specific rates of contact with the police and race-specific arrests are set as benchmarks. The relative risk that Black Torontonians will experience force estimated in these models, however, is smaller than the relative risk estimated in the main report (A Disparate Impact). Also, we do not estimate a statistically significant difference between risk of force between Black and White Torontonians when arrests for violent crimes are set as the population at risk for force.

 Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu concluded that:

Despite controlling for violent crime and other patrol zone factors, however, our overall finding is that racial disparities persist and remain troubling. That is, they point to the unjustified and disparate involvement of Black Torontonians in force incidents that can erode mental and physical wellbeing, police legitimacy, success in school for children, and trust in government.⁸⁰

Out-of-sight driving offences

Out-of-sight driving offences are those that cannot be observed by an officer, and are only identified once a traffic stop has been initiated. They can include driving without a licence, driving while suspended, driving without insurance, and driving without proper vehicle registration.

Using estimates of Toronto’s driving population as an additional benchmark, Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu found that the overrepresentation of Black people in out-of-sight driving offences increased when compared to using the general population of Toronto as a benchmark.

Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu drew upon data from the 2016 Canadian census that captured the “number of Toronto residents who drove to work using a car, truck, or other personal motor vehicle.” According to Dr. Wortley, “commute to work estimates may be considered superior to population benchmarks because they better capture the driving population (i.e., those who are of the legal driving age and have access to a motor vehicle)” but they are “not without their limitations” (e.g., they don’t capture people who use a car frequently for leisure purposes or to go to school).⁸¹

Drs. Wortley and Laniyonu concluded that “Black people remain grossly overrepresented in TPS out-of-sight traffic charges.”⁸²

In fact, the overrepresentation of Black people – particularly Black women – increases when we use the driving benchmark as opposed to the general population benchmark. These findings are consistent with both police statistics and survey data that suggest that Black people are much more likely to be stopped and questioned by TPS officers than people from other racial backgrounds. Together, these findings strongly support the argument that the TPS has engaged in racial profiling. ⁸³

Using the general population benchmark, Black people were 4.0 times more likely to be involved in an out-of-sight driving offence than their presence in the general population would predict. However, using the driving population benchmark, Black people were 5.1 times more likely to be involved in an out-of-sight driving offence than their presence in the driving population would predict.⁸⁴

Failure to comply

Failure to comply is a criminal offence that one can be charged with if they do not follow a court order or a police undertaking, such as conditions imposed when a person is on probation or terms of release when a person has been charged with an offence.

Using arrest statistics as a benchmark, Dr. Wortley found that Black people were 1.3 times more likely to be charged with failure-to-comply charges than their representation in arrest statistics, which is less than the 1.5 times threshold established by Dr. Wortley for a noteworthy disproportionality. Using the arrest benchmark significantly reduced the overrepresentation of Black people in failure-to-comply charges.

However, according to Dr. Wortley, this reduction in Black overrepresentation “does not eliminate evidence of the possibility of racial bias.”⁸⁵ One must look at the many steps involved in the application and enforcement of release conditions that could affect the representation of Black people in failure-to-comply charges.⁸⁶

TPS and TPSB’s reports and statistical analyses

Multiple surveys, reports, and studies commissioned by the TPS and TPSB themselves have confirmed that Black people are subjected to systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in policing services provided by the TPS.⁸⁷

Recently, as part of its Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy, the TPS commendably analyzed race-based data from 2020 on use-of-force incidents that involved the completion of provincial use-of-force reports, and strip searches.

This data confirms the OHRC’s finding of anti-Black racism in policing in Toronto.⁸⁸ In particular, it confirms that in 2020, Black people were disproportionately the subject of:

• enforcement actions
• strip searches
• use of force.

Enforcement actions

The TPS used “enforcement actions” as a benchmark to determine whether there were racial disparities in its engagement with the community. They were considered a measure of police contact and were defined as:

All incident reports of arrests resulting in charges (including released at scene) or released without charges, Provincial Offences Act Part III tickets (serious offences), summons, cautions, diversions, apprehensions, and those with the role type of “subject” or “suspect.” It excludes police interactions related to victims, complainants, witnesses, traffic or pedestrian stops, lower levels of tickets, and parking enforcement.⁸⁹ 

The TPS’s data demonstrates that TPS enforcement actions disproportionately impacted members of Black communities.

Although only 10.2% of the Toronto population in 2020:

• Black people comprised 22.6% of the people involved in “enforcement actions”; and
• Black people were 2.2 times overrepresented in “enforcement actions” compared to their presence in Toronto in 2020.⁹⁰

Strip searches

The TPS’s data also revealed that Black people were disproportionately impacted by strip searches.

Although only 10.2% of Toronto’s population in 2020:

• Black people comprised 31% (2,223) of all police strip searches;⁹¹ and
• Black people were overrepresented in strip searches even when benchmarking based on arrests. On that analysis, Black people were 1.1 times overrepresented.⁹²

Use of force

Although only 10.2% of Toronto’s population in 2020:

• Black people comprised 39% of people involved in use of force incidents (482 people);⁹³
• Black people remain overrepresented in use of force incidents even when benchmarking based on “enforcement actions” rather than population statistics in the census;⁹⁴
• Black people and Black youth (under the age of 17) were 1.6 and 1.5 times overrepresented in use of force incidents respectively compared to their presence in enforcement action;⁹⁵ and
• Black people were also 2.3 times more likely than White people to have firearms pointed at them by an officer where no civilian weapons were perceived by the officer.⁹⁶

Voices of TPS officers

During the Inquiry, the OHRC interviewed 12 officers, seven of whom were members of the Black Internal Support Network (BISN), an employee group within the TPS. Our goal was to learn about police culture, training, policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and discrimination, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities.

The officers gave personal and poignant examples of their experiences with anti-Black racism and racial discrimination within the TPS. They discussed how the TPS culture perpetuates racism and discrimination. Furthermore, the culture resists any actions or attempts at change, including education, training, and increased diversity of service at the member and leadership levels.

The officers also gave first-hand accounts of the anti-Black racism and discrimination they observed in the provision of services to the public. The OHRC appreciates the courage of these officers in coming forward and speaking so candidly with us. Their experiences further confirm the existence of anti-Black racism in the TPS. A summary of these interviews is contained in Chapter 4. 

The Courts

The Supreme Court of Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal, and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice have all acknowledged the existence of anti-Black racism in the criminal justice system, including within the TPS.⁹⁷ Multiple trial courts and human rights tribunals have found instances of racial discrimination and/or profiling by the TPS.⁹⁸

The OHRC identified eight HRTO and court decisions decided between 2009 and 2017 that found that Black people were the victims of racial profiling or racial discrimination by TPS officers.⁹⁹

TPS acknowledgement of anti-Black racism

The existence of anti-Black racism was denied for many years by the TPS and other police services in Ontario and across Canada.

However, the overwhelming evidence of racial discrimination and profiling, and the prolonged and resilient voices of Black communities in Toronto, have resulted in the TPS, the TPSB and City officials, among others, to acknowledge the reality of anti-Black racism in policing.

In 2009, then-Toronto Police Chief William Blair acknowledged the possibility of racial profiling within the TPS.¹⁰⁰

In 2017, then-Mayor John Tory acknowledged that “[a]nti-Black racism exists in Toronto” and eliminating it must be the city’s goal.¹⁰¹ Accordingly, Toronto City Council adopted the Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism.¹⁰² The plan recognized that “Black Torontonians face many disparities related to law enforcement” and are “disproportionately affected by racial profiling and over-policing.”¹⁰³

In December 2018, after the release of A Collective Impact, then-Chief Mark Saunders acknowledged that racial profiling and racism exist within the TPS.¹⁰⁴

In June 2020, Chief Saunders acknowledged that anti-Black racism is a “reality”, and the criticism has been “more than fair.”¹⁰⁵

Also in June 2020, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) acknowledged the existence of systemic racism in policing, which they recognized represented “a serious threat to the ability of Ontario’s police professionals to deliver effective, fair, and accountable policing services to the people of Ontario.”¹⁰⁶

In July 2020, following Chief Saunders’ resignation, Mayor Tory stated that, “sensitivity to anti-Black and anti-Indigenous racism and a commitment to ushering in a ‘change in policing’ [were] prerequisites” in choosing the next Chief of Police.¹⁰⁷

In August 2020, then-Interim Chief James Ramer stated that one of his priorities would be to identify and eliminate systemic anti-Black racism in the TPS.¹⁰⁸

Also in August 2020, the TPSB acknowledged that “systemic racism occurs within policing,” it “must do better” and the “status quo is not adequate.”¹⁰⁹

In November 2020, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CAPA) stated:

We have study after study, including government-commissioned reports, that demonstrate we have an issue with systemic racism throughout our justice system, which includes our legal system, our courts and our police services.¹¹⁹

On June 15, 2022, then-Interim Chief Ramer stated that the results of the TPS analysis of 2020 data on enforcement actions, strip searches, and use of force confirmed what Black communities had been telling the TPS for years: that the TPS continues to disproportionately over-police Black communities, among others. Based on the TPS data, he apologized for systemic racism within the TPS:

[Black and Indigenous communities] are disproportionately over-policed. This data demonstrates the unfortunate realities of those experiences. As an organization, we have not done enough to ensure that every person in our city receives fair and unbiased policing. For this, as Chief of Police and on behalf of the Service, I am sorry and I apologize unreservedly…

With the release of the initial results of this report and ongoing work, I recognize that today will be a difficult day for many within the Service and within the communities we serve.

It is difficult for the Toronto Police Service because our own analysis of our data from 2020 discloses that there is systemic discrimination in our policing in these areas. That is that there is a disproportionate impact experienced by racialized people and, particularly those from Black communities when there is a use-of-force interaction with the Toronto Police Service. ¹¹¹

These acknowledgements by the TPS, TPSB, and City officials form an important first step. Acknowledgement of the findings of this Inquiry would be an important next step.

As stated in 2020 by Ena Chadha, then-OHRC Chief Commissioner, after the release of A Disparate Impact:

The time for debate about whether systemic racism or anti-Black racism exists is over. It is time to come together to change law enforcement institutions and systems that produce such disproportionate outcomes – community trust and safety, especially the safety of Black lives, depend on it.¹¹²

Accordingly, the question is, “What can be done about it?” The answers and the OHRC’s recommendations are found in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 Endnotes

_{1] For example, see: Claire Lewis et al, The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1988), online (pdf): https://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/b-cover_page_letter_preface.pdf; Stephen Lewis, Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1992), online (pdf): https://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/report_of_the_advisor_on_race_relations_to_the_premier_of_ontario_bob_rae.pdf; Margaret Gitten et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), online (pdf): https://collections.ola.org/mon/25005/185733.pdf; Jim Rankin et al, “Singled out” series, Toronto Star (19 October 2002), online: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/known-to-police/singled-out/article_abe5f144-b412-5692-8290-683a291a2a37.html; OHRC, Paying The Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (Toronto: OHRC, 2003), online (pdf): https://www3.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/attachments/Paying_the_price%3A_The_human_cost_of_racial_profiling.pdf?_gl=1*1jcuhdi*_ga*MTkwOTEwMjQ1NC4xNjkwNTYxOTk2*_ga_K3JBNZ5N4P*MTY5MDkwNjQzNy4xNi4wLjE2OTA5MDY0MzcuMC4wLjA; OHRC, Policy and guidelines on racism and racial discrimination (Toronto: OHRC, 2005), online (pdf): https://www3.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/attachments/Policy_and_guidelines_on_racism_and_racial_discrimination.pdf; The 2007 OHRC Ontario Human Rights Charter; Hon. Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling, The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008), online (pdf): https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn30240-vol1-eng.pdf; OHRC, Human rights and policing: Creating and sustaining organizational change (Toronto: OHRC, 2011), online (pdf): https://www3.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/attachments/Human_rights_and_policing%3A_Creating_and_sustaining_organizational_change.pdf; “Known to Police” Series, Toronto Star (2012—2013), online: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/known-to-police/; The 2013 Mukherjee Report on Police Carding and Issue of Profiling; Diversity Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014), online (pdf): https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf; Logical Outcomes, “This issue has been with us for ages”: A community-based assessment of police contact carding in 31 Division – final report (Toronto: Logical Outcomes, 2014), online (pdf): https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn000043559042-eng.pdf; The 2015 OHRC Report Under Suspicion: Research and consultation report on racial profiling in Ontario; The 2016 United Nations Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent; OHRC, Under Suspicion: Research and consultation report on racial profiling in Ontario (Toronto: OHRC, 2017), online (pdf): https://www3.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Under%20suspicion_research%20and%20consultation%20report%20on%20racial%20profiling%20in%20Ontario_2017.pdf?_gl=1*1xq9phq*_ga*MTkwOTEwMjQ1NC4xNjkwNTYxOTk2*_ga_K3JBNZ5N4P*MTY5MDkwNjQzNy4xNi4xLjE2OTA5MDg1NDcuMC4wLjA; OHRC, A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2018), online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/TPS%20Inquiry_Interim%20Report%20EN%20FINAL%20DESIGNED%20for%20remed_3_0.pdf?_gl=1*1ahj0je*_ga*MTkwOTEwMjQ1NC4xNjkwNTYxOTk2*_ga_K3JBNZ5N4P*MTY5MDkwNjQzNy4xNi4xLjE2OTA5MDg3MzQuMC4wLjA.&_ga=2.137198521.801170755.1690908715-1909102454.1690561996#overlay-context=en/news_centre/ohrc-interim-report-toronto-police-service-inquiry-shows-disturbing-results; OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2020), online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/A%20Disparate%20Impact%20-%20TPS%20inquiry%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf; Hon. Gloria J Epstein et al, Missing and Missed, Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations (Toronto: TPSB, 2021), online: https://www.tps.ca/chief/chiefs-office/missing-and-missed-implementation/report-independent-civilian-review-missing-person-investigations/.}

_{2] Market Dimensions, “Toronto Police Community Evaluation” (2010) at 10, 11 and 21.}

_{³ Your Voice Canadian Market Research Company Inc., Report on Focus Groups held for the Toronto Police Service (December 2013).}

_{⁴ Diversity Institute – Ryerson University, “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014) at 53, online (pdf): www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf.}

_{⁵ Logical Outcomes, “The issue has been with us for ages: A community-based assessment of police contact carding in 31 Division – Final Report” (2014).}

_{⁶ Mitchell Hammer, Hamlin Grange and Michael Paige, “IDI Assessment Project on Building Intercultural Competence with the Toronto Police Service” (2015) – Executive Summary and Final Report.}

_{⁷ Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner, Understanding the Impact of Police Stops, A report prepared for the Toronto Police Services Board (17 January 2017), online (pdf): https://www.crimsl.utoronto.ca/sites/crimsl.utoronto.ca/files/DoobGartnerPoliceStopsReport-17Jan2017r.pdf.}

_{⁸ TPS and TPSB, The Action Plan: The Way Forward – Modernizing Community Safety in Toronto (2017) at 19, online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/5f/5d/5f5d80b1-16d1-46d8-a116-74bc3acc2c71/executive-summary-mobile.pdf#:~:text=With%20this%20action%20plan%2C%20we,all%20Toronto%20residents%20and%20communities.}

_{⁹ MNP, “Organizational Culture Assessment of the TPS” (2018) at 41.}

_{¹⁰ Dr. Gervan Fearon and Dr. Carlyle Farrell, Perceptions of the Toronto Police and Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16: A Community Survey (May 2019).}

_{¹¹ The Honourable Gloria J. Epstein, Missing and Missed: Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations (Toronto: TPSB, 2021) vol 3 at 720.}

_{¹² The Honourable Gloria J. Epstein, Missing and Missed: Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations (Toronto: TPSB, 2021) vol 3 at 606–611.}

_{13] OHRC, A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2018), Appendix E at 94, online: OHRC www.ohrc.on.ca/en/public-interest-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-discrimination-toronto-police-service/collective-impact-interim-report-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-racial-discrimination-black.}

_{14] OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2020), at 109–110, online: OHRC www.ohrc.on.ca/en/disparate-impact-second-interim-report-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-racial-discrimination-black.}

_{15] OHRC, A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC: 2018), Appendix E at 94, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/public-interest-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-discrimination-toronto-police-service/collective-impact-interim-report-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-racial-discrimination-black; OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (2020), at 109–110, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/disparate-impact-second-interim-report-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-racial-discrimination-black;.Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) – see Appendix 2}

_{¹⁶ Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 4, see Appendix 2.}

_{17] “Carding” is a shortened term for “contact card collection” or “contact card stops,” undertaken by the police when stopping an individual.}

_{18] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 55, see Appendix 2.}

_{19] The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: King’s Printer, 2018) online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-independent-street-checks-review.}

_{20] https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-intera...}

_{21] The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: King’s Printer, 2018) online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-independent-street-checks-review.}

_{22] The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: King’s Printer, 2018) online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/report-independent-street-checks-review.}

_{23] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 21, see Appendix 2.}

_{24] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 22, see Appendix 2.}

_{25] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 35, see Appendix 2.}

_{26] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021), see Appendix 2.}

_{27] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 37, see Appendix 2.}

_{28] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 43, see Appendix 2.}

_{29] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 38, see Appendix 2.}

_{30] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 37, see Appendix 2.}

_{31] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 39, see Appendix 2.}

_{32] Requiring TPS officers to provide a receipt to all civilians involved in street-check incidents.}

_{33] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 42–43, see Appendix 2.}

_{34] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 40, see Appendix 2.}

_{35] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 41, see Appendix 2.}

_{36] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 41, see Appendix 2.}

_{37] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 45, see Appendix 2.}

_{38] See also Jim Rankin et al, “As criticism piles up, so do the police cards,” Toronto Star (27 September 2013), online: www.thestar.com/news/gta/knowntopolice2013/2013/09/27/as_criticism_piles_up_so_do_the_police_cards.html.}

_{39] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 45, see Appendix 2. Black people were also overrepresented in “general investigation” street checks in 2008. Twenty-four per cent of these street checks involved Black people – Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 42, see Appendix 2; The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) unit had the highest Black carding rate of any policing unit. Eighty-three per cent of TAVIS cards were for general investigation and 40% were of Black people – Toronto Star Analysis Package (7 August 2013) at 15–17.}

_{40] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 42, see Appendix 2.}

_{41] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 49–50, see Appendix 2.}

_{42] While Black people were overrepresented in street-check data from all Ontario police services, with the exception of the OPP in 2008 to 2013, the street-check rate for Black people in Toronto was approximately five times greater than the rate for any other Ontario jurisdiction. This includes jurisdictions with a similar proportion of Black people that make up the population, like Peel, where 9.5% of the population is Black, and Ottawa, where 6.6% of the population is Black. Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 52, see Appendix 2; Statistics Canada, Census Profile, 2016 Census, Peel, RM [Census division], Ontario and Ontario [Province] (table), Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-316-X2016001. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, (2017) online: www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E.}

_{43] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 55; see also Patty Winsa & Jim Rankin, “Toronto Police chief Bill Blair suspends controversial practice of carding,” Toronto Star (6 January 2015), online:www.thestar.com/news/crime/2015/01/06/toronto_police_chief_bill_blair_suspends_controversial_practice_of_carding.html.}

_{44] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 55, see Appendix 2.}

_{45] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 62, see Appendix 2.}

_{46] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 56–57, see Appendix 2.}

_{47] Gervan Fearon and Carlyle Farrell, Perceptions of the Toronto Police and the Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16: A Community Survey (2017).}

_{48] Gervan Fearon and Carlyle Farrell, Perceptions of the Toronto Police and the Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16: A Community Survey (Toronto Police Services Board, 2017) at 53 and 96.}

_{49] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 57, see Appendix 2.}

_{50] Canadian Association of Black Lawyers, “Race and Criminal Justice: New report from CABL, Ryerson’s Faculty of Law and the University of Toronto confirms significant racial differences in perceptions and experiences with the Ontario criminal justice system” (10 February 2021), online: cabl.ca/race-and-criminal-injustice-new-report-from-cabl-ryersons-faculty-of-law-and-the-university-of-toronto-confirms-significant-racial-differences-in-perceptions-and-experiences-with-the-ontari/.}

_{51] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 58, “Quotas were set to ensure that the final sample consisted of at least 450 respondents from each of three racial groups: 450 of the respondents identified as Black, 450 as Asian (including people of Chinese, Korean, Japanese backgrounds) and 550 as White/Caucasian.” See Appendix 2.}

_{52] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 59, see Appendix 2.}

_{53] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 59, see Appendix 2.}

_{54] Half of Black male respondents (49.2%) reported they had been stopped by police in the past two years, compared to 25.5% of White males and 29.8% of Asian males. Black women also reported more police stops than White or Asian women – see: Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 59, see Appendix 2.}

_{55] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 60, see Appendix 2.}

_{56] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 60, see Appendix 2.}

_{57] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 28, see Appendix 2.}

_{58] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 61, see Appendix 2.}

_{59] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 62, see Appendix 2.}

_{60] Scot Wortley, Racial profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 71, see Appendix 2.}

_{61] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 4. See Appendix 3.}

_{62] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 6. See Appendix 3.}

_{63] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 7. See Appendix 3.}

_{64] For the purposes of this study, Dr. Wortley used a relatively high threshold of 50%. In other words, for the purposes of their analysis, an odds ratio of 1.50 or higher will be used to determine whether the overrepresentation of Black people in TPS use of force cases is noteworthy or not. Dr. Scot Wortley and Dr. Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 8. See Appendix 3.}

_{65] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 7. See Appendix 3.}

_{66] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 7. See Appendix 3.}

_{67] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 7. See Appendix 3.}

_{68] i.e., homicide, attempted homicide, aggravated assault, and firearms violations, see Dr. Scot Wortley and Dr. Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 8. See Appendix 3.}

_{69] Between 2014 and 2017, the TPS made only 164 arrests for homicide (41 per year), 281 arrests for attempted homicide (70 per year), 911 arrests for aggravated assault (228 per year), and 2,469 arrests for firearms offences (617 per year). By contrast, during this same period, the TPS conducted 110,218 arrests in total (27,554 per year) and 43,245 arrests for violent crime (10,811 per year). Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 8. See Appendix 3.}

_{70] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 8. See Appendix 3.}

_{71] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 8. See Appendix 3.}

_{72] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 9. See Appendix 3}

_{73] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 9. See Appendix 3}

_{74] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 9. See Appendix 3.}

_{75] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 9. See Appendix 3.}

_{76] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 9. See Appendix 3.}

_{77] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022)at 9. See Appendix 3.}

_{78] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 14. See Appendix 3.}

_{79] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 14. See Appendix 3.}

_{80] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 24-25. See Appendix 3.}

_{81] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 23. See Appendix 3.}

_{82] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 23 to 25. See Appendix 3.}

_{83] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 25. See Appendix 3.}

_{84] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 7. See Appendix 3.}

_{⁸⁵ Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 28. See Appendix 3.}

_{86] Scot Wortley and Ayobami Laniyonu, Addendum Report: Additional benchmarking of TPS use of force and charge data (November 2022) at 30. See Appendix 3.}

_{87] Market Dimensions, “Toronto Police Community Evaluation” (2010); Your Voice Canadian Market Research Company Inc., Report on Focus Groups held for the Toronto Police Service (December 2013); Mitchell Hammer, Hamlin Grange and Michael Paige, “IDI Assessment Project on Building Intercultural Competence with the Toronto Police Service” (2015) – Executive Summary and Final Report; Anthony N. Doob and Rosemary Gartner, Understanding the Impact of Police Stops, A report prepared for the Toronto Police Services Board (17 January 2017), online: University of Toronto https://www.crimsl.utoronto.ca/sites/crimsl.utoronto.ca/files/DoobGartnerPoliceStopsReport-17Jan2017r.pdf; TPS and TPSB, The Action Plan: The Way Forward – Modernizing Community Safety in Toronto (2017) at 19, online (pdf): Toronto Police Service https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/5f/5d/5f5d80b1-16d1-46d8-a116-74bc3acc2c71/executive-summary-mobile.pdf; MNP “Organizational Culture Assessment of the TPS” (2018) at 41, online TPSB https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R30_-_Preliminary_report_on_Diversity_in_Human_Resources.pdf; Dr. Gervan Fearon and Dr. Carlyle Farrell, Perceptions of the Toronto Police and Impact of Rule Changes Under Regulation 58/16: A Community Survey (May 2019).}

_{88] OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service, online: OHRC:www.ohrc.on.ca/en/disparate-impact-second-interim-report-inquiry-racial-profiling-and-racial-discrimination-black.}

_{89] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at Appendix C – Glossary of Terms, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{90] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 38 and 45, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{91] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 61-62, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{92] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 76, online: www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{93] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 48, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{94] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 49 and 53, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{95] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 49 and 53, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{96] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 54 and 55, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{97] For example R. v. Parks, 1993 CanLII 3383 (ON CA); R. v. Brown, 2003 CanLII 52142 (ON CA); Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services 2006 CanLII 37566 (ON CA); R. v. Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527; R. v. Dudhi, 2019 ONCA 665; R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34; R. v. Sitladeen, 2021 ONCA 303; R. v. Theriault, 2021 ONCA 517 (CanLII); R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 (CanLII), R. v. Sitladeen, 2021 ONCA 303 (CanLII).}

_{98] For example, Abbott v Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909; Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220; Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155; R v Ahmed, [2009] OJ No 5092 (SCJ); R v K(A), 2014 ONCJ 374; R v Smith, 2015 ONSC 3548; R v Thompson, [2016] O.J. No. 2118 (Ont CJ); Elmardy v Toronto Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074.}

_{99] Abbott v Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909; Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220; Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155; R v Ahmed, [2009] OJ No 5092 (SCJ); R v K(A), 2014 ONCJ 374; R v Smith, 2015 ONSC 3548; R v Thompson [2016] O.J. No. 2118 (Ont CJ); Elmardy v Toronto Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074.}

   _{The incidents that that were the subject of Abbott v Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909; Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220; R v Ahmed, [2009] OJ No 5092 (SCJ); and Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155 occurred before 2010.}

   _{For brief summaries of R v Thompson, [2016] O.J. No. 2118 (Ont CJ); Elmardy v Toronto (City) Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 2074; R v K(A), 2014 ONCJ 374 and R v Smith, 2015 ONSC 3548.}

_{100] Robyn Doolittle, “Racial bias exists on police force, chief says” (30 September, 2009) online: The Toronto Star https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2009/09/30/racial_bias_exists_on_police_force_chief_says.html.}

_{101] City of Toronto, “Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism” (2017) at Executive Summary, online (pdf): City of Toronto www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2017/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-109127.pdf.}

_{102] City of Toronto, “Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism” (2017), online (pdf): City of Toronto www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2017/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-109127.pdf.}

_{103] City of Toronto, “Toronto Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism” (2017) at Executive Summary, 33–35, online (pdf): City of Toronto www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2017/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-109127.pdf.}

_{104] “Toronto police chief acknowledges racial profiling challenges in wake of human rights report,” CBC News (11 December 2018), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/saunders-ohrc-response-1.4940677.}

_{105] Bryann Aguilar, “Criticism of police in wake of protests ‘more than fair,’ Toronto police chief says,” CP24 (4 June 2020), online: www.cp24.com/news/criticism-of-police-in-wake-of-protests-more-than-fair-toronto-police-chief-says-1.4969953.}

  _{Further, as indicated in A Collective Impact, in 2009, then-Chief Blair acknowledged that racial bias exists within the Toronto Police. Robin Doolittle, “Racial bias exists on police force, chief says,” Toronto Star, (30 September 2009), online: www.thestar.com/news/gta/2009/09/30/racial_bias_exists_on_police_force_chief_says.html.}

_{106] Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, statement, “Racism, in any form, is evil” (14 November 2020), online: OACP www.oacp.ca/en/news/statement-racism-in-any-form-is-evil.aspx; Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, statement, “OHRC’s Framework for the Province to Address Systemic Racism in Policing” (29 July 2021), online: OACP www.oacp.ca/en/news/statement-ohrc-s-framework-for-the-province-to-address-systemic-racism-in-policing.aspx.}

_{107] Chris Fox, “Next Toronto police chief must have ‘sensitivity to anti-Black racism,’ mayor says,” CTV News (27 June 2020), online: https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/next-toronto-police-chief-must-have-sensitivity-to-anti-black-racism-mayor-says-1.5002615.}

_{108] Kayla Goodfield, “‘Trust has been broken’: Toronto’s interim police chief apologizes to Dafonte Miller, promises transparency,” CTV News (6 August 2020), online: https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/trust-has-been-broken-toronto-s-interim-police-chief-apologizes-to-dafonte-miller-promises-transparency-1.5053280.}

_{109] TPSB, “Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety” (August 2020) at 2, online (pdf): TPSB https://tpsb.ca/images/agendas/PUBLIC_AGENDA_Aug_18.pdf.}

_{110] Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 1^st sess., 43rd Parliament, Meeting No. 12, 2020, 2, CAPA), https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/SECU/meeting-7/evidence.}

_{111] TPS Media Centre (article by Ron Fanfair), “Race-Based Data Shows Over-Policing” (15 June 2022), online: https://www.tps.ca/media-centre/stories/race-based-data-shows-over-policing/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w80pKL3RdMY.}

_{112] Ena Chadha, “Remarks by Interim Chief Commissioner Ena Chadha at the August 10, 2020, news conference on the release of A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service,” OHRC, accessed October 2, 2021, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/remarks-ohrc-interim-chief-commissioner-ena-chadha.}

The OHRC held extensive consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. Members of Black communities and organizations serving Black communities were engaged through interviews, focus groups, and a policy roundtable with police leaders to discuss pressing policing issues and potential reforms. The OHRC  also interviewed TPS and TPSB leadership, and conducted a survey of TPS officers.

This chapter provides a high-level summary of the results from these consultations, which also informed this final report and the recommendations.

Consultations with Black communities

The OHRC met with individuals and representatives from local organizations that reflect the range of lived experiences and intersectional identities that exist within Black communities. Many of the issues identified in A Collective Impact were discussed again and remain unresolved. For example, we continued to hear serious concerns about systemic racism, police brutality, overcharging, arbitrary stops, and other modes of abusive policing. These consultations further revealed the impact of disproportionate and discriminatory policing.

During consultations, we canvassed a range of possible solutions to the most pressing issues. Some stakeholders advocated for reforms directed toward changing front-line policing and improving accountability mechanisms. Others took the position that law enforcement is fundamentally flawed, and that meaningful transformation requires an end to police services as we know them and the creation of new public safety services.

This section of the report provides a summary of the key issues and potential solutions advanced by Black communities.

Transfer of current police functions to other agencies/organizations (de-tasking)

Members from some Black communities have called for “de-tasking and defunding”¹ and “disarming” in response to the over-policing and instances of excessive force. The OHRC sought to better understand the communities’ perspectives on de-tasking, defunding, and disarming because these concepts also emerged as popular rallying cries and shaped much of the public debate surrounding policing reform in North American cities, including Toronto in 2020.

Calls for “de-tasking” are based on the idea that transferring services or tasks away from the police may help reduce negative outcomes. Many stakeholders stated that allocating funds to social programs instead of policing will create safer, healthier, and more equitable communities that are less reliant on police services.

What we heard from Black participants about transferring tasks to non-police agencies is summarized below. Further discussion of de-tasking and disarming is included in Chapter 7.

De-tasking is generally understood as “the delegation of current police tasks towards more appropriate organizations and institutions, thus reducing the negative consequences of police engagement in unsuitable activities and reducing the police budget.”²

De-tasking may not reduce police budgets. It is possible that entities that assume tasks from the police can receive funding from sources outside of police budgets. In other words, police budgets are not necessarily tied to a particular task. As such, police funding may not be reduced if officers are assigned fewer tasks.

The idea of de-tasking received broad support during the OHRC’s consultations, including from some police officers. One Black TPS officer stated:

I would gladly take a pay cut if it meant more hands helping more people. I recognise that not everybody is a caregiver in our community, but if there are people who actually want to do the work – not just lip service to say, “oh, I could do that,” or “it should be this.” The people ready and willing to be like “OK, I'm ready to be a street social worker,” “I'm ready to attend these calls at three in the morning on a Saturday for somebody who is in crisis.” If there are people there, then yes, please…reallocate those funds.

Because a lot of the calls are not police calls; those calls should be sent to agencies and organizations that are able to deal with individuals without the stigma that comes with being a police officer. Because not every person in crisis wants to see a police officer. They can be very triggering for certain communities, and in my experience, especially communities from other countries where people don’t trust the police at all.³

In an interview following the policy roundtable, Anthony Morgan (Manager, Confronting Anti-Black Racism Unit, City of Toronto) stated:

I think if they were to become a lot more scoped in their work ... the resources that they get [could go] to supporting communities more generally. So, it's not even through police, it's just from council, from city budgets [which could better support] food programs, mental health programs, education programs, job training, all those things.... I don't think it would solve everything, but I think it would address a lot.⁴

Many community members recognized the need to critically examine several of the functions currently assigned to police, and evaluate budgets required for policing services. Responding to people in crisis was routinely advanced as an area where de-tasking could improve community safety outcomes.

We also heard that transferring tasks to non-police community safety providers would help vulnerable communities who are fearful of contacting the police. Persons with precarious immigration status and sex-workers were identified as the types of vulnerable groups within Black communities who could benefit from improved access to community-based public safety services.⁵ Community members also advocated for the creation of new public safety services or phone lines that could serve as an alternative to police service in appropriate circumstances.⁶

Mental health

During our consultations, members of Black communities consistently identified mental health crisis response as a task that could be more effectively performed by services staffed by mental health professionals rather than the police.

They questioned police officers’ de-escalation training and ability to resolve crisis situations non-violently in light of several high-profile police shootings and fatal encounters. Some participants felt the enforcement mindset of police culture undermines relationships with Black people, and erodes the public’s trust in officers’ ability to assist persons in crisis.

Participants took the position that officers are unsuited to de-escalate mental health-related calls, since the very presence of an officer may heighten the anxiety experienced by some members of the public. They referenced the death of Regis Korchinski-Paquet and critiqued the current model for addressing persons in crisis.

They noted that fear and anxiety associated with engaging with police is amplified due to the history of over-policing and criminalization that has shaped their relationship with the police. These conversations included concerns about the disproportionate number of Black persons in crisis who have been fatally shot by the TPS.⁷  

To reduce the number of police officers dispatched to crisis calls, participants noted the importance of effectively screening emergency calls and directing callers to alternative mental health supports.

In addition, members of Black communities supported calls to create a health-care-led response to crisis calls. Trained health-care professionals were viewed as being better equipped to de-escalate situations involving persons in crisis. The unique training provided to health-care professionals, and their ability to respond without the threat of lethal force or authority to charge or arrest an individual were cited as reasons for supporting a health-care model. Participants told the OHRC that an alternative crisis response unit could reduce or eliminate the need for Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITs), which include police officers (paired with mental health nurses).

Nonetheless, support for health-care-led responses to crisis calls was tempered by concerns about anti-Black racism and discrimination within health-care systems. Community members noted that the health-care system is not immune from systemic and anti-Black racism. Careful planning and training must take place to ensure health-care workers who respond to crisis calls do not subject Black people to racism. We heard:

If the intent is just to re-invest in mainstream services, we will re-create an existing problem. We would just be re-creating and reinforcing racist systems. I know people want to move fast. I just hope it will not be with blinders on.⁸

Other police functions

Participants identified other police functions that could be performed by other services. For example, they questioned the logic of sending armed officers to address non-emergency occurrences such as excessive noise and public nuisance complaints.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on de-tasking and reducing the scope of police activities, see Recommendations 7, 8, and 9.

Use of force

Participants spoke extensively about police use of force. We heard that much of the fear and mistrust between Black communities and the police stemmed from interactions where officers have improperly used force.

Some interviewees noted that officers’ discretion to use force, including lethal force, is disproportionately exercised against members of Black communities. They contended that this is linked to stereotypes about Black persons, which cause them to be unfairly viewed as threats. Participants raised concerns about the extent to which race is involved when use-of-force incidents are reviewed. Gaps in this area may undermine efforts to hold officers accountable.

Participants also expressed frustration with the SIU and court decisions that have not held officers responsible for using excessive force because the officers claimed they were acting in self-defence.

Use-of-force options

When discussing use of force, community members routinely mentioned the names of Albert Johnson,⁹ Lester Donaldson,¹⁰ Andrew Loku,¹¹ and other Black persons who were fatally shot by the police. Considering the tragic circumstances surrounding these deaths, they questioned the utility of deploying officers armed with guns to service calls related to low-level criminal activity, persons experiencing mental health crises, or wellness checks.

There were mixed viewpoints on less lethal use-of-force options available to front-line officers. These options include conducted energy weapons (CEWs) – better known as Tasers – and batons.  Acknowledging these weapons were less likely to cause civilian fatalities, participants expressed some support for using these options instead of firearms wherever possible. However, support was tempered by concerns about civilian fatalities linked to CEWs.¹²

Others noted that use-of-force equipment (e.g., guns or CEWs) will not reduce racial disparities in use-of-force data or fatalities. In their view, the goal should be to limit an officer’s discretion to use force in all circumstances. One interviewee stated, “We also have to think about how the police use their bodies as weapons that choke people, beat people, and so forth. They are trained to inflict harm, so the issue is about more than taking away their guns[.]”¹³

We also heard concerns that expanding the availability of less lethal weapons may impede efforts to get officers to use de-escalation techniques without weapons.

Police stops

Members of Black communities and community advocacy groups told the OHRC about TPS officers conducting unnecessary stops, questioning, and searches. Many told the OHRC about being randomly stopped on the street for no reason. Black individuals of all ages have been stopped during normal day-to-day activities, such as when walking on public streets, at work, with friends and family, and in front of their homes.

This is consistent with what we heard across the province in Under Suspicion: Research and consultation report on racial profiling in Ontario. We also heard many stories of unnecessary charges and arrests – some describing an “arrest-first”¹⁴ approach.

Concerns about unjust stops continue despite the enactment of Ontario Regulation 58/16: Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibitions and Duties (O. Reg. 58/16) in 2017, which prohibited officers across the province from conducting arbitrary or random stops.   The OHRC's consultations made it clear that these stops significantly impact members of Black communities and must be addressed. Street checks are addressed in Recommendation 14.

Accountability

The lack of accountability for racial profiling and racial discrimination was continually identified as a concern by Black communities. More specifically, the lack of accountability for fatal police shootings,¹⁵ excessive use of force, and other forms of misconduct have left some with the perception that accountability is an afterthought for front-line officers and oversight bodies, including the TPSB, courts, and tribunals.

For example, concerns were raised about the TPSB’s inability to get the TPS to comply with Board policy directives.¹⁶ Community members also raised concerns about the extent to which the TPSB has adopted and implemented recommendations from past reports and coroner’s inquests. In August 2020, for example, the Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP) recommended that the TPSB implement “a framework to monitor the implementation of the recommendations made by the jury in the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku” almost three years after the recommendations were released.¹⁷

Concerns about accountability and oversight were not limited to the TPSB:

We need a re-assessment of the policing apparatus. The police union and the board, the SIU – 98% of the cases absolve the police of any wrongdoing. It’s not just the boots on the ground. We need to look at all of that. Just dealing with the boots on the ground will not solve the problem.¹⁸

Diversity in employment and promotions

During consultations, the OHRC often heard that the TPS must reflect the diversity of the communities it serves to change or shift its culture of policing. People with lived experience of anti-Black racism can help improve internal processes and shift mindsets that have failed to address anti-Black racism and systemic racial bias in policing.

Participants emphasized that the TPS must consider diversity, demonstrated de-escalation skills, and combatting racism as criteria when assessing who should be promoted. This will help to create a more diverse workplace, including at the senior levels of policing, and help ingrain anti-racist principles throughout the TPS.

For the OHRC’s recommendations concerning diversity in employment, see Recommendations 10, 11, and 12.

Rebuilding trust

Most people acknowledged that the TPS can make changes that could improve its relationship with Black communities. They identified revamping current police practices by eliminating the use of excessive force, and curtailing surveillance of marginalized communities, as steps in the right direction.¹⁹

Some people stated that addressing historical harm to Black communities must be part of the trust-building process. In this regard we heard that changes to current police practices cannot correct past harms, compensate victims of unjust stops and arrests,²⁰ or bring back lives lost during fatal encounters with police. As such, measures to address systemic harm should consider restorative actions and advance overall well-being within Black communities.

They shared that the trauma associated with a negative interaction with the police has the potential to seriously disrupt several aspects of an individual’s life, including their education, employment, and personal relationships. Efforts to restore trust should consider issues beyond the traditional scope of police powers.

Some participants stated that the TPS has limited ability to provide full redress for the historical mistrust and the disparate outcomes that have burdened its relationship with Black communities.²¹ Accordingly, the TPS and TPSB should support restorative efforts led by non-police organizations.

To address the issues outlined in this section, Black communities called for a re-imagination of police services and public safety at all levels of the TPS and TPSB. Accordingly, police leadership, the TPA, and front-line officers must address the barriers – including police culture – without delay.

The communities' perspectives grounded the Inquiry’s report and helped to frame the recommendations to address anti-Black racism within the TPS.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding rebuilding trust and well-being in Black communities, see Recommendation 6.

Roundtable

In May 2022, the OHRC, TPS, and TPSB held a policy roundtable to discuss longstanding issues that have undermined Black communities’ relationships with the police, and to consider recommendations for change.

Participants included members of Black communities, government, academia, policing, and other stakeholders.

Issues explored included:

• discipline
• data collection
• training and education
• the nature and extent of discriminatory exercise of discretion and the role of Crown counsel
• use of force
• accountability, and
• enforcement mechanisms.

The OHRC also conducted follow-up interviews with some roundtable participants to gather additional information and perspectives.

Several themes arose from the roundtable that helped inform this report and the recommendations.

The need for greater transparency and community involvement in discipline

Roundtable participants expressed concerns regarding diminished public confidence in the police discipline processes, and made suggestions for reform. Participants also noted several factors that may have weakened public confidence in the police discipline system, including perceived negative treatment of Black complainants, long timelines, and police officers retiring before a final decision in a disciplinary matter is rendered.²²

Participants suggested that it was important to find meaningful ways to inject community perspectives in the disciplinary process for formal and informal complaints.²³ Involving Black communities at every stage of the discipline process was viewed as a necessary step for advancing public confidence – including the need to increase the level of community input for more complex or serious matters.

Community participants identified the TPSB’s ARAP as a good example of the police integrating the role of community perspectives when developing anti-racism initiatives.²⁴ Police stakeholders identified the need for improved public communication on how the discipline process works.

Improving the system for individual officer discipline

Participants discussed the relationship between systemic discrimination and individual acts of discrimination. They noted that contemporary efforts to address systemic discrimination should acknowledge that systemic issues may relate to the discriminatory conduct of individuals. They also noted that systemic issues are often used an excuse to not address an individual officer’s discriminatory conduct.

Many expressed concern with the power imbalance in the disciplinary process. They felt it focuses too heavily on an officer’s perspective and safeguarding confidentiality at the expense of improving accountability and public confidence.²⁵

In addition, members from Black communities emphasized the need for internal investigators to have increased training and education to identify and handle anti-Black racism complaints. To this end, it was suggested that investigators must be required to have the cultural competency to assess all relevant factors in racial discrimination complaints.²⁶ As one policing representative noted, it is important to assess cultural competence “not just with front-line staff, but also upper ranks and the role of selecting leaders’ cultural relevance and appropriateness to lead an environment in a time of unrest.”²⁷

Training is discussed further in Chapter 8.

Officer discipline is discussed further in Chapter 9.

Data collection, action, and accountability

During the roundtable session on race-based data collection, participants supported an expansion of current data collection efforts. They also emphasized that data collection must promote accountability and lead to tangible actions to address discrimination. 

For example, multiple participants suggested that data could be used to proactively identify problems with an officer’s conduct rather than relying on complaints from the public.²⁸ Another participant suggested that data, along with key performance indicators, could be used by the TPSB to measure the impact of reforms.²⁹

Some participants warned that race-based data collection is not always neutral and can often be used to cause more harm to Black communities and not initiate any form of accountability.³⁰

Roundtable participants also discussed legally binding consent decrees. A consent decree or consent order is an agreement between involved parties made legally enforceable by court order. Recently, consent decrees have been used by in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and various police services to allow the DOJ to oversee and resolve unconstitutional policing.  As a part of this, consent decrees have been used in the United States as a vehicle to translate data collection into action.

Roundtable Keynote Speaker of Roy Austin,³¹ former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, noted that consent decrees forced jurisdictions to collect data, leading “to a rapid decline of improper stop and searches,”³² which had mostly been happening in Black and Brown neighbourhoods.

This decline can be attributed to the work of the DOJ and other organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Association (ACLU) to limit the stops and searches. As Mr. Austin emphasized, consent decrees “…were making a difference. Making a difference on racialized stops. Making a difference on racialized searches.”³³ 

Participants also recommended that the TPSB work with the Information and Privacy Commissioner to develop appropriate privacy guidelines for the collection, analysis, and public release of any race-based and human rights data.³⁴ 

Finally, with respect to qualitative data, participants expressed concern about the role of community consultations in police reform projects. Community participants cited the long history of Black communities being “consulted to death” with little effective follow-up action.³⁵ Considering this history, new efforts to consult with people from Black communities are often viewed as a performative exercise.

In short, participants stressed that consultations should not be used to gather community input and data in isolation. Public consultations must be tied to processes that will inform discipline and accountability initiatives.

Data collection and the OHRC’s corresponding recommendations are discussed at Chapter 9.

Cultural change in policing

 One participant observed that systemic reform in the TPS and building Black communities’ trust in policing will require “a radical re-imagining on how we expect officers to conduct themselves in order to address anti-Blackness.”³⁶

Most participants agreed that systemic reform must include a cultural shift in the role of policing itself. Throughout the sessions, participants emphasized that police leadership must demonstrate moral courage to address systemic anti-Black racism internally and within police service delivery if there is going to be meaningful change.

Neighbourhood policing

Neighbourhood policing programs were viewed by policing participants as a positive model for forming genuine relationships with communities. On the other hand, academic and community participants noted the model has been a contested concept.

Community participants expressed concerns about over-policing and stated that they would like to see less police presence in favour of other types of first responders or service providers. This is especially true for mental health issues, and wellness issues for unhoused persons.³⁷

Consultation with TPS officers on anti-Black racism

It was important for the OHRC to hear from policing experts, leaders, and front-line officers during this Inquiry.

Police officers

The OHRC consulted with TPS leadership and representatives of the TPSB and Toronto Police Association (TPA), and conducted a survey of officers (below the rank of inspector). Each of these groups shared their perspective on how to address systemic discrimination in policing.

At the Inquiry’s launch in 2017, the OHRC reached out to officers through a public call, and again in March 2021 through a Service-wide communication facilitated by the TPS that was sent to all officers. The Service-wide communication advised that the OHRC was interested in officer feedback on topics including but not limited to: police culture, training, policies, procedures, accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and discrimination, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities.   

The OHRC interviewed two former and one current officer through the public call issued in 2017. Only five officers agreed to be interviewed or provided detailed feedback following the Service-wide communication in 2021.  

Four of the five officers who participated in 2021 indicated deep concerns about the culture at the TPS. The officers shared that TPS culture has a firmly entrenched status quo that perpetuates racism and discrimination against non-White Service members, and a common practice of covering for the misconduct of fellow officers. Further, they felt that this culture resists any actions or attempts at change, including education, training, and increased diversity of Service members and leadership. 

They also noted incidents and practices of anti-Black racism and racial discrimination that occur when providing police services, and a common practice of covering for the misconduct of fellow officers.

Interviews with members of the Black Internal Support Network (BISN)

The OHRC also interviewed seven uniform and civilian members of the BISN, an employee group of the TPS, to learn about their experiences of anti-Black racism within the TPS, police culture, training, policies, procedures, accountability mechanisms relating to racial profiling and discrimination, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities.

Everyone interviewed discussed how TPS culture firmly entrenches a status quo that perpetuates racism and discrimination. Further, efforts to address racial discrimination, including education, training, and increasing the diversity of Service members and leadership, were met with resistance. One officer shared that some officers made light of training sessions on microaggressions and discrimination.

BISN members acknowledged the progress made by the TPS in addressing overt forms of anti-Black racism. For example, senior officers noted that incidents of explicit racial slurs and derogatory language that occurred in the 1990s would no longer be tolerated. Overt forms of racism are taken more seriously within the TPS and no longer occur regularly.³⁸ One officer observed increased openness and sensitivity to marginalized community members.³⁹

However, covert forms of anti-Black racism persist. BISN members said these are difficult to raise and challenge. One officer noted there is a “blue wall of silence” that prevents the TPS from substantively addressing race-related issues.⁴⁰ Many felt complaints of anti-Black racism or racial profiling were not handled appropriately in the TPS, as there is a tendency to downplay concerns or suggest that issues raised by Black employees were not connected to racial bias.⁴¹

Members of the BISN told the OHRC that Black Service members were reluctant to raise issues of anti-Black racism because they have experienced denials, reprisal, or harassment when they did so. Members shared that they experienced increased monitoring and scrutiny when they raised concerns about racial discrimination in the workplace.

Uniformed and civilian members also shared their views on the impact of anti-Black racism on service delivery. They described the difficulty of building confidence in policing for Black communities and the historical nature of these concerns in general.

For example, one officer noted that incidents that occurred in the past have a bearing on current attitudes toward the police. The officer shared that early in his career, he was stopped at gunpoint by a White officer while on duty in plainclothes. He stated that it took him “years” before he could speak about it or raise the issue with management out of fear of not being believed.⁴²

He said that the associated trauma of this and other incidents informed his experience as a Black officer and shapes Black communities’ perception of police services. Another officer stated:

Even I find myself shaking when I see [police] lights and I am an officer. We fear that we might have a negative interaction because of our skin colour. This is a daily dance for me that I think about a lot so I know exactlywhy the community is concerned.⁴⁴  

Black Service members expressed support for increasing mental health and social supports and advocating for more government funding for other non-police interventions. Most BISN members acknowledged how, in many ways, policing has failed Black communities, and understood how this history gives rise to calls for restructuring law enforcement and public safety services.

Officers and civilian employees also stated that beyond funding, the police must modernize by developing genuine relationships and “showing their value by working with and not telling people always what to do … finding out what the community needs truly are.”⁴⁵   

Uniform and civilian staff members of the BISN expressed serious concerns about increased scrutiny in the workplace, being subject to harsher forms of discipline compared to their non-Black counterparts, and being passed over for promotions. They also expressed concerns that their engagement with TPS leadership has not resulted in effective change.

In addition, the structures of police governance and police culture were identified as factors that inhibit organizational change. Most Service members described the strong adherence to seniority and obedience, which leaves little room for dissent due to fear of reprisal, harassment, or embarrassment. Individual BISN members also expressed scepticism about the TPA’s willingness to support Black Service members when issues regarding discrimination arise.

Survey

As part of the effort to ensure that the Inquiry included a broad range of policing, community safety, and well-being perspectives, the OHRC worked with the TPS and TPSB to conduct a confidential and voluntary online survey for TPS officers between October 12 and 26, 2022.

TPS uniform officers below the rank of inspector were invited to share their perspectives on issues of racism, particularly anti-Black racism, within the TPS and in officer interactions with civilians. The TPS distributed the survey via an “E-update” email and strongly encouraged participation.

The survey was sent to TPS officers and staff four months after the TPS confirmed that it continues to disproportionately use force and other enforcement actions against Black communities, based on its race-based data collection on use of force and strip searches.⁴⁵

The OHRC analyzed 113 completed survey responses. An additional 152 survey responses were not analyzed because: 11 respondents declined to provide their consent for the OHRC to collect their survey responses, 110 respondents declined to provide name or badge number to participate in the survey, and 31 respondents were not uniform officers below the rank of inspector.

The findings provide a glimpse of some officers’ perception of anti-Black racism within the organization and in service delivery to the public. However, the results are not a representative sample of TPS officers' and civilian staff's views. In other words, the survey results reflect the views of the officers who responded and should not be generalized to all uniform officers. Nonetheless, evaluating the survey results along with the interviews with officers and BISN members provides insight on some Service members’ views about anti-Black racism in the TPS.

Of the survey participants:

• 26% agreed or strongly agreed that there is systemic anti-Black racism in Toronto policing services.

• 62% did not know if systemic anti-Black racism is present in Toronto policing services.

• 66% did not know if there is systemic anti-Black racism in employment at the TPS.

• 77% strongly or somewhat agreed that they were satisfied with TPS and TPSB’s efforts to address anti-Black racism in policing services.

• 66% strongly or somewhat agreed that they are satisfied with TPS and TPSB’s efforts to address anti-Black racism in employment.

In written comments, several respondents indicated that they found existing training to be excessive and unhelpful. Some respondents indicated that bias and racism do not exist in the TPS, and they did not change their behaviour on duty in response to training because they do not treat people with bias. “Repeatedly being told your organization is racist, when it is not, is insulting and it begins to have the opposite effect intended.” (male constable, age 36-40)

The TPS officer survey questions are presented in Appendix 11.

Chapter 4 Endnotes

_{[1] Within the current discourse on police reform, defunding and de-tasking have occasionally been used interchangeably. However, defunding refers to the reduction or elimination of police budgets.}

_{[2] Sarah Tran, “Detasking police and restructuring community safety – Professor Akwasi Owusu-Bempah featured in discussion about police and public safety on The Agenda,” University of Toronto Department of Sociology News, online: University of Toronto https://www.sociology.utoronto.ca/news/de-tasking-police-and-restructuring-community-safety-professor-akwasi-owusu-bempah-featured. Board of the Police Commissioner’s Subcommittee to Define Defunding Police, Defunding the police: Defining the way forward for Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM), online: (pdf): Halifax https://cdn.halifax.ca/sites/default/files/documents/city-hall/boards-committees-commissions/220117bopc1021.pdf.}

_{[3] OHRC interview with BISN member (27 July 2022).}

_{[4] Interview with Anthony Morgan, Manager, Confronting Anti-Black Racism Unit, City of Toronto (28 September 2022).}

_{[5] OHRC interview with Black Femme Legal, Samantha Pieters (18 June 2021).}

_{[6] OHRC interview with Sam Tecle (20 November 2020).}

_{[7] According to Justice Iacobucci, the term “in crisis” refers to a person “whose behaviour brings them into contact with police either because of an apparent need for urgent care within the mental health system, or because they are otherwise experiencing a mental or emotional crisis involving behaviour that is sufficiently erratic, threatening or dangerous that the police are called in order to protect the person or those around them.” See: Iacobucci, Police Encounters with People in Crisis (2014), at 4, para 2; Gerry McNeilly, Police Interactions with People in Crisis and Use of Force: OIPRD Systemic Review Interim Report (2017), at 4.}

_{[8] OHRC telephone consultation with Across Boundaries (15 December 2020).}

_{[9 Albert Johnson, 35, was shot and killed in his apartment by two Toronto Police officers in 1979. The officers were both charged with manslaughter but were acquitted in November 1980. OHRC, Timeline of racial discrimination and racial profiling of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service, and OHRC initiatives related to the Toronto Police, online: OHRC www.ohrc.on.ca/en/book/export/html/23851.}

_{[10] Lester Donaldson, 44, was shot and killed in his rooming house by a Toronto Police officer in 1988. The police said they were responding to a call about a man holding hostages but found Donaldson alone in his room. He was shot for allegedly lunging at the officer with a knife. The officer was charged with manslaughter but was later acquitted. OHRC, Timeline of racial discrimination and racial profiling of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service, and OHRC initiatives related to the Toronto Police, online: OHRC www.ohrc.on.ca/en/book/export/html/23851.}

_{[11] Andrew Loku was shot and killed by a Toronto Police officer in 2015. Loku was shot in the hallway of his residential building, after he was confronted by officers. Loku was holding a hammer at the time. The apartment complex Loku lived in was affiliated with the Canadian Mental Health Association. See: Special Investigations Unit, News Release (18 March 2016) https://www.siu.on.ca/en/news_template.php?nrid=2578; Canadian Mental Health Association, Andrew Loku Inquest, Online: https://toronto.cmha.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ANDREW-LOKU.pdf}

_{[12] Shanif Nasser, “A Young Black man was fatally tasered in his own backyard – now his family is demanding answers,” CBC News (21 June 2020), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/clive-mensah-black-taser-police-1.5655022.}

_{[13] OHRC consultation with Across Boundaries (15 December 2020).}

_{[14] An arrest-first approach includes arresting a civilian first and attempting to determine if there are grounds for the arrest later.}

_{[15] During our consultations, stakeholders regularly recalled the fatal shooting of Andrew Loku. The officer who shot Loku was cleared of any charges by the Special Investigations Unit in 2016. Special Investigations Unit, News Release (18 March 2016) https://www.siu.on.ca/en/news_template.php?nrid=2578}

_{[16] “Under the Police Services Act in Ontario, policies are made by the police service boards (as overreaching direction to the Chief of Police), while procedures are issued by the chief or commissioner of the OPP (as operational orders to all the members of a police service) – Failure to abide by these policies and procedures can be the subject of misconduct proceedings.” See Lorne foster et al. Racial Profiling and Human Rights in Canada: The New Legal Landscape, Irwin Law 2018. At 109.}

_{[17] Anti-Racism Advisory Panel, TPSB Online: https://www.tpsb.ca/advisory-panels/24-panels-and-committees/94-arap.}

_{[18] OHRC consultation with the Zero Gun Violence Movement, Louis March (29 December 2020).}

_{[19] OHRC consultation with Jane Finch Action Against Poverty (20 November 2020).}

_{[20] “With the growing demand for Ontarians to undergo police record checks in order to be considered for employment, volunteer, housing, insurance and academic opportunities, concerns about the negative impacts of non-conviction police records are mounting. Thousands of Ontarians have police records – that they are often unaware of – that could be disclosed on police record checks. A recent report by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association puts the number of Canadians with a police record as high as one in three. Marginalized populations such as those with mental health issues, homeless populations, racialized populations, and those with developmental disabilities come into disproportionate contact with police and are therefore more likely to have a police record.” John Howard Society of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Foundation, On the Record: An Information Guide for People Impacted by Non-Conviction Police Records in Ontario (October 2014) online at http://www.johnhoward.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/On-the-Record-1-FINAL.pdf, at page 6.}

_{[21] For example, the Police Services Act does not explicitly speak to providing social services and other community based-supports that may be required to address social barriers created by police misconduct or racial bias.}

_{[22] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 1 (30 May 2022).}

_{[23] A formal complaint generally refers to a member of the public filing a complaint with a police oversight body, such as the OIPRD. Informal complaints refer to instances where a member of the public expressed concerns to a police oversight body without filing a complaint.}

_{[24] For an overview of the Anti-Racism Advisory Panel, see Chapter 9.}

_{[25] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 1 (30 May 2022).}

_{[26] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 1 (30 May 2022).}

_{[27] OHRC policy roundtable participant, Session 3 (30 May 2022).}

_{[28] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 1 (30 May, 2022).}

_{[29] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 3 (30 May, 2022).}

_{[30] OHRC policy roundtable, Session 5 (31 May 2022).}

_{[31] Mr. Austin was also White House Deputy Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs, Justice and Opportunity. In this position, he co-authored a report on Big Data and Civil Rights, worked with the President’s Task Force on 21^st Century Policing. and helped develop the Police Data Initiative.}

_{[32] Roy Austin, OHRC policy roundtable, Session 4 (31 May 2022).}

_{[33] Roy Austin, OHRC policy roundtable, Session 4 (31 May 2022).}

_{[34] OHRC policy roundtable participant, Session 5 (31 May 2022).}

_{[35] OHRC policy roundtable participant, Session 3 (30 May 2022).}

_{[36] OHRC policy roundtable participant, Sessions 6 and 7 (31 May 2022).}

_{[37] OHRC policy roundtable participant, Session 1 (30 May 2022).}

_{[38] OHRC consultation with BISN member (September 6, 2022).}

_{[39] OHRC consultation with BISN member (September 6, 2022).}

_{[40] OHRC consultation with BISN member (July 27, 2022).}

_{[41] OHRC consultation with BISN member (6 September 2022).}

_{[42] OHRC consultation with BISN member (6 September 2022).}

_{[43] OHRC consultation with BISN member (27 July 2022).}

_{[44] OHRC consultation with BISN member (2022).}

_{[45] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy, Understanding Use of Force & Stop Searches in 2020 Detailed Report. June 2022 Online: https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf;Samantha Beattie, “Toronto Police Continue To Disproportionately Shoot, Kill And Use Force On Black People: Report” Huffington Post (10 December, 2018) online: https://www.huffpost.com/archive/ca/entry/toronto-police-anti-black-racism_ca_5cd57ce9e4b07bc729788862.}

As set out with data and evidence in Chapter 3, Black persons across Toronto are disproportionately stopped and searched by the TPS.

This systemic problem is a result of significant gaps in the provincial regulations, TPSB policies, and TPS procedures that govern police interactions with the public – especially in situations not involving arrests.

Chapter 5 identifies these gaps and ways to close them to reduce random stops and searches.

Support for reforming police stops

In Ontario and internationally, there is ample support for providing greater and more detailed guidance in relation to stops and searches.

In 2022, then-Interim Police Chief Ramer stated, “There is absolutely no place for carding … I know there [are] proponents out there … there is no basis for carding and I would never apologize for not supporting it.”¹

The Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System found that “wherever broad discretion exists, racialization can influence decisions and produce racial inequality in outcomes.”² The Commission recommended that guidelines be created “for the exercise of police discretion to stop and question people, with the goal of eliminating differential treatment of [B]lack and other racialized people.”³

In New York City (NYC), part of the ruling in Floyd vs City of New York found that the disproportionate use of stop and frisk constituted a pattern of racial profiling and violated the U.S. Constitution. Judge Scheindlin ordered the NYC Police Department to revise its stop and frisk policies to meet constitutional standards and New York state law.⁴ This change contributed to a dramatic reduction of stops while crime rates in NYC continued to fall.⁵

In Baltimore, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) found that systemic deficiencies, including in policies, contributed to unconstitutional searches by the Baltimore Police Department (BPD).⁶ The consent decree between the DOJ and BPD includes criteria for conducting searches to adhere to constitutional standards.⁷

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance recommended that governments of member states “introduce a reasonable suspicion standard, whereby powers relating to control, surveillance or investigation activities can only be exercised on the basis of a suspicion that is founded on objective criteria.”⁸

Ontario Regulation 58/16: stops in non-arrest circumstances

As noted in Chapter 3, Ontario Regulation 58/16: Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties (O. Reg. 58/16) was enacted in January 2017.

Its goal was to ensure that police–public interactions are conducted without bias or discrimination, and to prevent random stops of individuals to collect identifying information.⁹ O. Reg. 58/16 applies when an officer is:

1. inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed;
2. inquiring into suspicious activities to detect offences; or
3. gathering information for intelligence purposes.

However, O. Reg. 58/16 does not apply in many non-arrest circumstances. For example, it does not apply where the officer is:

1. talking to a driver during a traffic stop;
2. investigating a specific crime;
3. not asking for identifying information; or
4. executing a warrant.¹⁰

The OHRC has repeatedly maintained that O. Reg. 58/16 has not achieved its purpose and should be broadened in scope.¹¹ There cannot be accountability for racial profiling in policing if only a small portion of interactions is captured under the regulation.

The evidence demonstrates that racial profiling can and often does occur when police are talking to a driver, investigating a specific offence (which can be interpreted very broadly), or when officers do not ask for identifying information. Excluding such interactions undermines the goal of identifying and eliminating racial profiling in police interactions with the public.

Before O. Reg. 58/16, thousands of TPS street checks¹² were documented. Since it came into effect, the TPS has reported conducting only 28 street checks: 25 in 2017, two in 2018, and one in 2019.¹³

When asked to explain the decline, then-Chief of Police Mark Saunders said that front-line officers are not doing a lot of proactive policing because they do not have a lot of opportunities to do so. He said that the TPS had examined whether street checks were continuing, “under a different methodology and calling it something else so it could get hidden, and we didn’t find any of that.”¹⁴

However, A Collective Impact and this report substantiate that the TPS continues to stop and search civilians at a high rate (much higher than other cities in Ontario), and that Black people in Toronto continue to be stopped and searched at a rate far higher than people from other racial groups.¹⁵ See also Dr. Wortley’s findings summarized in Chapter 3 and in Appendix 2.

Given the discriminatory history of carding and street checks, the circumstances where TPS and other police officers in Ontario are allowed to approach individuals in a non-arrest scenario should be narrowed and set out in O. Reg. 58/16. Placing tighter restrictions on the circumstances when officers can or cannot stop individuals would help eliminate random stops – a consistent demand from Black communities and human rights organizations.¹⁶

Improper and disproportionate stops and searches of members of Toronto’s Black communities are compounded because O. Reg. 58/16 does not require police to provide individuals with a full explanation of their rights after being detained.

Section 6(1) of the regulation only requires police to inform the individual that they are not required to provide identifying information to the officer and explain why the police officer is attempting to collect identifying information about the individual.¹⁷ This is insufficient.

According to s. 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), all people have certain rights that are triggered by a police detention. Those rights should be fully explained to the individual being stopped, who may or may not be aware of their rights, or might be too scared or intimidated to assert them.

This is especially so for Black persons who may feel that they cannot disregard police directions or assert their right to walk away, because police will consider it evasive and use it to constitute sufficient grounds for an investigative detention.¹⁸

O. Reg. 58/16 should be amended to provide clear criteria when police officers can and cannot stop members of the public in non-arrest circumstances. It should also be amended to require a full explanation of detained persons’ rights.

For the OHRC’s recommendation related to amending O. Reg. 58/16, see Recommendation 87.

TPSB policies and TPS procedures: stops in non-arrest circumstances

Deficiencies identified in O. Reg. 58/16 are reflected in TPSB policies and TPS procedures guiding police interactions with the public. Specifically, the TPSB’s Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information, and TPS Procedure 04-14, Regulated Interactions share the limited scope of O. Reg. 58/16. They do not adequately restrict police officers’ discretion to stop – leaving space for the police to use their stop-and-search powers in a discriminatory manner.¹⁹

Policies and procedures also do not require officers to advise individuals about their rights upon detention, including their right to leave. This may give rise to arbitrary detentions, contrary to s. 9 of the Charter.²⁰

TPSB policies and TPS procedures should provide clear criteria for police stops in non-arrest circumstances. The TPSB and TPS should not wait for the provincial government to implement these changes. Given their acknowledgements of anti-Black racism, the TPSB and the TPS can act immediately. The acknowledgements are an important first step, but concrete and immediate change is required.

For the OHRC’s recommendation for revising TPSB policies and TPS procedures guiding police interactions with the public under O. Reg. 58/16, see Recommendation 14.

Right to search

Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

To be reasonable and therefore consistent with s. 8 of the Charter, a search must meet three requirements:

1. The search must be authorized by law;
2. The law authorizing the search must be reasonable; and
3. The search must be conducted reasonably.²¹

Broadly speaking, this means that the police do not have the right to search someone unless there is some legal justification.

For example, the police are not legally entitled to randomly stop individuals and search them or their vehicles. Such searches would constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charter, as well as the s. 9 protection against arbitrary detention.

Investigative detention and pat-down searches

The police are entitled to stop people briefly to conduct an investigative detention.  An investigative detention is legal if the police have reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime, and that the detention is reasonably necessary based an objective view of the circumstances. 

The detention should be brief, and the individual must be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention. Where a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that their safety or the safety of others is at risk, the officer may engage in a protective or pat-down search of the detained individual.²²

The scope of the protective or pat-down search is limited to exterior patting of clothing such as pockets, waistband, or areas that may reasonably conceal such items as weapons or implements that may be used as weapons. The search is usually performed with open hands to maximize the ability to detect weapons through clothing. This search may also be described as a “safety search.”²³

Search incident to arrest and frisk searches

The police are also permitted to conduct a “search incident to arrest.” A valid search incident to arrest requires that:

1. The individual searched has been lawfully arrested;
2. The search is truly incidental to the arrest in the sense that it is for a valid law enforcement purpose related to the reasons for the arrest; and

3. The search is conducted reasonably.²⁴

In practical terms, this means that when the police lawfully arrest someone for an offence, they are permitted to search or frisk them for evidence of crime that may be on their person, or for safety reasons.

This may include emptying and searching pockets as well as removing clothing, which does not expose a person’s undergarments, or the areas of the body normally covered by undergarments. Removing clothing such as belts, footwear, socks, shoes, sweaters, extra layers of clothing, or the shirt of a male would all be included in a frisk search. A frisk search may be started in the field and concluded at the station.²⁵

Search criteria

O. Reg. 58/16 does not address police searches. Police searches are addressed by TPSB’s policy on searches²⁶ and the TPS Search of Persons Procedure (01-02).²⁷ However, they do not provide sufficient guidance on the circumstances where protective searches (formerly Level 1) and frisk searches (formerly Level 2) are appropriate.

TPS’s Search of Persons Procedure reminds officers that they must have legal authority and grounds for conducting a search. The procedure notes that a search must be reasonable and justified given all the circumstances, but offers little guidance on how to identify appropriate circumstances for conducting a protective search.²⁸

The risk assessment included as an appendix to the procedure does not address this concern.²⁹ The appendix focuses on searches incident to arrest, strip searches and body-cavity searches. It sets out case law relevant to searches incident to arrest and risk factors to be considered prior to conducting a strip search. The appendix does not include a similar list of factors for protective searches that occur in non-arrest scenarios.

Furthermore, the procedure fails to remind officers that race should not be a factor when considering the grounds conducting a search.

Race-based data collection

TPS and TPSB’s data collection efforts do not mandate race-based data collection on the full range of searches that officers conduct.³⁰  TPSB’s Policy on Searches, the TPS Search of Persons Procedure, TPS Procedure on the Collection, Analysis and Reporting of Race and Identity-Based Data, and TPS Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy do not require race-based data collection on protective searches, frisk searches or cavity searches.³¹

In response to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director’s report, “Breaking the Golden Rule: A review of strip searchers in Ontario,” race-based data on strip searches was included in the TPS Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy.³²

However, the TPS chose to exclude protective searches and frisks from the strategy. Their reasoning is unclear, given the wide range of information being collected about searches. For example, the Search of Persons Procedure notes that, where practical, all protective and frisk searches should be recorded.

In addition, there are forms that officers complete once a search has been conducted – a "search in the field only" form if the person is not brought into the station and a "booking hall search" form if they are. Officers are also required to make notes in their memo books. Each of these tasks provides the TPS with an opportunity to mandate the collection of relevant race data. 

For further discussion and recommendations on data collection, please see Chapter 9.

The absence of guidance gives TPS officers too much discretion and broad scope to engage in improper searches. Given the disproportionate number of strip searches³³ and impact of other searches on members of Black communities in Toronto, the absence of detailed criteria for searches and robust data collection contributes to systemic discrimination. Accordingly, these policies and procedures must be amended to have clear criteria for when a search is lawful.

For the OHRC’s recommendation to improve the TPS Search of Persons procedure, see Recommendation 15.

Street check data collected prior to 2017

The TPS should destroy personally identifiable information from carding/street check data collected before January 1, 2017, unless it is being used for a purpose set out in subsection 9(10)(2) of O. Reg. 58/16, in which case it should be destroyed once it is no longer being used for that purpose.

As documented previously, the TPS engaged in discriminatory carding and street checks for many years prior to (and after) the enactment of O. Reg. 58/16 in 2017.

It is concerning that the TPS collected and retains significant personal data, in particular about Black persons, obtained through racial profiling.³⁴

Many, including the OHRC,³⁵ argued that the data should be destroyed on the basis that it was improperly collected, and the police were never entitled to collect or maintain such personal information. Others argued it should be maintained for future litigation purposes or for possible missing persons investigations.

To date, the provincial government, the TPSB, and the TPS have not purged the information from police databases. Rather, they implemented a regime that restricts access to the data but does not require it to be destroyed.³⁶

Justice Tulloch’s recommendation

In 2018, then-Justice Michael Tulloch examined this issue as part of his Independent Street Checks Review. He recommended that all historical data should be automatically destroyed five years after it was collected, unless it is being used for a purpose set out in subsection 9(10)(2) of O. Reg. 58/16, in which case it should be destroyed once it is no longer being used for that purpose. He also noted that a police service may choose to destroy historical data earlier than five years after it was collected.³⁷

The Regulated Interactions Review Panel recommendations

As required under the TPSB’s policy, the TPSB established a Regulated Interactions Review Panel (RIRP) composed of three persons: a Board member, a retired judge, and a community member. The mandate of the RIRP includes reviewing the Chief’s quarterly report for compliance with the TPSB’s policy provisions on access to historical street check data, identifying trends, and making recommendations.³⁸

The RIRP reviewed the following data in the Chief’s quarterly reports from 2018 about access to historical street check data, which included the following statistics regarding operational access:³⁹

Operational access to historical street check data

The RIRP determined that the information complied with the policy requirements for access to historical street check data. However, the RIRP asked, “What types of investigative reasons are leading to these operational access requests being made?”⁴⁰ The small number of requests for investigative access, particularly in 2018, reinforced the Review Panel’s view that:

• The number of people with access to the data does not seem to align with the requests being made; and

• Based on the trends related to operational access, there is a live question whether maintaining operational access, remains necessary.⁴¹

The RIRP recommended that:

• The TPSB review its policy in light of Justice Tulloch’s, as he was then, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review, with particular attention to the portion of its Policy that currently requires the retention of Historical Contact Data; and

• If the TPSB determines that retaining historical street check data remains necessary (in whole or in part), the Chief eliminate operational access to the data while maintaining access for legal and other related purposes.⁴²

Privacy considerations for race-based data are always important. This is especially true for data collected in the absence of any regulatory framework, as was the case with street check data for several years leading up to 2017. Given that more than five years have passed since 2017 and the passing of O. Reg. 58/16, there is no reason for the TPS to maintain this personal information.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on data collected from carding/street check data, see Recommendation 64.

Chapter 5 Endnotes

^{[1] OHRC interview with the then-Interim Chief James Ramer (26 October 2022).}

^{[2] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at iv, ix and 359. Similarly, in R v Brown, the Ontario Court of Appeal determined that “racial profiling can be a subconscious factor impacting on the exercise of a discretionary power in a multicultural society”; R v Brown, [2003] 64 OR (3d) 161 at para 81.}

^{[3] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at iv, ix and 359.}

^{[4] Floyd et al v City of New York et al, (2013) 8 Civ 1034 (SAS); 12 Civ 2274 (SAS).}

^{[5] Michael D White and Henry F Fradella, Stop and Frisk: The Use and Abuse of a Controversial Policing Tactic (New York: NYU Press, 2016).}

^{[6] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (10 August 2016) at 30–34 and 129–130, online (pdf): https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download.}

^{[7] City of Baltimore, “City of Baltimore Consent Decree” (2017), online: https://consentdecree.baltimorecity.gov.}

^{[8] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “ECRI General policy recommendation no. 11 on combating racism and racial discrimination in policing adopted on 29 June 2007” (Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2007), online (pdf): https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-11-on-combating-racism-and-racia/16808b5adf.}

^{[9]The Honourable Michael H. Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) at Appendix B Order in Council and Terms of Reference, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf. The Report of the Independent Street Checks Review notes that the purpose or objective of the Regulation is not reflected in the Regulation. Nonetheless, the purpose is described in the Street Checks Review as the prevention of arbitrary or random stops of individuals for the sole purpose of collecting their identifying information (at page 83). From the start of the process of drafting the regulation, the OHRC made several submissions to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS) geared towards reducing racial profiling in street checks and other police practices. See OHRC, “Joint Response to Ontario Draft Regulation” (28 October 2015), online: https://studylib.net/doc/9676903/doc---ryerson-university; OHRC, “OHRC Submission to the MCSCS on street checks” (11 December 2015), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-ministry-community-safety-and-correctional-services-street-checks-0; OHRC, “Strategy for a Safer Ontario – OHRC submission to MCSCS” (29 April 2016), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/strategy-safer-ontario-%E2%80%93-ohrc-submission-mcscs; OHRC, “Letter to Minister David Orazietti regarding Street Checks Regulation” (10 August 2016), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-minister-orazietti-regarding-street-checks-regulation.}

^{[10] TPSB, Policy on regulated interaction with the community and the collection of identifying information (17 November 2016), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information; TPS, Procedure 04-14 Regulated Interactions (3 January 2020), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/2e/19/2e194193-4e37-44d5-b151-1432715dcb3c/5060f77e-187d-428c-b753-12145560bb50.pdf; Government of Ontario, “New changes to policing: When and how a street check (also known as carding) can be done” (21 December 2016), online: www.ontario.ca/page/street-checks; Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties, O Reg 58/16, ss 1, 4.}

^{[11] OHRC, “OHRC Submission to the Independent Street Checks Review” (1 May 2018), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-independent-street-checks-review.}

^{[12] Street checks are defined as “identifying information obtained by a police officer concerning an individual, outside of a police station, that is not part of an investigation.” See The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) at xiv, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf.}

^{[13] Scot Wortley, Racial Profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 55. See Appendix 3.}

^{[14] OHRC interview with Chief Mark Saunders (23 July 2020).}

^{[15] see 5, p. 62.}

^{[16] See also; OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (29 July 2021), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing.}

^{[17] Sections 6(2) and 6(3) also set out several exceptions to this requirement.}

^{[18] R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para 169.}

^{[19] OHRC, OHRC Submission to the Independent Street Checks Review (1 May 2018), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-independent-street-checks-review.}

^{[20] Legal opinion letter from J. Michael McDonald and Jennifer Taylor to Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission (15 October 2019) regarding “NS Human Rights Commission – Independent Legal Opinion on Street Checks,” online (pdf): https://humanrights.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/editor-uploads/independent_legal_opinion_on_street_checks.pdf.}

^{[21] R v Caslake, [1998] 1 SCR 51 at para 10.}

^{[22] R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52.}

^{[23] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.}

^{[24] R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77.}

^{[25] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.}

^{[26] TPSB, Adequate standards compliance policy, XXXIXLE-012 – Search of persons, online: https://tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/adequacy-standards/38-part-5/242-xxxix}

^{[27] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021) at Appendix B (8 February 2016), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf.}

^{[28] TPS, 01-02 Appendix B: Risk Assessment – Type of Search (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf sets out case law relevant to searches incident to arrest and risk factors to be considered prior to conducting a strip search. The appendix does not include a similar list of factors for protective searches.}

^{[29] TPS, 01-02 Appendix B: Risk Assessment – Type of Search (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf.}

^{[30] TPS procedure notes that officers may conduct protective searches, frisk searches, strip searches, and body cavity searches. TPS race data collection strategy only reports on strip searches.}

^{[31] Pursuant to the TPS’s Search of Persons procedure, all protective and frisk searches must be recorded on audio and video, and captured in the officer’s memorandum book.}

^{[32] https://www.oiprd.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/OIPRD_Breaking-the-Golden-Rule_Report_Accessible.pdf.}

^{[33] Despite a decline in the overall number of strip searches conducted in 2021, TPS data confirms that there were “slightly higher” strip search rates for Black persons compared to the overall average. See TPS, 2020 Race & Identity-Based Data Collection Findings, online: https://www.tps.ca/race-identity-based-data-collection/2020-rbdc-findings/.}

^{[34] The OHRC defines racial profiling as any act or omission related to actual or claimed reasons of safety, security or public protection, by an organization or individual in a position of authority, that results in greater scrutiny, lesser scrutiny or other negative treatment based on race, colour, ethnic origin, ancestry, religion, place of origin or related stereotypes.}

^{[35] OHRC, “Letter to Minister Orazietti regarding Street Checks Regulation” (10 August 2016), online:}

^{https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-minister-orazietti-regarding-street-checks-regulation.}

^{[36] See Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties, O Reg 58/16, s 9; TPSB, Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information (17 November 2016) at ss 13–21, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information; TPS, Procedure 04-14 Regulated Interactions (3 January 2020) at 3, online: https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/2e/19/2e194193-4e37-44d5-b151-1432715dcb3c/5060f77e-187d-428c-b753-12145560bb50.pdf.}

^{[37] The Honourable Michael H. Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) see Recommendations 8.12 and 8.13 at 230, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf.}

^{[38] TPSB, Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information (17 November 2016), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information.}

^{[39] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[40] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[41] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[42] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

In the OHRC’s second Inquiry report, A Disparate Impact, the expert analysis of TPS arrest, charge, and release data found that Black people are grossly overrepresented in police charges. 

Despite being charged at a disproportionately higher rate, Black people were overrepresented in cases that resulted in withdrawn charges. Their cases were also less likely to result in a conviction compared to cases involving White people.

As set out in Chapter 3 of this report, the data and evidence reviewed since A Disparate Impact confirm that Black people across Toronto continue to be disproportionately arrested and charged.

To their credit, the TPSB and TPS have acknowledged this fact and taken some remedial measures. This chapter identifies important gaps in policies, procedures and practices, and makes recommendations regarding the proper and fair use of alternatives to charges and arrests for youths and adults.

This chapter also examines the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by the TPS in officer deployment and investigations that lead to charges and arrests. This new technology raises concerns regarding racial discrimination.

Disproportionate use of arrests and charges

Disproportionate arrests and charges of Black people have been the subject of multiple reports and studies for over 30 years.

In 1992, the Government of Ontario established The Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Commission) to examine how criminal justice practices, procedures and policies in Ontario reflect systemic racism.

The Commission released its report in 1995 and identified police overcharging as an issue facing Black and other racialized communities.¹ Its surveys and consultations revealed that many Ontarians did not feel the police fairly exercised their charging discretion in interactions with members of Black communities across Ontario.²

Community voices raised concerns that the police were quick to charge racialized persons when they would not charge White persons in similar circumstances, and that charges against racialized persons tended to be more severe or more numerous than warranted.³ The 1995 Commission also received several reports of incidents that were provoked or exacerbated by harsh police treatment, and that resulted in charges against a racialized person.⁴

The Commission studied 217 cases in Toronto courts. It found:

Proportionate to their number in court, Black defendants are significantly more likely than White or other racial minority accused to face at least one drug or weapons charge. The study also shows that these types of charges are significantly more likely to have arisen from proactive than reactive policing. According to these data, 77% of the cases resulting in at least one drug or weapons charge, but only 37% of other cases, stem from proactive police activity.⁵

This report confirms that the overcharging of Black people in Toronto continues. They are overrepresented in discretionary, lower-level charges with a low probability of conviction. For example:

• The charge rate for Black people was 3.9 times greater than for White people and 7.1 times greater than the rate for people from other racialized groups.
• Although they represented only 8.8% of Toronto’s population in 2016 Census data, Black people represented 42.5% of people involved in obstruct justice charges and were 4.8 times more likely to be charged with obstruct justice offences than their representation in the general population would predict. By contrast, White people and people from other racialized groups were underrepresented.
• Black people represented 35.2% of people involved in “out-of-sight” driving charges (such as driving without valid insurance) – charges that arise only after a stop had already taken place, suggesting other motives for the stop.
• Black people represented 37.6% of people involved in cannabis charges, and were 4.3 times more likely to be charged with a cannabis possession offence despite conviction rates and many studies showing that Black people use cannabis at similar rates to White people.
• Despite being charged at a disproportionately higher rate, Black people were overrepresented in cases that resulted in withdrawn charges. Their cases were also less likely to result in a conviction compared to cases involving White people.⁶

Recent steps by the TPSB and TPS

Recently the TPSB and TPS have taken positive steps toward better identifying and addressing systemic anti-Black racism in arrests and charges.

In June 2022, the TPS released an analysis of its race-based data on use of force and strip searches. This analysis looked at “enforcement actions,” which included data on charges and arrests. Enforcement actions are incidents that result in "arrests, apprehensions, diversions, tickets or cautions for serious provincial offences, and includes those classified as suspects or subjects in occurrence records.”⁷ The data revealed disparities – specifically that Black people were 2.2 times more likely to be involved in enforcement actions than their population in the city. This analysis is helpful in identifying and explaining the disproportionate number of charges and arrests faced by members of Black communities.⁸

The TPS prepared a list of 38 Action Items arising from this analysis. The list included some actions aimed at encouraging officers to make use of their discretion in choosing diversion programs or alternatives to arrest and charge.

Alternatives to charges and arrest for youth

The TPSB and TPS have recognized the importance of pre-charge diversion programs for youth.

In 2015, TPSB Chair Alok Mukherjee stated that pre-charge diversion for youth, “would strengthen our model of community-based policing through partnership with community agencies providing diversion programs, contribute to increased trust between young people and the police, and result in potential financial savings by reducing court attendance by police officers.”⁹

Then-Police Chief Mark Saunders stated the purpose of such programs is “not only to reduce the amount of young people entering the justice system, but to provide meaningful intervention at critical times of their lives.”¹⁰

In 2017, with the support of the TPSB, the TPS launched the Toronto Youth Pre-Charge Diversion Program across all 17 divisions.¹¹ Several hundred youth take part in the program every year. However, the race of participants is not tracked.¹²

In 2020, the OHRC asked the TPSB if it considered expanding the program to include individuals over the age of 18. The TPSB responded:

Given that the program is a cooperative effort with the Province, there may be requirements in place that limit expansion at this time. That being said, the Board would support an expansion of the pre-charge diversion program to include adults, if it was demonstrated to be effective and evaluated with a human rights lens prior to implementation … Depending on its capacity, [the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel] could in the future evaluate the program with an anti-racism lens and make recommendations to the Board and the TPS.¹³

To the OHRC’s knowledge, no such evaluation has taken place. It should.

Alternatives to charges and arrest for adults

The OHRC believes that the proper and fair use of alternatives is an important part of the solution to the overcharging and over-arrest of Black people. The TPS should be aware and make use of alternatives for adults, particularly those up to the age of 25 with no prior contact with the criminal justice system.

Police discretion relating to charges has been considered in two recent areas of legislative reform – administration of justice offence (AOJO) charges, and diversion measures or alternatives to charging.

Bill C-75 alternatives to AOJO charges

On March 29, 2018, the federal government introduced Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. Bill C-75 received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019.

Among other things, Bill C-75 introduces a diversionary regime for offences involving certain failures to comply with court orders (such as breaches of bail and failures to appear), where the breach did not cause property damage, economic loss, or physical or emotional harm to a victim. A conviction for these offences may pose a significant challenge for an accused seeking to secure bail.

In its overview of the legislation, the government specifically referenced a concern about the overrepresentation of Indigenous and vulnerable populations in the criminal justice system:

[AOJOs] are offences committed against the integrity of the criminal justice system. The most common AOJOs include failing to comply with bail conditions (i.e., disobeying a curfew, drinking alcohol), failing to appear in court and breaches of probation (e.g., failing to report to a probation officer). Over the years, the number of individuals charged with AOJOs has been increasing, despite a consistent decrease in the volume and severity of crime in Canada: in 2014, police reported that the rate of persons charged with an AOJO increased by 8% since 2004 (compared to 20% decrease in rate of persons charged with other Criminal Code offences). AOJOs have contributed to an increase in pre-trial detention, and also to the overrepresentation of Indigenous persons and of individuals from vulnerable populations in the criminal justice system.¹⁴

Bill C-75 adds a new section 523.1 to the Criminal Code, creating an alternative procedure for handling particular AOJOs, i.e., when an individual has failed to comply with a summons, appearance notice, undertaking or release order, or has failed to attend court as required.

Under the new procedure, instead of charging someone for failing to comply with the requirements placed on them, police can issue a notice to appear before a judge or justice of the peace for a judicial referral hearing. Even if charges are laid, a judge or justice of the peace has the authority to consider various responses under the new procedure.

For a judicial referral hearing under section 523.1 to proceed, the failure in question must not have caused a victim physical or emotional harm, property damage, or economic loss.

Upon hearing the matter, the judge or justice may decide to:

• take no further action
• cancel any other summons, appearance notice, undertaking or release order for the accused and
• make a release order under section 515, or
• where detention of the accused in custody is justified under section 515(10), make an order accordingly and provide reasons for why the accused should be detained until they can be “dealt with according to law” (see section 515(5)), or
• remand the accused to custody to be photographed and have their fingerprints recorded pursuant to the Identification of Criminals Act.

If the judge or justice decides to do any of the above, any charges that were laid against the accused for the failure in question must be dismissed. The individual cannot be charged later for any failure that was the subject of the hearing.¹⁵

Bill C-5 alternatives to simple possession of drug charges

On December 7, 2021, the federal government introduced Bill C-5, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Bill C-5 received Royal Assent on November 17, 2022.

Among other things, the Act amends the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) and requires a peace officer or prosecutor to consider issuing a warning, referring an individual to a treatment program, or taking no further action, instead of proceeding with criminal charges for simple drug possession.

Following the enactment of Bill C-5, David Lametti, then-Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, identified the elimination of systemic racism and discrimination as a primary incentive for the legislation. He said:

Systemic racism is a reality for too many in Canada's criminal justice system. We have heard from the public, the courts, and criminal justice experts, and seen the evidence of the disproportionate representation of Indigenous people, Black persons, racialized Canadians, and members of marginalized communities, both as offenders and as victims.

...This new legislation allows for greater use of early diversion programs. This means that an individual can get the help they need to address underlying issues and avoid reoffending. This is particularly important in the context of the opioid crisis, which is having devastating effects on individuals, families, and communities across Canada. These evidence-based reforms address systemic racism and discrimination in our criminal justice system and keep communities safe by reducing the risk of re-offending. Our approach promotes fair and just outcomes for Indigenous people, Black persons, racialized Canadians, and members of marginalized community, while continuing to punish serious criminal offences and protecting public safety.¹⁶

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding alternatives to charges and arrests, see Recommendations 16 and 17.

TPSB policies and TPS procedures

Officers need better policy and procedural direction on whether to arrest, lay charges, or use alternatives.

Current TPS procedures offer minimal guidance. For example:

• The TPS Arrest procedure provides no guidance on when a person should be charged/arrested or offered an alternative such as diversion or a treatment program.¹⁷
• The TPS Routine Order on the “New Provincial Offences Warning Form” provides no guidance on when a warning should be given for a provincial offence, like trespassing, instead of a ticket or charge.¹⁸
• Although supervisors review charges and arrests for “thoroughness and completeness,” they are not required to assess whether officers exercised their discretion appropriately (e.g., if there were reasonable grounds for the arrest, or if the officer engaged in racial profiling, racial discrimination, or anti-Black racism in charges or arrests).
• Although TPS’s Human Rights and Race and Ethnocultural Equity policies prohibit discrimination, they also do not provide any guidance on how to identify, monitor or address it in charges and arrests.¹⁹

Current TPSB policies have similar significant gaps. The policies do not provide guidance to the Chief of Police on arrests and charges, and do not include any related oversight or accountability mechanisms.

For the OHRC’s recommendations related to TPSB and TPS policies and procedures on charges and arrests, see Recommendations 19 and 20.

Officer training

Officers need better training to reduce overcharging of vulnerable and marginalized communities, including Black communities.

For example, the Criminal Offences Study Packet and the Introduction to Drug Investigation course do not provide guidance on when an officer should exercise their discretion to lay charges or pursue alternatives for obstructing a peace officer or possession of a controlled substance, respectively.²⁰

As a starting point, all TPS officers should be trained on the following:

• proper exercise of discretion when considering charges
• racial disparities revealed in charges and arrests as presented in A Disparate Impact, A Collective Impact and this report
• alternatives to charging and arrest for youth, and
• alternatives to charging and arrest for adults, including for AOJO offences (Bill C-75) and drug possession offences (Bill C-5).

To achieve the goal of the legislative reforms (i.e., fewer charges and unbiased charging), the TPS should track how often alternatives are being used by their officers. It should also collect race-based data to determine if there are disparities in officer discretion in the use of alternatives to arrest.

The TPSB has taken note of the matter of officer training in alternatives. A footnote in its public consultation draft of the De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy states:

An additional recommendation will be made to amend the Arrest chapter in the Adequacy Standards Compliance Policy to include a section directing the Chief to ensure Service Members are trained to use alternatives to arrest, including referral to alternative response providers, community services and resources, youth diversion, or other available options, where appropriate.”²¹

At time of writing, the policy has not been passed by the TPSB, and there have been no amendments to the Arrest Chapter in the Adequacy Standards Compliance Policy.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding training in charges and alternatives to charges, see Recommendation 45.

Crown Counsel and pre-charge approval

To address overcharging and racial profiling, Ontario should amend the Police Services Act and the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, and make changes to the Crown Prosecution Manual to implement a Crown pre-charge screening process. 

Pre-charge approval by the Crown (also often referred to as Crown pre-charge screening or pre-screening) provides an extra layer of monitoring that may reduce the disproportionate impact of charges and arrests on Black people.

The OHRC noted in its Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing:

Our expert analysis of the data confirms that Black persons are proportionately overcharged by the TPS. For example, Black persons represented only 8.8% of the general population, but 28.8% of arrests involving two to five charges, 33.8% of arrests involving six to nine charges, and 38.9% of arrests involving 10 or more charges. Notably, the data indicate that many of these charges were withdrawn or dismissed.²²

The following excerpt from the Framework summarizes OHRC’s analysis of Crown pre-charge screening programs elsewhere in Canada.

Crown pre-charge screening programs have been successfully implemented in British Columbia, Quebec and New Brunswick. New Brunswick uses a pre-charge screening or charge approval process that requires the Crown Prosecutor to review and approve charges before the police can lay them. This process also applies to provincial offences. Police officers investigate alleged crimes and then forward reports (including recommended charges) to Crown counsel, who decide whether to lay charges or institute alternative measures.

Comparing the rate of withdrawn charges in provinces that use pre-charge screening with rates in Ontario highlights the potential benefits of reforming the current system.

An OHRC analysis of adult criminal court data shows that provinces that use pre-charge screening have much lower rates of stayed²³ or withdrawn charges than Ontario.

Specifically, 29% of charges were stayed or withdrawn in Quebec in 2018–19, while the figures were 37% in New Brunswick and 54% in B.C., equalling an average stayed/withdrawn rate of 40% among the three pre-charge screening provinces.

In Ontario, by contrast, 68% of charges were stayed or withdrawn in 2018–19, which indicates broad patterns of over-charging that result in courts being flooded with cases that are very unlikely to result in convictions.

 A pre-charge screening pilot project, conducted at the RCMP detachments and three communities in Alberta, found that the screening process reduced the number of charges laid by 29% and court cases started by 21%. This data strongly suggests that reducing the overall number of charges will save scarce court resources, and minimize the disproportionate impact of over-charging on Black communities.

It is noteworthy that being charged, in and of itself or in conjunction with pre-trial custody, can have serious negative consequences for people in terms of financial hardship (job loss, legal expenses, etc.), diminished employment prospects, interrupted education pathways and reputational harm. Provinces that have implemented pre-charge screening are better equipped to prevent people from entering the criminal justice system because of charges that lack merit, which can mitigate some of these negative outcomes.

Examining Crown policy manuals in provinces with pre-charge screening confirms that these systems can support initiatives to address systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system. For example, in British Columbia, the Crown pre-charge screening process uses a two-part test to determine if charges should proceed. At the first stage, the evidentiary test considers whether there is a substantial likelihood of conviction.

If the first part of the test is satisfied, Crown counsel apply the public interest test. Factors that weigh in favour of not prosecuting an individual under the second stage include the over-representation of Indigenous persons as accused within the criminal justice system, and the role that bias, racism or systemic discrimination played in bringing the person into contact with the criminal justice system. Factors that weigh in favour of laying a charge include the over-representation of Indigenous women and girls as victims of violent offences.

Ontario’s Crown Prosecution Manual includes a similar test. However, Crown Attorneys are not instructed to screen all cases before the charge is laid. Ontario Crown Attorneys are also not explicitly directed to consider the impact of bias, racism or systemic discrimination. Enabling Crown counsel to apply this equity lens to charges before Indigenous, Black and racialized persons are brought before the courts has the potential to reduce the over-representation of these groups in the criminal justice system.²⁴

There is precedent for pre-charge advice from the Crown in Toronto. In 2017, the Province launched a program embedding Crown attorneys in the TPS 51 Division and Ottawa Police Service to provide police with real-time advice on bail decisions. The Crown attorneys also worked with police and community-based health and social service agencies on alternatives to criminal charges for vulnerable, low-risk accused who could be diverted out of the criminal justice system.²⁵

The TPS assessed the program and determined that the embedded Crown attorneys were able to make several important contributions, including:

• advice on pre-charge diversion screening for people with mental health and addiction issues
• advice related to sufficiency of charges/charge type
• pre-charge advice about both routine investigations and larger projects/anticipated takedowns, and
• liaison with the 51 Division multi-agency community service providers team meetings (FOCUS situation table).²⁶

A survey was also sent to all members of 51 Division about their views of the project. Of the 23 responses received, 65% stated that the project prevented them from laying a charge that, absent embedded Crown input, they would have laid – thereby diverting individuals to mental health court or a mental health program.²⁷ The surveyed officers all recommended that the project continue.²⁸ Then-Interim Chief Ramer also agreed that pre-charge advice from the embedded Crowns at 51 Division was valuable.²⁹

However, one shortcoming of the program was that race and related outcomes were not tracked.

The Crown pre-charge advice pilot provides further evidence that Crown involvement at the charging stage is not only helpful and practical, but also critical in reducing unnecessary and harmful overcharging practices. As the Board overseeing the largest municipal police service in Canada, the TPSB should take a leadership role by urging the provincial government to implement Crown pre-charge approval before laying a criminal charge.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on Crown pre-charge approval, see Recommendations 88, 89, and 90.

TPS equity audits

TPS supervisors review every arrest and charge for “thoroughness and completeness.” Information reviewed includes: the record of arrest, the synopsis of the allegations, the charge that was laid, the witness list and statements, and the exhibit list.³⁰ It may also include the officer’s memo book notes. The supervisor signs off on the record of arrest and synopsis.³¹

However, TPS supervisors are not required to assess if the arrest or charge was free of racial profiling or racial discrimination. In an interview with the OHRC, a TPS Deputy Chief of Police advised that such a review would only take place if concerns were raised by an officer or a witness.³² Ideally, while reviewing a charge for thoroughness and completeness, a supervisor should also review each charge for potential racial profiling and/or racial discrimination.

Supervisory officers should be required, at a minimum, to conduct equity audits of charges for provincial offences, administration of justice charges, as well as criminal charges at the unit level once every three months. These audits should be conducted with an anti-discrimination lens and should be focused on ensuring that overrepresentation of Black people or any other marginalized group is addressed.

For OHRC’s recommendation regarding Supervisory equity auditing of charges, see Recommendation 18.

TPS and the use of artificial intelligence

In recent years, law enforcement organizations, including the TPS, have increasingly used artificial intelligence (AI) to identify individuals, collect and analyze data, and help make decisions, including where police should be deployed and on whom they should focus their attention.

In January 2020, the TPS denied using a controversial AI facial recognition software called Clearview AI. Subsequently, in February 2020, the TPS acknowledged that some of its officers had indeed been using Clearview AI since October 2019, and as soon as then-Chief Saunders was made aware of the software’s usage by TPS officers, he issued a directive to immediately stop using Clearview AI.[xxxiii] Overall, 89 investigations used the technology and, according to the TPS, 30% of those investigations were “substantiated and/or advanced” using the technology.³⁴ 

Using AI with body-worn cameras and facial recognition technology

As the Citizenlab noted in its report To Surveil and Predict: A Human Rights Analysis of Algorithmic Policing in Canada, there are several issues with the use of AI and facial recognition technology in policing, including:

• privacy concerns related to the capture and retention of photographic data by law enforcement

• unreliable facial recognition technology – particularly in the case of racialized people and women

• data-sharing between the private sector and law enforcement.³⁵

According to the TPSB’s 2020 policy on body-worn cameras:

Recordings from body-worn cameras may not be used in combination with facial-recognition technology, video analytics software, voice recognition software, or to generate a searchable database of images of individuals who have interacted with Service Members, with the exception of comparing images that are directly related to an investigation to a “mug shot” database in a manner approved by the Board.³⁶

However, the OHRC remains concerned about the use of AI in conjunction with facial recognition and body-worn cameras³⁷ considering the over-surveillance and overcharging of Black communities, and TPS’s past use of facial recognition technology.

Several jurisdictions have suspended the use of facial recognition by law enforcement. In 2020, California implemented a three-year ban on police using facial recognition technology on footage from body-worn cameras.³⁸ Oakland,³⁹ San Francisco⁴⁰ and Somerville⁴¹ enacted even broader bans on the use of this technology by the municipalities.

Use of AI in police deployment decisions

The TPS should make sure that officer deployment and AI do not result in racial discrimination against Black people in charges. In recent years across Canada, law enforcement efforts to prevent crime have begun to employ techniques of predictive policing that involve the use of crime data to determine future probabilities of criminal occurrences.

In theory, predictive policing has the capacity to lessen longstanding patterns of biased police deployment in Black, other racialized, and Indigenous communities. In practice, however, predictive policing has been found to reinforce existing biases.

Police services are entitled to assign their officers to different neighbourhoods to carry out their duties. As a policing strategy, police may target enforcement to certain neighbourhoods where particular crimes occur at higher-than-average levels. In some cases, such neighbourhoods may be low-income areas with relatively high proportions of Indigenous and/or racialized residents.

Allocating a high number of police to racialized neighbourhoods raises human rights concerns when:

• this allocation is disproportionate (i.e., heavy-handed) in relation to the level of crime, type of crime, or form of victimization police seek to address, and

• residents experience greater degrees of intrusive police scrutiny as a result.

Also, selectively targeting communities based on racial bias, or attempting to prevent crime in racialized neighbourhoods through aggressive or unnecessarily broad approaches or pretext stops, will likely expose Indigenous or racialized people to higher levels of surveillance, stops and arrests, mostly for minor offences occurring in those neighbourhoods. These deployment practices can lead to Indigenous and racialized people being over-policed and may violate the Ontario Human Rights Code.⁴²

Similarly, there is a danger in using AI tools or approaches that are not accurate or are based on racially biased data or algorithms. They may overestimate the risk posed by Indigenous, Black or other racialized people, and compound existing disparities in criminal justice outcomes.⁴³

Need for a province-wide approach to AI based on human rights principles

The use of AI technology in policing, locally and province-wide, should be informed by human rights principles.

In September 2021, the OHRC made submissions to the TPSB on its draft Policy on Use of Artificial Intelligence Technologies. The OHRC did not, and does not in this report, call for a complete ban on AI or facial recognition technology. Rather, the OHRC promotes the human rights principles of equity, privacy, transparency, and accountability to make sure that AI technology does not create or perpetuate systemic discrimination.

To make broader change and ensure consistency, the OHRC and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) recommended that the TPSB urge the provincial government to implement a legislative and regulatory framework informed by the OHRC and IPC’s submissions and recommendations.⁴⁴

The OHRC and IPC also called for the TPS to conduct privacy and human rights assessments in consultation with experts before procuring and using relevant AI technologies or algorithms.⁴⁵

In February 2002, the TPSB approved the Policy on Use of Artificial Intelligence Technologies. The policy addresses transparency and accountability issues in the use of AI technology. It also sets out risk reporting requirements related to any current or future AI technologies.

However, more is required to ensure that the TPS’s use of AI does not result in further racial profiling and discrimination.

For the OHRC’s policy guidance on artificial intelligence, see Recommendations 20, 21, and 22.

Chapter 6 Endnotes

_{[1] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 179–189.}

_{[2] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 182.}

_{[3] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 183.}

_{[4] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 183.}

_{[5] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 185.}

_{[6] OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2020), online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/A%20Disparate%20Impact%20-%20TPS%20inquiry%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[7] TPS, “Use of Force: Measurement & Outcomes,” video transcript: https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/b9/f4/b9f492b5-8e11-450a-af6e-deae2658010b/1ec05b46-427f-41eb-8697-cd12e95dad0b.pdf.}

_{[8] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (Toronto: Toronto Police Service, 2022) at 10, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.}

_{[9] TPSB, “Draft Minutes of Public Meeting: June 18, 2015” (18 June 2015), Report from Chair Dr. Alok Mukherjee regarding “Youth Pre-charge Diversion Program” (2 June 2015) at 31, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=180&catid=7&m=0.}

_{[10] TPSB, “Draft Minutes of Public Meeting: December 17, 2015” (17 December 2015), Report from Chief Mark Saunders regarding “Youth Pre-Charge Diversion Program” (13 November 2015) at 106, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=186&catid=7&m=0.}

_{[11] Muriel Draaisma, “‘We know this is better for kids’: Toronto police launch program to keep youth out of court system,” CBC News (20 June 2017), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/youth-precharge-diversion-program-1.4169394.}

_{[12] OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Peter Yuen (Priority Response Command) (12 March 2020).}

_{[13] Responses of the TPSB to written questions at 32–33, 113–117 (22 January 2020), asked under s 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19.}

_{[14] Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, clauses 212, 234, online: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-75/royal-assent; Government of Canada, “Legislative Background: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, as enacted (Bill C-75 in the 42nd Parliament)” (26 August 2022), online: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/c75/p3.html.}

_{[15] Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, clauses 212, 234, online: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-75/royal-assent; Government of Canada, “Legislative Background: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, as enacted (Bill C-75 in the 42nd Parliament)” (26 August 2022), online: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/c75/p3.html.}

_{[16] Department of Justice Canada, “Statement by Minister Lametti on Royal Assent of legislation that addresses systemic racism and discrimination in the criminal justice system,” Cision Canada (18 November 2022), online: https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/statement-by-minister-lametti-on-royal-assent-of-legislation-that-addresses-systemic-racism-and-discrimination-in-the-criminal-justice-system-837945376.html.}

_{[17] TPS, Procedure 01-01 Arrest (2 February 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/9b/d2/9bd29690-bfcf-42df-9480-7ba0d0ec6068/08da6409-baec-4b98-afe5-458c1e8d01b4.pdf.}

_{[18] TPSB, TPS Routine Order from the Office of the Chief – New Provincial Offences Warning Form (July 2013).}

_{[19] TPSB, Race and Ethnocultural Equity Policy (15 November 2010), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/176-race-and-ethnocultural-equity-policy.}

_{[20] Toronto Police College/Service, TPS Study Package for General Investigators Course – Criminal Offences (amended April 2014); Toronto Police College/Service, TPS Introduction to Drug Investigations – Course Training Standard (undated).}

_{[21] TPSB, “Consultation Draft: De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Policy” (accessed 30 July 2023) at 4, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[22] OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (July, 2021) https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing#:~:text=The%20OHRC%20calls%20on%20Ontario,from%20policing%20across%20the%20province}

_{[23] Staying a charge is when a charge and criminal proceedings attached to it are halted by a judge or Crown. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 579(1).}

_{[24]OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (July, 2021) https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing#:~:text=The%20OHRC%20calls%20on%20Ontario,from%20policing%20across%20the%20province.}

_{[25] Government of Ontario, “Progress on Ontario’s Plan for Faster, Fairer Criminal Justice” (30 October 2017), online: file:///C:/Users/scormier/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Word/news.ontario.ca/en/backgrounder/46817/progress-on-ontarios-plan-for-faster-fairer-criminal-justicehttps://news.ontario.ca/en/backgrounder/46817/progress-on-ontarios-plan-for-faster-fairer-criminal-justice.}

_{[26] TPSB, TPS Internal Correspondence from Detective Sergeant Richmond to Superintendent Riviere of 51 Division – Project Assessment – 51 Division Embedded Crown (January 2018).}

_{[27] TPSB, TPS Internal Correspondence from Detective Sergeant Richmond to Superintendent Riviere of 51 Division – Project Assessment – 51 Division Embedded Crown (January 2018).}

_{[28] TPSB, TPS Internal Correspondence from Detective Sergeant Richmond to Superintendent Riviere of 51 Division – Project Assessment – 51 Division Embedded Crown (January 2018).}

_{[29] OHRC interview with then-Interim Chief James Ramer (26 October 2022).}

_{[30] First-level supervisors are sergeants; OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Peter Yuen (Priority Response Command), (12 March 2020).}

_{[31] OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Peter Yuen (Priority Response Command), (12 March 2020).}

_{[32] OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Peter Yuen (Priority Response Command), (12 March 2020).}

_{[33] “Toronto police admit using secretive facial recognition technology Clearview AI”, CBC (14 February 2020), online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-clearview-ai-1.5462785.}

_{[34] Detective Operations of TPS, “Clearview AI: Usage, Review & Analysis” (27 March 2020), online (pdf): https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21169254/tps-clearview-ai-usage-review-and-analysis-report-1.pdf.}

_{[35] Kate Robertson, Cynthia Khoo and Yolanda Song, To Surveil and Predict: A Human Rights Analysis of Algorithmic Policing in Canada (Toronto: Citizen Lab and International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto, 2020) at 91–92, online (pdf): https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/To-Surveil-and-Predict.pdf.}

_{[36] TPSB, Policy on Body Worn Cameras (24 November 2020), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/154-body-worn-cameras.}

_{[37] See the Accountability Chapter 9 of this report; OHRC, “Letter to Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board on its policy and procedure on body-worn cameras” (28 October 2020), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-toronto-police-service-and-toronto-police-services-board-its-policy-and-procedure-body-worn.}

_{[38] U.S. AB 1215, An act to add and repeal Section 832.19 of the Penal Code, relating to law enforcement, 2019-2020, Reg Sess, Cal, 2019, online: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1215.}

_{[39] City of Oakland, Ordinance No 13635, § 2, 1-12-2021; and Ordinance No 13563, § 3, 9-17-2019. Prohibition on City's acquisition and/or use of Biometric Surveillance Technology and Predictive Policing Technology at 9.64.045, online: https://library.municode.com/ca/oakland/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT9PUPEMOWE_CH9.64REACUSSUTE_9.64.045PRACUSBISUTEPRPOTE.}

_{[40] City of San Francisco, Ordinance 107-19, s 19-B, Acquisition of Surveillance Technology (15 July 2019), online: https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_admin/0-0-0-47320.}

_{[41] City of Sommerville, Ordinance V2-1, Banning the usage of facial recognition technology in Somerville (27 June 2019), online: http://somervillecityma.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?ID=20991.}

_{[42] OHRC, “Policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement” (2019) at 4.2.1. Unwarranted deployment, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-eliminating-racial-profiling-law-enforcement.}

_{[43] OHRC, “Policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement” (2019) at 4.2.6. Artificial intelligence, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-eliminating-racial-profiling-law-enforcement; “Toronto police admit using secretive facial recognition technology Clearview AI,” CBC News (13 February 2020), online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-clearview-ai-1.5462785.}

_{[44] IPC, “Additional comments and recommendations on the OHRC’s draft recommendations to eliminate racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (10 November 2022) at 2–3. For further information on IPC submissions and guidance relating to AI and facial recognition technology in policing, see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Privacy regulators call for legal framework limiting police use of facial recognition technology” (2 May 2022), online: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2022/nr-c_220502/; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Privacy guidance on facial recognition for police agencies” (May 2022), online: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/surveillance/police-and-public-safety/gd_fr_202205/.}

_{[45] Information and Privacy Commissioner, “Additional comments and recommendations on the OHRC’s draft recommendations to eliminate racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (10 November 2022) at 2–3.}

For decades, Black communities, mental health advocates, the OHRC and others have been calling for action to reduce discriminatory, excessive, and inappropriate use of force.

Multiple reports and coroner’s juries have recognized the disproportionate use of force employed by the TPS against marginalized persons – Black communities in particular. The following reports offer important recommendations to address this problem:

• Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Clare Lewis, 1989)¹  
• Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario (Stephen Lewis, 1992)²
• The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence (Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling, 2008)³  
• independent review of the use of lethal force by the TPS (Honourable Frank Iacobucci, 2014)⁴
• the jury in the inquest into the deaths of Reyal Jardine-Douglas, Sylvia Klibingaitis, Michael Eligon (2014)⁵  
• the jury in the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (2018).⁶

These reports and juries called for, among other things, substantial changes to TPS policies and procedures regarding the use of force, changes to the use-of-force model, a greater focus on de-escalation, and improvements in how police officers are trained and monitored concerning the use of force.

Those calls for change have done little to date. The data examined by the OHRC shows that Black people remain disproportionately represented in all instances of use of force by the TPS, including cases that result in death or serious physical injury, and in cases of lower-level use of force.

It is critical that the TPS and TPSB move urgently to implement all recommendations from previous reports and coroner’s juries that addressed police use of force and its impact on Black communities.

The intersection between race and mental health is of particular concern for Black communities because of the impact police use-of-force practices can have on the mental health of community members.  These practices are exacerbated for those Black persons already living with mental health or addiction issues.⁷ The delay in implementing reforms on use of force has resulted in preventable harm and racial discrimination.

This chapter will analyze use-of-force data, review recent and proposed policy and procedural changes by the TPSB and TPS, and make recommendations to strengthen efforts to eliminate discriminatory use of force. It will begin with a review of the findings on use of force in from the OHRC’s previous interim inquiry reports.

Death and serious injury data (SIU Investigations)

Despite making up only 8.8% of Toronto’s population, Black people were overrepresented in:

• SIU use-of-force cases (28.8%)
• police shootings (36%)
• use-of-force cases that resulted in civilian death (61.5%)
• police shooting deaths (70%).

Between 2013 and 2017, a Black person in Toronto was nearly 20 times more likely than a White person to be involved in a fatal shooting by the TPS.

Black men comprise 4% of Toronto’s population, yet were complainants in 25% of SIU cases alleging sexual assault by TPS officers.

The Inquiry’s experts conducted further analysis to assess whether other commonly cited factors could explain the significant racial disparities in the data. In addition to neighbourhood crime rates, they identified several factors that arguably could be at play when an officer chooses to use force. These included civilian characteristics (e.g., age, gender) and situational factors (e.g., community setting, civilian behaviour, mental illness, civilian impairment, the presence of a weapon).

Our experts found that these factors could not explain the overwhelming overrepresentation of Black people in SIU investigations and shooting deaths.

They analyzed other factors that some might argue have an influence on the use of force, including the person’s behaviour toward the police at the time of the incident, and if they had a criminal history. However, the experts found that these factors did not account for the overrepresentation of Black people in use-of-force data.

This analysis debunks several commonly held, seemingly neutral or non-discriminatory explanations for the overrepresentation of Black people in these statistics.

Lower-level use of force

SIU cases account for only a small percentage of police use-of-force incidents. Many serious forms of force do not meet the SIU’s threshold, which focuses on the nature of a person’s physical injury (e.g., broken bones meet the threshold, but severe bruises or lacerations may not). Lower-level use-of-force incidents can still have significant adverse physical and emotional impacts on the person subjected to that force.

Our experts found that between 2016 and 2017, Black people were grossly overrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents, even more than in incidents that resulted in an SIU investigation.

Specifically, Black people were involved in 38.9% of the cases included in the lower-level use-of-force dataset.

Black males were particularly overrepresented, accounting for 34.5% of all lower-level use-of-force cases. Although Black females were underrepresented in the dataset, the Black female rate was still 3.6 times greater than the rate for White females, and 25 times greater than the rate for women from other racialized groups.

Summary of overrepresentation in use-of-force categories

Although they represent only 8.8% of Toronto’s population, Black people were grossly overrepresented in almost all use-of-force categories:

• 32.2% of cases involving a police firearm
• 36% of cases involving police use of pepper spray
• 36.7% of cases involving police strikes
• 41.1% of cases involving police grounding (i.e., bringing a person to the ground) /other force
• 45.5% of cases involving police Taser use
• 57.1% of cases involving a police dog.

As well, compared to their representation in the general population, Black people were:

• 2.7 times more likely to suffer from broken bones from a police use-of-force incident
• 3.8 times more likely to suffer an injury from pepper spray
• 4.2 times more likely to suffer abrasions or scratches
• 4.4 times more likely to suffer a head injury
• 4.6 times more likely to experience body pain or soft tissue damage
• 4.7 times more likely to experience cuts or lacerations
• 4.7 times more likely to experience a Taser-related injury
• 6.6 times more likely to experience chest pains as the result of a police use-of-force incident.

Several commonly held beliefs that might provide a non-discriminatory explanation were considered, such as the belief that this happens because Black people live in high-crime patrol zones. However, even accounting for factors such as low-crime and high-crime patrol zones, average income, and the percentage of single-mother households, the experts found that Black people were still grossly overrepresented in both serious and lower-level use-of-force incidents.

Even when accounting for these alternative factors, there were significant disparities in the relative risk that Black people will experience serious and lower-level police use of force relative to White people.

For instance, relative to their representation in the general population in a patrol zone, the odds that a Black person would experience force were 4.9 times greater than the odds of a White person. The odds that people belonging to other racialized groups would experience force were 0.6 times (or 40%) less than the odds for White people.

Although patrol zone, violent crime rate, and median household income may be predictors of the likelihood of experiencing police use of force, these indicators cannot explain why Black people were overrepresented. The experts concluded that being Black is a strong predictor of police use of force, accounting for both crime rate and median household income.

The OHRC urges the TPS to review and adopt the multiple recommendations made in previous reports, and by juries’ decisions. This Inquiry recommends additional changes – presented in the following pages – that the TPS should implement immediately.

Recent procedure and policy changes by the TPS and TPSB

The OHRC recognizes that the TPS and TPSB have recently taken positive steps in their procedures and policies regarding the use of force that may address some of the community’s concern about the disparate application of force. Recent shifts are summarized below.

TPS 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) procedure

In June 2022, the TPS issued Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation).⁸ Key changes in the Incident Response procedure, and amendments made to it in 2021, include the emphasis on de-escalation, the inclusion of a duty to intervene, and expanded data collection requirements. In addition, upon receipt of a use-of-force report, supervisory officers are required to ensure that the reports are accurate, and review all body-worn camera and in-car camera footage from the officer involved.

De-escalation

De-escalation is defined by the TPS as verbal and non-verbal strategies intended to reduce the intensity of a conflict so as to gain compliance without the application of force, or if force is necessary, reducing the amount of
force used. 

The Incident Response procedure identifies de-escalation and communication as core tools that must be considered continuously and utilized, where possible, even after use of force has occurred. The rationale section of the current procedure also notes that disengagement is among the de-escalation tactics that should be considered in use-of-force situations.

In addition, officers are now required to intervene and take reasonable steps to prevent the behaviour from continuing if they have clear reason to believe that another officer is engaging in misconduct – including, but not limited to, assault or physical abuse (i.e., excessive use of force) involving any person.

The intervening officer must record details of the incident and substance of the officer’s complaint, including dates, times, locations, other persons present and other relevant information, including the presence of video and/or other evidence. Officers are required to report the incident forthwith to their immediate supervisor or another supervisor. If they fail to do so, they may be disciplined for misconduct.

Changes proposed in the draft Incident Response procedure 

The draft Incident Response procedure provides further guidance on the steps officers can take to intervene. For example, the duty to intervene may include using verbal instructions or reasonable soft or hard physical control that is proportional to the perceived risk, with the goal of “preventing further harm to the members of the public.”⁹

The draft states that officers will not be retaliated against for intervening, and that they can make a confidential report to a third party if they intervene against a superior officer. Furthermore, where an incident of excessive force is under investigation, a witness officer who did not intervene will be investigated to determine whether they should be subject to training or discipline.

The draft sets out disciplinary measures that may flow from an officer's failure to intervene. For example, “failure to report the misconduct of another member, may constitute misconduct and may be subject to discipline as outlined in Service Procedure.” To strengthen the duty to intervene, the OHRC recommends that the TPS take immediate steps to enact this provision.

The TPS may make further amendments to the Incident Response procedure. A draft update has been posted on the TPSB’s website, which could replace the current version.

Reporting requirements

The Incident Response procedure requires that the TPS collect, analyze, and publicly report data on the race of individuals against whom officers use force.¹⁰ This requirement is in accordance with O. Reg. 267/18 of the Anti-Racism Act, 2017, O. Reg. 926/90 Equipment and Use of Force of the Police Services Act and the TPSB’s policy on Race-based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting. In accordance with the TPSB’s procedure and O. Reg. 267, officers shall record the perceived race of the individual(s) about whom the use-of-force report is completed.

In accordance with O. Reg. 926, use-of-force reports must be submitted to the Chief of Police when an officer:

• draws a handgun in the presence of a member of the public;
• points a firearm at a person;
• discharges a firearm;
• uses a weapon on another person;
• draws and displays a conducted energy weapon to a person with the intention of achieving compliance;
• points a conducted energy weapon at a person;
• discharges a conducted energy weapon; or
• uses force on another person, including through the use of a horse or a dog, that results in an injury requiring the services of a physician, nurse or paramedic and the member is aware that the injury required such services before the member goes off-duty. (s.14.5(1))

O. Reg. 926/90 also states that “The chief of police shall submit an annual report to the police services board … analyzing the data from the reports submitted.” (s. 14.8(6))¹¹

The Incident Response procedure does not require officers to collect race data on lower-level use-of-force incidents. The draft procedure also fails to include this requirement. This gap appears to be addressed by the TPSB’s draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy.

TPSB Draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy

The TPSB has also posted a draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy. It has some important changes.

In February 2023, a representative of the TPSB stated that the proposed updates to TPSB’s use-of-force policy were made in response to recommendations from the 2020 Police Reform in Toronto report. More specifically, the representative noted that the Police Reform Report recommended:

…the Executive Director, in consultation with the Chief of Police, to review the Board’s Use of Force Policy, consult with internal and external experts, and propose to the Board by November 2020, amendments to the Policy that will align it with best practices to reduce death and injuries[.]¹²

As part of the policy development process, the Board conducted research and internal consultations, and engaged stakeholders, including the OHRC. 

The stated broad goals of the draft policy are to:

• Prioritize de-escalation in all appropriate circumstances

• Produce positive outcomes arising from interactions between members of the Service [i.e., TPS officers] and the public, and

• Minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the degree of force used by Service members, as well as injury or death where a Service member is justified in using force, while ensuring the safety of the community and Service members.

The stated purposes of the draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy include:

• eliminating the use of excessive force

• ensuring that the Service’s training, procedures, and practice prioritize a Service [m]ember pursuing de-escalation options to the greatest extent possible without endangering officer safety

• ensuring that Service [m]embers employ de-escalation and communication tactics in all appropriate circumstances by continuously assessing incidents as they unfold for opportunities to effectively de-escalate a conflict without force or with a lesser degree of force, including after a [m]ember has begun the lawful use of force

• ensuring that any force option will be used against a member of the public only where it is necessary, without bias, and in a manner proportionate to the circumstances to effectively protect public safety

• ensuring that where Service [m]embers are present during an interaction where another member is using inappropriate or excessive use of force, they will intervene to stop it, and report it to their supervisors.

Reporting requirements

The TPSB’s current use-of-force reporting requirements were consistent with provincial requirements until January 1, 2023. On this date, the Province implemented changes to O. Reg. 926 that expanded use-of-force reporting to include instances where an officer uses force on a person through a horse or dog, points a firearm at a person, or displays a conducted energy weapon (CEW) with the intent to achieve compliance.¹³ These are not reflected in the current policy. However, the TPSB’s new draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy includes these changes and goes a step further by requiring officers to collect race-based data on a wider range of use-of-force incidents.

For example, the TPSB’s draft policy uses a definition of “physical force” that captures a broader range of incidents than the reporting requirements set out in the Equipment and Use of Force regulation. The TPSB’s policy defines physical force as:

… techniques intended to control or stop a subject’s behaviour, which exceed mere physical contact (e.g., handcuffing a resisting individual, punches, armlocks, tackles, oleoresin capsicum [OC] aerosol spray, baton, firearms). Physical force includes drawing a firearm or displaying a Conducted Energy Weapon [CEW], whether or not the firearm or [CEW] were discharged at the subject …¹⁴        

In contrast, the Equipment and Use of Force regulation requires officers to complete a use-of-force report when an officer, “uses force on another person, including through the use of a horse or a dog, that results in an injury requiring the services of a physician, nurse or paramedic[.]”¹⁵  

The definition proposed by the TPSB captures the lower-level use-of-force incidents examined during this Inquiry. According to the draft policy, the Chief of Police will create procedures to ensure officers report on physical force incidents, and provide the Board with an annual report on physical force incidents that includes the total number of reports that year, a breakdown of the reasons for the use of physical force, the perceived race of the members of the public involved, and the number of persons in crisis involved in these incidents.¹⁶ 

Progress and gaps in draft policy

The OHRC is encouraged by the TPSB’s new draft policy. By placing a greater emphasis on de-escalation, it potentially reduces the number of use-of-force encounters. It can also help the TPS build trust with Black and other communities.

The draft policy also makes progress towards addressing decades-long concerns from Black, Indigenous, and other vulnerable communities by:

• placing the highest value on protecting the life and the safety of the public

• underscoring the importance of ensuring that TPS members employ de-escalation and communication tactics in all appropriate circumstances, and continuously assess incidents as they unfold

• prohibiting the use of excessive force, prohibiting chokeholds, carotid holds,¹⁷ or any other techniques intended or likely to restrict breathing capacity unless no other reasonable alternatives exist to prevent grievous bodily harm or death of police officers or a member of the public

• requiring the TPSB to publish on its website anonymized data on all use-of-force incidents reported by TPS members, and

• giving supervisors a more robust role in identifying and responding to inappropriate use of force, missed opportunities for de-escalation, and/or discriminatory conduct.

These are important policy shifts that respond to community concerns and some recommendations advanced by the OHRC in its racial profiling policy, and the best practices shared with TPS throughout the TPS Inquiry.

The OHRC hopes that when implemented with additional reforms recommended by the OHRC, the revised policy will reduce use-of-force rates and respond to unique concerns from racialized communities, persons in crisis, and other Code-protected groups.

Scope of incidents subject to use-of-force reporting

There is more to be done to ensure that the draft policy and draft procedure work in harmony to reflect leading practices, reduce disparities in use of force, and achieve the TPSB's vision of establishing bias-free policing. The policy should include the following:

• Expand use-of-force reporting to lower-level uses of force.

• Expand use-of-force reporting to include the use of handcuffs (mechanical restraints) to obtain subject compliance that occurs outside of an arrest, and the application of handcuffs to persons under 18.

• Clarify the steps the TPSB can take in response to data that establishes disparities between racialized groups.

• Investigate when a CEW is discharged.

• Direct that officers avoid using force when engaged with a youth.

• Provide clear guidance on circumstances where deadly force is prohibited.

• Use a comprehensive definition of use of force to guide use-of-force reporting.

Use-of-force incidents that must be reported are narrowly defined. They do not include the full context surrounding the use of force, or instances the public would consider use of force by the police.

The TPSB’s draft policy on De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force has the potential to improve race-based use-of-force data collection and analysis because it captures incidents where physical force is used. However, the OHRC is concerned that the definition of physical force proposed by the TPSB’s draft policy, which captures some lower-level use-of-force incidents, is not reflected in TPS’s draft Incident Response procedure.¹⁸

More importantly, the TPSB’s draft policy has not been implemented at the time this report was drafted. This is concerning as the OHRC released findings about the disparate impact of lower-level use of force on Black communities in 2020.  

Unfortunately, policies and procedures currently issued by the TPS and TPSB require use-of-force reports when an officer uses “physical force on another person that results in an injury requiring medical attention” among other criteria.¹⁹ This approach ties the reporting requirement to the presence of a physical injury. As such, circumstances where TPS members use measurable force are not reportable if they do not result in a physical injury. This method results in an underreporting of relevant use-of-force incidents, and will undermine efforts to address concerns in this area.

For example, the current reporting requirements would not capture uses of force that would attract public scrutiny, such as chokeholds. The TPSB’s draft policy prohibits the use of chokeholds, or any other technique intended or likely to prevent respiration. Yet, the prohibition is not absolute.

These holds are prohibited unless “no other reasonable alternatives exist to prevent grievous bodily harm or death.” Based on current requirements, an officer’s use of a chokehold would not be subject to reporting if it did not result in injury or hospitalization. This result undermines the danger associated with the use of this technique and the TPSB’s efforts to place tighter restrictions on its use. Similarly, if a civilian experienced multiple kicks or punches during an interaction with police, the use of force would not be reported if they did not cause injury or hospitalization.

Furthermore, reporting requirements that are based on injury or hospitalization do not account for the mental health or psychological impact and trauma that police use of force has on an individual.

In Maynard v. TPSB, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) accepted evidence about the psychological impact of a use-of-force incident where Mr. Maynard, a Black man, was taken down at gunpoint by police. In that case, the HRTO stated, “There was no dispute that Mr. Maynard carries with him to this day a lasting sense of anxiety and fear whenever he sees a police officer[.]” The HRTO went on to state, “… it comes as no surprise that he [Maynard] finds himself unable to completely recover his sense of the man he was before the incident.”²⁰ 

As observed in the case of Mr. Maynard, the impact of a use-of-force incident on an individual’s dignity, self-respect, or overall mental health is not contingent on the physical injury. As such, TPS should seek to collect race data on a wide range of force incidents that fall below the injury or hospitalization threshold.

The OHRC’s report, A Disparate Impact, uncovered some of the problems associated with using a limited definition of use of force. In that report, lower-level use of force is described as incidents where physical force was used by TPS officers, but did not result in serious civilian injury or death. Using this definition, the OHRC found that Black people were significantly overrepresented in use-of-force cases involving the TPS.²¹

To understand the impact of use-of-force practices, incidents where lower-level use of force is used should be monitored and publicly reported. Leaving these incidents out of the monitoring and reporting obligations creates a gap in the oversight process.

Use-of-force reports should contain additional contextual information. Relevant context includes whether the subject was experiencing a mental health crisis or was perceived to have a mental health disability, whether the civilian was charged with an offence, and the length of time the subject was detained.

To effectively monitor use-of-force disparities, a robust definition that includes lower-level use of force is needed. The OHRC supports a definition that captures all instances where physical force is used, including “coercive touches such as wrist or arm locks, or striking the subject with the hands or feet.”²² Use of force that falls within the scope of this definition should be reported to a supervisor and form part of the TPS annual use-of-force report.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on use-of-force reporting, see Recommendations 30, 31, and 32.

Handcuffs (mechanical restraints), physical restraints and zip ties 

The proposed De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy should require reporting on the use of restraints such as handcuffs, mechanical restraints, or zip ties where they are used for adults. This excludes routine handcuffing that occurs during an arrest.  All applications of these restraints on persons under 18 years old should be reported.

There have been high-profile incidents where officers have used restraints on members of Black and Indigenous communities that have attracted criticism from human rights tribunals, police disciplinary panels, and members of the public. These incidents have sparked important policy shifts that are in line with the OHRC’s recommendation to expand reporting requirements.

For example, in response to an incident where officers unjustly handcuffed an Indigenous man and his grandchild, the Vancouver Police Board developed an interim Use of Handcuffs policy after conducting its own extensive review.²³ In subsequent disciplinary police proceedings, the officers were found to have acted “recklessly using unnecessary force on Mr. Johnson and his granddaughter by applying handcuffs to the parties on arrest without good and sufficient cause.”²⁴

In 2020, the HRTO found Peel police officers violated section 1 of the Code when they handcuffed and shackled a Black six-year-old girl at her elementary school.²⁵ The Tribunal stated, “The handcuffing of an individual by police epitomizes a use of force that is a potent symbol of the authority of the state. Quite simply, the use of handcuffs by police restricts the individual’s freedom and therefore amounts to adverse treatment.”²⁶

In response to this case and other concerns about systemic racial discrimination, the Peel Regional Police has entered into a Human Rights Project with the OHRC to develop a strategy to appropriately address use-of-force incidents involving youth.³¹  

These incidents support the calls to monitor the use of handcuffs and mechanical restraints to ensure that they are applied without bias.

For the OHRC’s recommendation on use of handcuffs and mechanical restraints, see Recommendation 31.

TPSB’s role in responding to TPS data and reports that disclose racial disparities

Sections 43 and 47 of the TPSB’s draft policy require the Chief of Police to present an annual report on use of force to a public meeting of the TPSB. The report should include:

• the number of use-of-force incidents, reports and applications of force in that year

• trends for the previous four years

• numbers and types of injuries to members of the public and officers sustained during use-of-force incidents, and

• perceived race of members of the public involved in use of force.

The report should also include an “analysis to identify any broad patterns or trends in incidents of use of force and/or de-escalation and their impacts, that could indicate the degree to which the Policy is effective in achieving its purposes as defined above, as well as training needs, equipment upgrade needs, and/or Policy modification needs.”²⁷

Where the analysis discloses disproportionalities or disparities for Code-protected groups, the TPSB should be required to act.  As it stands, the policy does not clearly state the action the TPSB will take, or the actions that it will require from TPS, when problematic trends emerge.

The OHRC recommends that the TPSB direct the TPS to establish and implement action plans where disparities arise for all Code-protected groups. The action plans should be based on established benchmarks, and set targets to address the disparities or disproportionalities identified in the annual report. This recommendation is consistent with the requirements in the Anti-Racism Act and its data standards. But it goes beyond this framework by recommending the TPS take action where the data uncovers disparities for Code-protected groups not covered by the Anti-Racism Act, such as persons in crisis.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding race-based disparities in reports to the TPSB, see Recommendation 34.

Discharged conducted energy weapons and subsequent investigations

The draft policy mandates an investigation²⁸ when an officer discharges their firearm. However, it does not mandate an investigation when an officer discharges a conducted energy weapon (CEW). Discharging a CEW should be subjected to the same investigative standards as a firearm. Both weapons are potentially lethal, and Code-protected groups remain disproportionately subjected to their use.

According to the TPS’s draft procedure, when a firearm is discharged, an investigator is assigned to conduct a thorough investigation and submit a report. While CEW use is subject to reporting and review, it is not subject to the same scrutiny as the discharge of a firearm.

The policy and training framework currently in place has not dispelled human rights concerns related to CEWs. For example, in 2017 the OHRC’s written deputation to the TPSB on CEWs referred to a Canadian study finding that people with addictions may be more likely to die after being struck by a CEW.²⁹

The Inquiry’s 2020 report, A Disparate Impact, found that Black people were grossly overrepresented in most use-of-force categories, including CEW use. Black people represented 8.8% of Toronto’s population, and 45.5% of cases involving police CEW use.³⁰ The TPS should be directed to investigate instances when CEWs are discharged and identify trends, in an effort to combat the persistent disparities in this area.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding the use of CEWs, see Recommendation 35.

Use of force and youth

TPS and TPSB’s respective incident response and de-escalation policies do not provide much guidance on incidents involving youth.

The TPS’s draft policy states that the Chief of Police will establish a process to ensure that officers are “trained to take into account individual physical, developmental and mental characteristics of persons in crisis, individuals with mental or developmental issues, and youth, so as to enable the Service Members to more successfully de-escalate incidents where such information is available.”

The TPSB should clarify the policy and training objectives that would guide officers when they are engaged with vulnerable populations such as youth. The OHRC takes the position that officers should always:

• Use de-escalation techniques when engaged with young persons.

• Implement training that emphasizes the child’s overall psychological and physical well-being.³¹

• Seek intervention from trained mental health or child and youth professionals to address non-criminal behaviours.

As part of these efforts, the TPS should ensure that officers use a trauma-informed approach that acknowledges that “racialized and equity-seeking groups are at greater risk for experiencing four or more types of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) that result in trauma.”³² This is particularly important for children under the age of 12.

When young persons over 12 are engaged, officers should “employ developmentally appropriate and trauma informed tactics”³³ that include using a calm and natural demeanour and avoid threatening language.³⁴ Officers should employ the least intrusive interventions that consider the child’s physical and mental development. In addition, heightened training for 911 dispatchers (discussed later in this chapter) will help streamline the number of incidents involving children that warrant a police response.

Considering the findings from JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board,³⁵ mechanical restraints like handcuffs should not be used on children.³⁶

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding youth and the use of force, see Recommendations 36 and 37.

Use of lethal force

To place the highest value on the protection of life and the safety of the public, the TPSB should provide clear guidance to the TPS on circumstances where the use of deadly force is prohibited.

For example, the Camden County Police use-of-force policy defines deadly force and sets out circumstances where it should not be used.³⁷ Among other prohibitions, the Camden policy prohibits the use of deadly force as a means to prevent property damage or loss, to prevent the destruction of evidence, or against a person who poses a threat only to themselves and not to others.

A similar policy should be adopted by the TPS.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding the use of lethal force, see Recommendations 27 and 28.

Commitment to “zero harm and zero death”

The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, stated in unequivocal terms that the goal of the TPS should be “zero harm and zero death.” This means that the goal should be no harm and no deaths when police interact with a member of the public.

On October 18, 2017, the TPS stated that it “striv[es] every day to achieve zero harm/zero death in all interactions with the public.”³⁸ Sadly, this goal remains elusive, particularly for Black people.

Considering this Inquiry’s finding of systemic anti-Black racism and that Black persons are more likely to be subject to police force, including lethal force, the commitment to zero harm and zero death must be reaffirmed and clarified. It must be implemented in a manner that takes into account the unique experiences of Black communities.

For the Inquiry’s recommendations regarding the use of lethal and less-lethal force, see Recommendations 23, 25, 26, 27, and 28.

Disarming front-line officers in appropriate circumstances

Being a police officer can be a dangerous job. Police officers are often asked to deal with high-stress situations where their health and safety, and that of the persons they encounter, may be at risk. The presence of guns in Toronto makes police work even more dangerous and, as such, there are times when an armed response is required.

However, there may be circumstances where police officers do not need to be armed, and where the presence of an armed officer may be unnecessarily frightening or intimidating, and/or escalate a situation rather than de-escalate. The OHRC believes that the TPS should consider disarming some front-line officers in appropriate circumstances.

This Inquiry found that between 2013 and 2017, a Black person in Toronto was nearly 20 times more likely than a White person to be involved in a fatal shooting by the TPS. This disparity warrants a serious exploration of changes to policies or procedures that can reduce the number of shooting incidents involving TPS officers, while preserving the safety of all parties during interactions with police.

Members of Black communities and police accountability advocacy groups have long pushed for disarming. For example, the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel recommended that the TPSB “commit to undertake a study of jurisdictions where police do not routinely patrol with firearms, to determine if and how such a model could be adopted in whole or in part within Toronto.”³⁹

There is no statutory requirement for police officers to carry guns. It is not mandated in the Police Services Act or any other legislation or regulation. Rather, O. Reg. 283/08 (3.1)(2): Equipment and Use of Force grants Chiefs of Police the power to exercise their discretion to authorize an officer to carry a firearm by enacting a procedure.⁴⁰

Thus, Chiefs of Police appear to have the discretion to determine whether and which officers carry firearms.

In Toronto, the possession of a firearm is authorized by Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation), which states that officers be “issued a firearm.” Notably, there is no stated requirement that officers “carry” that firearm while on patrol.

At a TPSB meeting in April 2021, counsel for the TPS acknowledged that the requirement that all officers carry a firearm was not set out in the Police Services Act or any legislation or regulation, but rather was a matter of occupational health and safety and collective bargaining, based on the tasks officers are required to perform.⁴¹

The TPSB’s former Chair Jim Hart and former Executive Director Ryan Teschner reaffirmed this position during an interview with the OHRC. They further emphasized that if the issue of disarming was to be reviewed, it would need to be at a provincial level.⁴²

However, there is no express language in TPS collective agreements indicating a legal requirement for officers to carry a firearm at all times, nor does there appear to be any case law where the courts or arbitrators have confirmed that police officers in Ontario must carry firearms.⁴³   

TPSB’s collective agreement with the TPA includes sections that state that all uniform patrol cars, except those assigned to traffic duties, shall be manned by two fully trained and armed police officers while on patrol during specified hours.⁴⁴ It could be argued that the decision to arm officers is an implied term of the collective agreement. Nonetheless, these provisions do not expressly preclude the TPS or TPSB from exploring whether officers can be deployed unarmed in low-risk situations.⁴⁵

Contrary to the stereotype of a criminal armed with a gun, in most TPS use-of-force cases, regardless of race, the civilians were not in possession of a weapon at the time of their encounters with police.⁴⁶

The TPS and TPSB should urge the provincial government to publicly review whether there are situations where officers can be deployed with non-lethal weapons instead of guns, and engage with the provincial government as part of this review.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding use of force, non-lethal weapons and de-escalation, see Recommendations 23, 26,  and Recommendations 91 and 92.

Supervision to address systemic racial discrimination in TPS use of force

This Inquiry’s finding that Black people are disproportionately impacted by TPS’s use of force shows that supervision within the TPS must
be strengthened.

TPS’s current policies and procedures may capture individual instances of discrimination, but it is unclear whether there are systems in place to effectively monitor the connection between these incidents and
systemic barriers.

The Incident Response procedure should provide more guidance in this area. For example, in his interview with the OHRC, Superintendent of Professional Standards, Domenic Sinopoli, indicated that if he was reviewing a case alleging excessive force involving a Black complainant, he would not examine whether race was a factor unless there was something to trigger a review. However, specific allegations of racial profiling or a statement by a complainant or witness would trigger further analysis.⁴⁷

TPS’s issued Incident Response procedure sets out a process for reviewing each use-of-force report. As part of this process, a supervisory officer will notify the Unit Investigation Officer and/or the Unit Complaint Coordinator and review all body-worn camera and in-car camera footage of the officers involved in the incident.⁴⁸ This review considers the principles of fair and impartial policing to recognize implicit biases.

The draft Incident Response procedure also stipulates that upon being notified, a Unit Investigating Supervisor shall review a use-of-force report for the purpose of identifying instances of inappropriate or excessive use of force that requires additional training, discipline, or notification of the SIU, and to “identify and address any evidence of the use of force based on Human Rights Code protected grounds.”⁴⁹

However, based on a review of TPS procedures, and interviews with TPS leadership about supervision, the OHRC found gaps in TPS’s ability to monitor systemic discrimination. For example, the issued Incident Response procedure states that the Unit Commander – Professional Standards will conduct an annual study that includes an analysis of use-of-force trends for the entire Service.⁵⁰ This section of the procedure does not expressly direct the Unit Commander to identify trends related to racial discrimination. Nor does it direct the Unit Commander to advance recommendations to the TPS or TPSB in response to the trends identified.

Progress has been made to increase the scope of the Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights Unit’s work, and to further support officers in their ability to identify racial profiling, discrimination, and anti-Black racism. This work must continue to be prioritized.

Effective early warning or early intervention systems (EIS) based on race data and other important indicators are particularly important to enhance screening for racial profiling and racial discrimination in TPS use of force. Further discussion of EIS can be found in Chapter 9.

Finally, day-to-day supervision of officers and performance management should be strengthened to identify, monitor, and address the racial profiling, discrimination and systemic factors that may contribute to the overrepresentation of Black person in use-of-force data.

The OHRC reviewed over 140⁵¹ Use of Force Reports made between July 2016 and June 2017. Despite the reports having a field to indicate a recommendation for additional training, the OHRC did not find any incidents where it was recommended as a result of a use-of-force incident, including training on racial profiling or racial discrimination.⁵²

When asked, the TPS was unable to provide the number of officers for whom additional training was recommended during the period of the Inquiry.⁵³ Deputy Chief Shawna Coxon advised that additional training would depend on the context of the situation and the officer’s history.⁵⁴ Although TPS supervisors conduct regular reviews of use-of-force incidents, the OHRC is concerned that officers do not appear to be referred for training to address issues. This suggests a fundamental flaw in this accountability mechanism.

See OHRC’s recommendations regarding supervision, see Recommendations 33, 34, and 61(b).

Transfer of public safety functions to other agencies or organizations

During the Inquiry, there was considerable public discourse on the concept of detasking. It was consistently suggested that reducing the number of incidents with which police are tasked would reduce use-of-force incidents, racial disparities in use-of-force data, and improve public safety.

University of Toronto Professor Akwasi Owusu-Bempah characterized detasking as:

…a reallocation or a reassignment of certain tasks and functions that we recognize that the police aren't performing very well, that there are negative outcomes to their involvement in those activities such as increased risk for the use of violence and potential for criminalization…⁵⁵

In a report issued in early 2023, the British Columbia Office of the Human Rights Commissioner stated that detasking may result in greater safety and better outcomes:

Detasking the police in key areas would improve community safety and particularly the safety of Indigenous, Black and other racialized communities who are disproportionately impacted by biased policing by investing in evidence-based services that reflect community needs.

Improving community safety requires a shift in focus from the police as default responders to other community safety strategies. Key steps include detasking police as first responders to mental health crises, substance use crises and homelessness, and reallocating funding towards health-based services and housing supports.⁵⁶

Former Mayor of Toronto John Tory spoke positively about the potential for detasking to address systemic racism in policing:

We must fix that model by changing the way policing is done in order to stamp out systemic racism within our police service, and to re-think, in some cases, whether police are the right community response at all.⁵⁷

Justice Gloria Epstein in her Report of The Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations recommended that certain tasks previously performed by police be transferred to civilians.⁵⁸

The TPS and TPSB response to community calls for transfer of public safety functions

The TPSB and TPS have taken some positive steps towards detasking. In 2020, the TPSB published Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (Police Reform Report).

Responding to community calls for detasking, the TPSB adopted the following recommendations from its Police Reform report:

1. The Executive Director to work with the Service, City Manager and other stakeholders to identify the categories of calls that might be addressed by a non-police response.
2. The Executive Director to work with the City Manager, Government of Ontario, community based mental health and addictions service providers, organizations representing people with mental health and/or addictions issues and other stakeholders to develop new and enhance existing alternative models of community safety response, including mobile mental health and addictions crisis intervention.
3. The Executive Director to work with the Service, and others including the Auditor General, to identify non-core policing services that can be delivered by alternative service providers.
4. The Executive Director to work with the Service, and others including the Auditor General, to identify funding or areas of funding currently allocated to policing that can potentially be re-allocated to support alternative community safety models and/or fund other City of Toronto programming and services that contribute to community safety.
5. The Chief of Police to work with the Chair and Executive Director to develop and implement a line-by-line approach to reviewing the police budget in order to identify opportunities for service delivery improvement and efficiencies, including the possible redirection of non-core policing functions and their associated funding to alternative non-police community safety providers or community safety services or programming.
6. The Executive Director to engage the Service to detail potential reductions to the Toronto Police Service budget that would result from any proposed changes to the current community safety response model, once the details of this alternative model are developed.

The TPS and TPSB have made considerable progress implementing Recommendations 1 and 2 through the launch of two pilot projects:

1. Community Crisis Support Services Pilot (CCSSP), and

2. 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot (CCDP).

These programs are described below.

At time of writing, the TPS had made the following progress on Recommendations 3–6:

3. In progress with a “targeted due date” of September 24, 2024.

4. In progress with the details “under assessment” and the targeted due date to be determined. According to the Staff Superintendent responsible for Strategy and Risk Management, which includes the implementation of the recommendations in the TPSB’s Police Reform Report, the Auditor General has been working with the TPS for over a year to identify categories of calls the TPS should not be involved with (see below). Before divestment can occur, “there has to be an entity that will pick it up that is able to fill the gap.”³⁷

5. Is “being organized and timelines are being established.” The “targeted due date" is December 2023. According to the Staff Superintendent responsible for Strategy and Risk Management, (5) overlaps with (3) and (4).

6. Appears to be partially contingent on the CCSSP being expanded across Toronto, which is expected in 2025.  

Mental health and alternative community safety models

During the Inquiry, the OHRC heard community calls to improve outcomes for vulnerable segments of Black communities during encounters with the police. Throughout our consultations with many stakeholders, including TPS leadership, mental health crisis response was identified as a task that mental health professionals could perform more effectively. Such a shift could also reduce use-of-force encounters involving vulnerable people.

Within this context, the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku, which examined race and mental health, recommended the TPS use the Gerstein Crisis Centre police telephone line when interacting with a person in crisis.⁵⁹ 

The OHRC is pleased to see that there has been significant work on civilian-led mental health crisis responses over the past year, which culminated in the City of Toronto’s CCSSP, the 9-1-1 CCDP, and the expansion of the Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITs).

The OHRC supports these pilot projects and the expansion of the MCIT program. However, the TPS and TPSB should address community calls to expand civilian-led mental health crisis responses to reduce police interactions with people in crisis. These services should also be culturally responsive to Black and other racialized communities. Improvements to these programs and funding are discussed below.

Community Crisis Support Service Pilot

In February 2021, the Toronto City Council approved the Community Crisis Support Service Pilot (CCSSP) program.

The CCSSP provides an alternative to police enforcement, creating a community-based, client-centred, trauma-informed response to non-emergency crisis calls and wellness checks. The program focuses on health, prevention, and well-being.

On February 2, 2021, Toronto City Council voted unanimously to implement the CCSSP, with the original budget, including a direction to the “City Manager to consult with the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Chief on the potential reallocation of funds from the Toronto Police Service budget to ensure that the funding of the Community Crisis Support Services Pilot will not result in new financial burden to Toronto residents and to report the outcomes of this consultation through the City’s budget process.”⁶⁰

The program began with a budget of $1.7 million in 2021, which will increase to $7.2 million in 2024.⁶¹

In its submission to the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, the Gerstein Crisis Centre stated in relation to the CCSSP that it was:

… concerned that the financial commitments expressed by the city to support the new initiatives will not be sufficient and fall short of what is needed to achieve the intended outcomes … We strongly urge the City to re-examine their own budget and secure further funding in collaboration with the province.⁶²

A January 12, 2022 report from the City Manager to the Executive Committee states that “city-wide implementation is expected in 2025, if not sooner.”⁶³

Programs like the CCSSP should be further expanded to allow room for other proactive mental health services.

For example, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is a program that provides intensive support services for individuals with serious mental illness who have very complex needs and find engaging with other mental health services challenging.⁶⁴ ACT teams can be another resource to help prevent mental health crises that currently engage a police response.⁶⁵ 

The OHRC notes the following recommendation from the Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto report:

The City recognize that policing is not the most appropriate means of addressing community safety in all settings, and shift responsibility and resources to more appropriate strategies as follows:

[…] Initiate the necessary processes to plan and implement the reallocation of approximately $150 million in funds currently used to police people with mental health challenges and invest those funds in the expansion of civilian crisis response programs, safe beds, ACT teams, Intensive Case Management, and other crisis services.⁶⁶

9-1-1 Community Crisis Diversion Pilot

On June 24, 2021, the 9-1-1 Community Crisis Diversion Pilot (CCDP) budget of $522,000 was approved by the TPSB for a one-year term from August 1, 2021 to July 31, 2022.

In his report to the TPSB at the September 13, 2022 meeting, then-Interim Chief Ramer noted:⁶⁷

At its meeting of July 27, 2022, the [Toronto Police Services] Board received a six-month mid-term evaluation of the 9-1-1 C.C.D. in relation to the results of the pilot over the first 6 months. The mid-term evaluation reported on the success of the 9-1-1 C.C.D. having diverted 117 events from a police response.

Because of its success, the Chief recommended extending the 9-1-1 CCDP from October 1, 2022 to September 30, 2023, with an increased budget of $1,002,300. The budget enhancement provides for expanded services, including:⁶⁸

[…] expanding the catchment area from 14, 51 and 52 Divisions to anywhere in Toronto, and increasing staffing from one crisis worker operating in the 9-1-1 CCDP for 20 hours each day (between 07:00 a.m. and 03:00 a.m.) to a second crisis worker to overlap with the first during the peak hours of demand for 24 hours each day. This avoids any gap in alternative response option service.

The TPSB approved the recommendation on September 13, 2022.⁶⁹

In the TPS news release, Susan Davis, Executive Director of the Gerstein Crisis Centre, noted:

Gerstein Crisis Centre welcomes the expansion of the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project with our Toronto Police Service partners as we continue to build purpose-built infrastructure for mental health support across the City of Toronto. Our communities are facing complex issues and solutions will require innovative and collaborative models that work across sectors to create a strong support network for all Torontonians connecting people to the right supports when they need them and wherever they reach out.⁷⁰

The OHRC also welcomes the expansion and extension of the 9-1-1 CCDP. The TPS and TPSB should consider making the program permanent so that vulnerable people in crisis can be assisted in the safest and most culturally responsive way possible.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding non-police crisis response and an independent civilian review or commission to address community calls for de-tasking, see Recommendations 7 and 8.

Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams

Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITs) are collaborations between participating Toronto-area hospitals and the TPS. A mental health nurse and a specially trained police officer respond to situations involving people experiencing a mental health crisis.⁷¹

The program has been in place for many years. However, it has been limited to certain divisions and times of day. Over the years, there have been clear and consistent requests and recommendations to make the program available across the city around the clock.

On August 18, 2020, the TPSB directed the Chief to create a plan to implement an “immediate expansion of the MCIT program … with a view to providing MCIT services 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and across all Divisions.”⁷² Then-Interim Chief Ramer confirmed that the TPS would have 24-hour coverage from MCITs by the end of the first quarter of 2021.⁷³

At its April 22, 2021, meeting, the TPSB received a report from Chief Ramer stating that MCITs would be expanded to run 14.5 hours a day (9:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m.)⁷⁴ However, the report also noted:⁷⁵

Expansion to provide [MCIT] coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and across all divisions will require on-going advocacy in collaboration with hospital partners for more funding from the Ontario Ministry of Health to increase the number of nurses in the program and support their salaries. Program nurses are employed by the hospitals and their salaries are, therefore, paid through provincial health care funding allocations.

The Divisional Crisis Support Officer (D.C.S.) Program has been developed to provide additional support to those in crisis when the M.C.I.T.s are unavailable or not working. The D.C.S. will be a 1 officer car deployed daily in each division throughout the city on each platoon. The D.C.S. officer will have specialized training in de-escalation techniques, communication skills, the role intersectionality plays in mental health disorders and common mental health disorders.

By the completion of the M.C.I.T. expansion plan in [April 2021], the M.C.I.T.'s and D.C.S. officers together will provide 24-hour coverage for mental health response and support to the community and divisional officers[.]

The increase in MCIT coverage by the TPS and TPSB is important for the safety of marginalized communities in Toronto. Divisional Crisis Support officers appear to provide useful support in lieu of 24-hour MCIT coverage.

There continue to be issues that frustrate MCIT coverage. According to an internal memo obtained by CBC News, the TPS temporarily suspended the deployment of Divisional Crisis Support officers in September 2021, citing "staffing pressures." These officers were intended to assist with MCITs exclusively to ensure coverage. However, now they are expected to attend any emergency calls regardless of their nature. The memo states that the “intent is to return to the original program deployment model as soon as staffing allows.”

When asked to comment on the memo, a spokesperson for the TPS stated: “Specifically, instead of having only one dedicated police officer on each shift, we are training more [primary response unit] officers in order for them to be better prepared to respond to mental health calls for service.”⁷⁶

The OHRC urges the TPS and TPSB to maintain its original goal in the 81 Recommendations arising from the Police Reform Report. The OHRC encourages the TPS and TPSB to engage Ontario’s Ministry of Health to achieve full 24-hour MCIT coverage across Toronto.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding MCIT expansion, see Recommendations 24 and 103.

Auditor General Reports

In January 2021, as part of its Police Reform decisions, the TPSB entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Toronto’s Auditor General to have independent audits of several areas of the Service’s operations. At the June 2022 Board meeting, the Auditor General presented three reports.⁷⁷

The Auditor General’s first report deals with an audit of the 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations, with a focus on staffing, and improved information management.⁷⁸

The second report reviews certain types of calls-for-service that police currently respond to, and makes recommendations to support more effective responses. In doing so, the Auditor General identified six “event types” of calls for service where police attendance is likely “not essential.”⁷⁹ The report found that 40% of calls for service in six lower-priority event types “could have been handled by alternative responses if proper alternative responses were in place.”⁸⁰

The Auditor General published a third report to identify key common themes and findings across the two projects.⁸¹

It is important to note that the Auditor General did not conduct a race-based analysis in completing the three reports.

These reports identify several key areas for change and action, such as undertaking reviews and evaluations, and improving information and data collection so that the Service can better allocate resources and improve its workforce management.⁸²

These actions would strengthen alternative community safety models – especially in responding to people facing mental health crises.

During the June 2022 TPSB meeting, then-Chair Jim Hart commented on the Auditor’s recommendations as follows:

…the Service, in its management response, accepted all recommendations and committed to implementing them, and work with the city and other stakeholders where necessary. The Board strongly supports the Service in its dedication to quickly moving forward to implement these recommendations and looks forward to seeing progress in this regard.

I believe that working to quickly implement the recommendations contained in these significant reports is a clear demonstration of our commitment to ensuring that policing is delivered to Torontonians in the most efficient and effective way possible.

I view the recommendations made by the Auditor General as another step in our ongoing work to evolve and modernize the Service to meet the complex needs of the City, by understanding when police services are needed, recognizing when the public would be better served by another agency or stakeholder, and allocate the Service’s and other resources to deliver community safety, and ensure community wellbeing, most efficiently and effectively. This is complex, collaborative work that will take time and effort, but the result will be better, more effective services for everyone. ^[83]

The TPA also supported the Auditor’s reports in a public statement:

The Toronto Police Association is thanking City of Toronto Auditor General Beverly Romeo-Beehler and her team for their thorough, evidence-based examination of 9-1-1 Operations and Police Response to Calls for Service and is asking the Toronto Police Service and all levels of government to move quickly on the AG’s recommendations …

The TPA and its members have known for years that without a proper investment in other social services, calls for help will continue to fall at the feet of policing; this cannot continue. As the AG notes, our members want to help people, but we are also open to different ways of doing business, including having a non-police entity respond to certain calls for service, where and when it’s appropriate.” ^[84]

The OHRC supports the findings and recommendations made in the Auditor General’s reports, and is encouraged by the TPS, TPSB and TPA’s decision to acknowledge the reports’ findings.

The OHRC encourages the TPSB and TPS to continue their efforts to detask, and empower community agencies/organizations to play a more significant role in promoting public safety, particularly with respect to calls for mental health support.

The alternative service delivery models discussed in this section have the strong potential to address critical gaps in police service delivery. First, the alternative service delivery models provide experts in areas such as mental health with the resources and funding required to improve the response to persons in crisis. In doing so, outcomes for these Code-protected groups, including Black persons experiencing crisis, may be improved. Secondly, the availability of alternative service providers will reduce the demand for police services. In turn, police resources may be directed to other tasks.

Chapter 7 Endnotes

_{[1] Clare Lewis, The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General, 1989), online: https://archive.org/details/mag_00066901.}

_{[2] Stephen Lewis, Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario, Bob Rae (Toronto: 9 June 1992), online (pdf): www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/report_of_the_advisor_on_race_relations_to_the_premier_of_ontario_bob_rae.pdf.}

_{[3] The Honourable Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling, The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence, vol 1 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2008) at 119, online (pdf): https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn30240-vol1-eng.pdf.}

_{[4] The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, Police Encounters with People in Crisis: An Independent Review Conducted by The Honourable Frank Iacobucci for Chief of Police William Blair, Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Toronto Police Service, 2014) at 17, 18, 153–155, 205–209, online (pdf): Global News https://globalnews.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/police-encounters-with-people-in-crisis.pdf.}

_{[5] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Reyal Jardine-Douglas, Sylvia Klibingaitis, and Michael Eligon (February 2014) at Recommendation 10.}

_{[6] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendations 1, 8.}

_{[7] For example, there have been a number of fatal shootings by TPS involving persons with mental health issues, including Andrew Loku, Michael Eligon, Lester Donaldson, and Albert Johnson. Fatal encounters that did not involve a shooting include the death of Regis Korchinski-Pacquet.}

_{[8] TPS, Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation) (27 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf.}

_{[9] TPS, “15-01 – Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) Consultation Draft” at 4—5 online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[10] The TPSB’s policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis, and Public Reporting explains the scope of interactions that will be subject to race-based data reporting. The policy states that TPS has “chosen a phased implementation of this Policy, with a focus on a single area for collection first: Use of Force. After this first phase, the Board will, as soon as possible, expand the application of this Policy …”. See TPSB, Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting (19 September 2019), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/177-race-based-data-collection-analysis-and-public-reporting.}

_{[11] RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5 (1).}

_{[12] TPSB, Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), at Appendix A, recommendation 49 online (pdf): online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[13] Equipment and Use of Force, RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5, online: https://canlii.ca/t/tv8#sec14.5. The provincial use of force report is to be completed by a Service member when the use force in the circumstances specified by section 14.5(1) of the Equipment and Use of Force regulation (RRO 1990, Reg 926).}

_{[14] TPSB, “De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Consultation Draft”, at section 45, online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0}

_{[15] Equipment and Use of Force, RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5, online: https://canlii.ca/t/tv8#sec14.5.}

_{[16] TPSB, “De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Consultation Draft,” at section 47 online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[17] Chokeholds are a neck restraint which constrict a person’s airway. The “carotid hold” technique obstructs blood flow to the brain, but not the airway, causing a person to become unconscious: OHRC, “OHRC letter and submission on the Equipment and Use of Force Regulatory Amendment and Implementation of Modernized Use of Force Report” (30 October 2022), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/ohrc-letter-and-submission-equipment-and-use-force-regulatory-amendment-and-implementation.}

_{[18] The OHRC reviewed a TPS draft procedure, which was shared publicly in early 2023, TPS, “15-01 – Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) Consultation Draft” online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[19] TPS, Incident Response Procedure (15-01) (27 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf. The procedure also requires members to complete a use of force report when an officer: draws a handgun in the presence of a member of the public; discharges a firearm or less lethal weapon; points a firearm regardless if the firearm is a handgun or long gun; uses a weapon other than a firearm on another person; uses a CEW as a demonstrated force presence, in drive stun mode or full deployment. The TPSB’s Use of Force policy approved March 22, 2007 does not require use of force reporting where the physical force used does not result in an injury requiring medical attention.}  

_{[20] Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220 at para 196.}

_{[21] This includes lower-level use-of-force cases that resulted in physical injury (such as bruises and lacerations) but did not rise to the level of the SIU’s “serious injury” threshold. OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2020), Executive Summary at 3, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/A%20Disparate%20Impact%20-%20TPS%20inquiry%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[22] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Definitions at 2—6, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[23] Vancouver Police Department, “Vancouver Police updates handcuffing policy” (7 April, 2023), online: https://vpd.ca/news/2023/04/07/vancouver-police-updates-handcuffing-policy/#:~:text=The%20Vancouver%20Police%20Board%20undertook,devices%20used%20by%20VPD%20officers.}

_{[24] “Vancouver police acted ‘oppressively’ during arrest of BMO customer and his granddaughter”}

 _{APTN National News (6 April 2022), online: https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/vancouver-police-acted-oppressively-during-arrest-of-bmo-customer-and-his-granddaughter/.}

_{[25] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040.}

_{[26] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 34.}

_{[27] TPSB, “Consultation Draft: De-Escalation and Appropriate Use of Force” (22 March 2007) at s 43(h), online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[28] Section 41 of the TPSB’s De-Escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy states that the Chief of Police will “[i]mmediately cause an investigation to be made where a member unintentionally or intentionally discharges their firearm, except on a target range or in the course of weapon maintenance.”}

_{[29] Temitope Oriola, Nicole Neverson and Charles T Adeyanju, “‘They should have just taken a gun and shot my son’: Taser deployment and the downtrodden in Canada” (2012) 18:1 Soc Identities 65 at 65, 74. The researchers found that 16 of 26 Taser-related deaths in Canada involved persons with “chronic drug problems.”}

_{[30] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 95, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[31] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 98.}

_{[32] “Trauma is the response to a deeply distressing or disturbing event that overwhelms an individual’s central nervous system and their ability to cope.” See Thrive Toronto and Wellesley Institute for the City of Toronto, “Safe TO: Roadmap to become a Trauma-Informed City” at 1, online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-168554.pdf.}

_{[33] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Children and Youth at 10, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[34] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Children and Youth at 10, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[35] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 98.}

_{[36] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (Toronto: TPS, 2022), online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf includes an appendix with 38 action items at 93. One of the action items calls for the expansion of “Adverse Childhood Experience Training to all uniform members. Currently, training is provided to Neighbourhood Community Officers.” It is unclear how the draft policy on de-escalation and use of force informs this training as the policy does not address youth.}

_{[37] See Camden County Police, Use of Force Policy at sections 4.5–4.8 online: https://www.policingproject.org/camden.}

_{[38] TPSB, “Discussion Paper for Public Consultation” delivered at Achieving Zero Harm/Zero Death – An Examination of Less-Lethal Force Options, including the Possible Expansion of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs) (18 October 2017), online: www.tpsb.ca/images/TPSBCEWConsultation_Agenda_DisPaper.pdf#:~:text=The%20Toronto%20
Police%20Service%20strive,and%20safest%20place%20to%20be.}

_{[39] ARAP, Submissions to the Toronto Police Services Board on the Draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Policy, online: https://tpsb.ca/43-consultations-and-publications/dauf/370-anti-racism-advisory-panel}

_{[40] Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15; Equipment and Use of Force, O Reg 283/08.}

_{[41] TPSB, “Virtual Public Meeting: April 22, 2021” (22 April 2021), at 2:11:10 online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQJ-0lzM8xE.}

_{[42] OHRC Interview with former Chair Jim Hart and then-Executive Director Ryan Teschner (Toronto Police Service Board) (14 October 2022).}

_{[43] Ontario Ministry of Labour, Training and Skills Development “Collective Agreements” (9 June 2021), online: https://sp.ltc.gov.on.ca/sites/mol/drs/ca/search/pages/results_en.aspx?k=Toronto%20Police#Default=%7B%22k%22%3A%22Toronto%20Police%20Services%20Board%22%2C%22r%22%3A%5B%7B%22n%22%3A%22LTCIMEmployer%22%2C%22t%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22ǂǂ546f726f6e746f20506f6c696365.}

_{[44] Toronto Police Service Collective Agreement between the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Association 2019-2023 at articles 7.08, 8 online: https://ws.lr.labour.gov.on.ca/CA/doc/913-22339-23%20(951-0222)?library=Public%20Administration .}

_{[45] The Occupational Health and Safety Act applies to policing and may raise some points to consider. For example, officers have the right to refuse unsafe work. However, “if the hazard is inherent in the work and if the work refusal puts someone else in danger, then the worker cannot refuse unsafe work.” See Public Services Health & Safety Association, “This National Police Week, Consider OHS in Your Police Agency” (19 May 2022), online: https://www.pshsa.ca/blog/this-national-police-week-consider-ohs-in-your-police-agency#home-pshsa-logo. See also Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1, s 43, online: https://canlii.ca/t/2km#sec43.}

_{[46] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 64 and 102, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf. Between 2013 and 2017, the dataset reveals that very few SIU cases involved armed attacks on TPS officers. In fact, most civilians involved in police use of force cases were unarmed during their encounter with the police. Like the SIU cases, in lower-level use-of-force cases, eight out of 10 cases (80%) involved unarmed civilians, and even when armed, civilians rarely used weapons to threaten or assault police officers.}

_{[47] OHRC interview with Superintendent Domenic Sinopoli (Professional Standards Unit) (25 February 2020).}

_{[48] This policy provision is in accordance with the 38 action items arising from the TPS’s analysis of its 2020 Race Based Data Collection. Specifically, the TPS has committed to implement mandatory reviews of body-worn cameras and in-car camera systems for all use-of-force incidents (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9).}

_{[49] TPS, 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/ De-escalation) Consultation Draft at s.19, online https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0}

_{[50] TPS, Incident Response Procedure (15-01) (27 June 2022) at 12 online (pdf) https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf.}

_{[52] Due to limitations of the TPS data collection systems, the OHRC and Dr. Wortley were only able to identify 141 Use of Force Reports containing sufficient information to allow for meaningful analysis. For a detailed description of the identification process, see Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 93, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[52] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 86, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[53] Letter to the OHRC with answers and materials from Superintendent Christopher Kirkpatrick (3 September 2020) at 9.}

_{[54] OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Shawna Coxon (Communities and Neighbourhood Command) (28 February 2020).}

_{[55] Brooklyn Neustaeter, “What defunding the police could look like in Canada’s largest city” CTV News (10 June 2020), online: CTV News www.ctvnews.ca/canada/what-defunding-the-police-could-look-like-in-canada-s-largest-city-1.4977969.}

_{[56] British Columbia’s Office of Human Rights Commissioner, Equity is safer: Human rights considerations for policing reform in British Columbia (November 2021) at 49, online: www.bchumanrights.ca/publications/scorpa/.}

_{[57 Nick Boisvert “Toronto Mayor John Tory calling for police reform in bid to ’stamp out systemic racism,” CBC News online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/tory-police-reform-motion-1.5626549}

_{[58] The Honourable Gloria J. Epstein, Missing and Missed: Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations, Independent Reviewer at p. 727 and 869.}

_{[59] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 14.}

_{[60] Toronto City Council, “EX20.1 – Community Crisis Support Service Pilot” (2 February 2021), online: http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2021.EX20.1.}

_{[61] City of Toronto, “EX20.1 – Report for Action – Community Crisis Support Service Pilot” (13 January 2021) at 18, online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-160016.pdf.}

_{[62] Gerstein Crisis Centre, “Deputation to City of Toronto Executive Committee Re: Community Support Service Pilot (Ex20.1)” (26 January 2021) online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/comm/communicationfile-126274.pdf.}

_{[63] City of Toronto, “Report for Action – 2022 Launch of Community Crisis Support Service Pilots and Policing Reform Updates” (12 January 2022), online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-175060.pdf.}

_{[64] Canadian Mental Health Association, “Assertive Community Treatment (ACT)”, online: https://toronto.cmha.ca/programs-services/assertive-community-treatment-act-teams/.}

_{[65] Toronto Neighbourhood Centres et al, Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto (2021) at 10, online (pdf): https://ccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Rethinking-Community-Safety-A-Step-Forward-For-Toronto-Full-Report-12.pdf.}

_{[66] Toronto Neighbourhood Centres et al, Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto (2021) at 23–24, online (pdf): https://ccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Rethinking-Community-Safety-A-Step-Forward-For-Toronto-Full-Report-12.pdf.}

_{[67] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project from James Ramer, Chief of Police at 4, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[68] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), “Toronto Police Services Board Report: Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project”, James Ramer, Chief of Police (29 August 2022) at 13, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[69] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project from James Ramer, Chief of Police at 4, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0}

_{[70] Blue Line Staff and Toronto Police Service, “Toronto Police and Gerstein Crisis Centre extend the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project for another year”, Blue Line (2 November 2022), online: Blue Line https://www.blueline.ca/toronto-police-and-gerstein-crisis-centre-extend-the-9-1-1-crisis-call-diversion-pilot-project-for-another-year/.}

_{[71] TPS, “Mobile Crisis Intervention Team”, online: https://www.tps.ca/organizational-chart/communities-neighbourhoods-command/field-services/community-partnerships-engagement-unit/mobile-crisis-intervention-team-mcit/.}

_{[72] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), recommendation 4 at 17, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[73] TPSB, “Virtual Public Meeting: December 15, 2020” (15 December 2020) at 19:00 online:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKAkNc7lgk0 See also:  TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: December 15, 2020” (15 December 2020), Remarks from Chief Ramer at the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/57-2020/656-december-15.}

_{[74] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: April 22, 2021” (22 April 2021), online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/59-2021/690-april-22.}

_{[75] TPSB, "Report on Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (M.C.I.T.) Program Expansion Plan and 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot” (6 April 2021), online (pdf): https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R1b_4_MCIT_Expansion_plan_and_911_Crisis_Call_Diversion_Pilot.pdf.}

_{[76] Adam Carter, “Toronto police temporarily suspending program for officers meant to assist on mental health calls,” CBC News (20 October 2021), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-suspension-1.6218283.}

_{[77] TPSB: June 22, 2022 (22 June 2022) at 9, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[78] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228260.pdf.}

_{79] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022) at 5, online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf. The six event types include: check address, check well-being, unwanted guest, dispute, landlord and tenant dispute, noisy parties.}

_{[80] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf.}

_{[81] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022) at 9, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Key Common Themes: Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Operations & Review of Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228367.pdf.}

_{[82] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228260.pdf; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Key Common Themes: Toronto Police Service – Audit of 911 Operations & Review of Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228367.pdf.}

_{[83] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022) at 11, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[84] TPA, “Toronto Police Association Supports Findings by City of Toronto Auditor General: TPA Agrees Members Have Become ‘Default Response’,” Globe Newswire (22 June 2022), online: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/06/22/2467469/0/en/Toronto-Police-Association-Supports-Findings-by-City-of-Toronto-Auditor-General.html.}

Since 2010, the TPS and TPSB have implemented various programs, policies, and procedures to address racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism, including the:

• Police and Community Engagement Review (PACER)¹
• TPS Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights (EIHR) unit²
• TPSB Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP)³
• TPSB Race and Ethnocultural Equity Policy (EEP)⁴
• TPSB Human Rights Policy⁵
• TPS Human Rights Strategy and Procedure⁶
• Project Charter between the TPS, TPSB and the OHRC⁷
• Neighbourhood Officer Program.⁸

This chapter addresses the need for a distinct TPS procedure and TPSB policy on racial profiling, and summarizes the changes to TPS training during the Inquiry period to address systemic issues. The chapter also identifies critical gaps in training that demonstrate the need for a comprehensive evaluation of all training.

Racial profiling

Evidence of systemic racial profiling can be found in an organization’s formal and informal policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. Discretionary, less-formal processes combined with under-monitored, less-regulated decision-making provide opportunities for ambiguity, subjectivity, and racial bias.

Currently the TPSB and TPS do not have distinct policies or procedures on racial profiling.⁹ The absence of such policies and procedures has been recognized as a factor that inhibits trust between Black communities and the police, and may contribute to incidents that can contribute to a breach of the Human Rights Code.¹⁰

The OHRC found no distinct definition of racial profiling in TPSB policies or TPS procedures, despite the existence of definitions for racial disparity, racial disproportionality, racial equity and inequity, intersectionality and racially biased policing in TPS procedures., Racial profiling is subsumed as a concept under racially biased policing. None of the TPSB policies or TPS procedures identify or prohibit activities that amount to racial profiling. Principles from case law are not articulated, and clear roles and responsibilities for officers, supervisors, the Chief of Police, and TPSB are not defined.

The absence of clear policies and procedures on racial profiling has been recognized as a factor contributing to racial discrimination in the United States.

California

California’s Racial and Identity Policing Board (RIPB) was created by state legislation to eliminate racial profiling and improve racial sensitivity in law enforcement. Its mandate includes publishing an annual report with policy recommendations for eliminating racial profiling. It drew from a range of stakeholders such as law enforcement, academic, governmental and non-profit organizations with relevant expertise to compile best practices.¹¹

The RIPB stated that “Foundational to any bias-free policing policy should be the inclusion of a clear written policy and procedure regarding an agency's commitment to identifying and eliminating racial and identity profiling if and where it exists.”¹² The RIPB stated:

Agencies should create a separate policy dedicated to bias-free policing that expressly prohibits racial and identity profiling. The policy should explicitly and strongly express the agency's core values and expectations when it comes to bias-free policing … The policy should clearly articulate when the consideration of race, ethnicity, disability and other protected characteristics is inappropriate in carrying out duties and when it is legitimate policing to consider them (e.g., when a specific suspect description includes race or other protected characteristics).¹³

 

Baltimore

The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has linked the failure to create adequate policy mechanisms in Baltimore to racial disparities and low community trust.

The DOJ found the failure of the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to have adequate policy mechanisms, among other things, to prevent discrimination, contributed to the large racial disparities in BPD’s enforcement that “undermine the community’s trust in the fairness of the police.”¹⁴

For example, the BPD lacked a fair and impartial policing strategy until 2015, “despite longstanding notice of concerns about its policing of the City’s African-American population.” Before enacting its Fair and Impartial Policing policy in 2015, BPD only had a general prohibition against discrimination, which did not provide sufficient guidance to officers on how to conduct their policing activities in a non-discriminatory way, although it did provide a basis for the BPD to discipline officers.¹⁵

The TPSB and TPS

Numerous reports, including the TPSB’s own Police Reform Report, have recognized the need for policies and procedures on racial profiling.

Recommendation 45 of the Police Reform Report recommends that the Chair and Executive Director of the TPSB explore and report on the Board’s ability to enact a policy where all instances of alleged racial profiling and bias are investigated and addressed.¹⁶

The OHRC has previously recommended that its policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement^xvii be adopted by the TPSB and TPS. The TPSB has advised that it will consider this policy as it implements the recommendation from the Police Reform Report and is “open to the idea of considering the need for a stand-alone policy on racial profiling, based on the guidance recently provided by the OHRC.”¹⁸

Given the large racial disparities the OHRC documented in the Inquiry’s reports, it is imperative that the TPSB and TPS develop strong and coherent policies and procedures to address and combat racial profiling.

As noted above, evidence of systemic racial profiling can be found in an organization’s formal and informal policies, procedures and decision-making processes. The less formal the process, and the less closely decisions are regulated or monitored, the more opportunity there is for ambiguity, subjective considerations, discretionary decision-making and racial bias to come into play.¹⁹

Other Ontario Police forces have begun to enact such policies. For example, the Peel Regional Police (PRP) has updated a directive on Racial Profiling and Bias-Based Policing in response to HRTO decision Nassiah v. Peel (Regional Municipality) Services Board.²⁰ The directive, which includes procedures, training, and accountability, will be used to familiarize all PRP personnel and address profiling and biased policing.

At a minimum, TPSB and TPS policies and procedures must include:

• a definition of racial profiling
• how racial profiling can be identified by TPS officers
• a strict prohibition on racial profiling, and
• accountability mechanisms, including disciplinary consequences for any breach of the policy.²¹

For the OHRC’s recommendations on a racial profiling policy, see Recommendations 38 and 39.

Training

When the Inquiry began, the OHRC undertook to review TPS training material related to racial profiling and racial discrimination between the periods of January 2010 to January 2017.

The TPS provided various training resources to the OHRC that give snapshots of segments of training programs and outlines for courses.

The OHRC’s review of these resources found several flaws in the TPS training, including:

• insufficient information on racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism

• inadequate explanation of key principles related to racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism, and

• lack of integration of key concepts into broader training programs.

Since our review of these initial documents, the release of the OHRC policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement, the release of the Inquiry’s interim reports A Collective Impact and A Disparate Impact, and subsequent engagements of the OHRC and the TPS and TPSB, the TPS has improved its training.

TPS documents received in 2023 show the TPS has made efforts to ensure their training addresses racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism. For example, the addition of active-bystander training, a dedicated anti-Black racism training developed by subject-matter experts, and scenario-based training on racial discrimination are now part of the In-Service Training. These are steps in the right direction.

2010 to 2017

Each year all TPS officers receive training through the Toronto Police College (TPC) called the In-Service Training Program (ISTP). Officers receive the ISTP training over three days.

Day 1 is dedicated to classroom learning. Days 2 and 3 focus on active training, which includes “dynamic simulations” where officers participate in scenarios involving live actors, firearms, Conducted Energy Weapons (CEW) training, and “judgment training” where officers participate in scenarios through interactive video simulations. The scaffolding approach to training is used, building on the knowledge learned from the ISTP from previous years.²²

The OHRC found that the TPS’s 2017 ISTP training resources did not sufficiently focus on racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism. While the training did include some units related to these concepts – such as presentations from Black communities about their lived experiences, a scenario involving a traffic stop of a Black man who felt he was the victim of racial profiling, and a scenario on anti-Muslim bias – anti-racism or discrimination concepts were not fully integrated within the entire course. The lack of integration appeared in several areas of the training. Dynamic simulations, for example, did not include scenarios where officers identify and address racial discrimination.

The training resources also failed to integrate racial profiling, racial discrimination, racial bias, and anti-Black racism concepts into core training sessions. For example, the following training materials provided to the OHRC did not mention these concepts:

• 2014 criminal offences study package for general investigators
• 2016 arrest and release training
• 2017 traffic generalist course
• 2017 provincial statutes course
• 2017 in-service training re use of force.

In addition, many of the documents demonstrated a significant lack of understanding of key principles. Key concepts, such as updated examples from case law and clear roles and responsibilities of officers and supervisors, were missing.

This example shows how the 2017 ISTP misstated a critical legal principle. Instead of recognizing established law that a prohibited ground of discrimination need only be one factor in adverse treatment for there to be discrimination, the training – delivered to all officers – erroneously indicated that racial profiling arises when race is the sole basis for an officer’s decision.²³

The error legitimized racial profiling by allowing an officer to use race and ethnicity as part of the rationale for developing an opinion about someone.

Subsequent improvements in training

Our review of documents from 2020 to 2023 demonstrates improvements to TPS training and discussions related to racial profiling, racial discrimination, and anti-Black racism. These changes were influenced by the:

• Loku inquest recommendations

• creation of the TPS’s EIHR²⁴

• TPSB’s Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting

• the OHRC policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement, the Inquiry’s reports A Collective Impact and A Disparate Impact, and subsequent engagements of the OHRC, and

• advocacy from racialized communities and the TPSB’s Police Reform Report.

In 2018, the jury in the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku recommended that the TPS develop and implement annual or regular training at division and platoon meetings focusing on the equitable delivery of policing services, stating “The training should acknowledge the social inequities and challenges faced by racialized communities.”²⁵ Topics should include bias-free service delivery and anti-Black racism, and should be provided by reputable, external educators and other experts.²⁶

In 2020, the TPSB’s Police Reform Report directed the TPS to “make permanent the current anti-Black racism training component of the annual re-training (civilians) and In-Service Training Program (uniform).”²⁷

The report also directed the Chief of Police to create a permanent and stand-alone training course that includes:

Anti-racism; anti-Black and anti-Indigenous racism; bias and implicit bias avoidance; interactions with racialized communities … an understanding of intersectionality; the importance of lived experience in developing understanding and compassionate service delivery.²⁸

The TPS is also in the process of rolling out several new initiatives in their recruit training. As of December 2022, TPS recruits receive a five-day course called “Fair and Unbiased Policing.” This course includes a review of human rights legislation, Black experiences, anti-oppressive practice, mental health and addictions, ethical inclusion leadership, emotional intelligence, and trauma and self-care and compassion delivery.²⁹

Superintendent Frank Barredo of the TPC explained that the concepts from this course are interwoven throughout other areas of the recruits’ training. For example, in dynamic simulation training, instructors assess recruits on their ability to demonstrate concepts learned in the classroom.³⁰

As part of the Fair and Unbiased Policing course, recruits also receive active-bystander training, which instructs officers to intervene when witnessing misconduct. The training includes overcoming inhibitors to intervention, such as fear of reprisal, fear of embarrassment, and natural deference to seniority and obedience, and focuses on empathy. The training is scenario-based and recruits are evaluated based on instructors’ observations.³¹

Training for officers through the ISTP has also evolved.

On Day 1 of training, the 2020 ISTP included a first-ever 30-minute module entitled “Anti-Black racism in policing and its effects.”³² Content included:

• the City of Toronto’s Confronting Anti-Black Racism Unit’s definition of anti-Black racism and the OHRC’s definition of racial profiling
• Canadian historical roots of anti-Black racism
• common anti-Black stereotypes
• research supporting “Black threat implicit bias,” and
• examples of racial profiling in suspect selection and through third-party information.³³

Senior management within the TPS indicated that anti-Black racism training was integrated throughout the three days of the 2020 ISTP, including in use-of-force training.³⁴ However, based on the OHRC’s review, the second and third days (simulation training) did not appear to integrate concepts of racial profiling, racial discrimination, racial bias, or anti-Black racism in stop, search and questioning activities, charges and arrests, and use of force.³⁵

The 2020 ISTP did include a dynamic scenario where officers are responding to a radio call about a suspicious person. The training manual states that learning points include “the importance of maintaining bias free encounters,” “the value of being able to identify criminal profiling versus bias based profiling” and the requirement that “interactions never violate the Human Rights Code.” However, race or other prohibited grounds of discrimination are not explicitly part of the scenario.³⁶

The EIHR unit also developed training to implement TPSB’s policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting. This was done in consultation with Dr. Grace-Edward Galabuzi, an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration of Toronto Metropolitan University, who has extensive experience with anti-racism and social justice.³⁷

In February 2020, all senior officers at the rank of inspector and above, and all civilian managers, received a half-day training on anti-Black racism from the City of Toronto’s Confronting Anti-Black Racism Unit.³⁸

In 2021, the TPS enhanced the anti-Black racism training in the ISTP. The course was developed by a subject matter expert and contained instructions on:

• human rights terminology, including the OHRC’s definition of racial profiling, implicit bias and ways to recognize and address it
• rebuilding trust with Black communities
• bias by proxy, and
• the impact of anti-Black racism.

The course included video scenarios and discussion of anti-Black racism.³⁹ Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the training was delivered by an e-learning course.

The 2022 ISTP included training on bias, anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination. It was delivered in person and builds on some of the concepts discussed in the 2021 course. Topics included intersectionalism,⁴⁰ being trauma-informed, and the concept of privilege.⁴¹ The TPS advised the OHRC that officers were evaluated through knowledge checks and classroom discussion by instructors.⁴² However, they did not provide any grading schemes, and the OHRC did not find any learning goals in the course training similar to dynamic simulations.

In March 2023, select staff of the OHRC participated in a full-day TPS interactive training at the TPC. The event consisted of samples of various training sessions that TPS officers receive in ISTP, including dynamic simulations. Subsequently, the TPC provided the OHRC with additional details of some components of their 2023 in-service training.

Day 1 of the 2023 ISTP includes lectures in:

• police trauma-informed resiliency
• Indigenous experiences
• incident response
• rights to counsel under the Charter
• peer intervention, and
• centering Black experiences.

Days 2 and 3 focus on active training, including dynamic simulations and judgment training as described above.⁴³

The 2023 ISTP takes steps to integrate knowledge of anti-Black racism into other areas of training, but, as discussed below, further work needs to be done. The dynamic simulations the OHRC participated in involved scenarios requiring officers to draw on a number of areas covered on Day 1 of their training, including de-escalation skills, use-of-force options, knowledge of legislation and regulations, mental health, referrals to community organizations, and trauma-informed practice.⁴⁴

Both dynamic simulations and judgment training video scenarios are followed by a debriefing session, and each scenario includes a list of criteria of anticipated responses and learning points that instructors use to evaluate officers.⁴⁵ Superintendent Barredo also stated that recruits received the same scenarios as active officers in the 2023 ISTP.⁴⁶

Within the ISTP, the 2023 anti-Black racism course, Centering Black Experiences, is 80 minutes long (in contrast to the 30 minutes received for the 2020 ISTP). It includes education, history, and some practical guidance for officers interacting with Black persons in a trauma-informed manner.

One of the main themes of this training is racial trauma. It recognizes the longstanding government policies, histories, legacies, and erasure of people of African descent in Canada, and the current psychological and physiological impacts of racial trauma on Black Canadians today. It teaches trauma-informed practice principles, de-escalation methods, and practical tools and strategies to name and reframe harmful stereotypes and support equitable communication.⁴⁷ It also includes a list of culturally responsive mental health supports for Black communities to which officers can refer people.⁴⁸

A new and welcome addition to the ISTP is the focus on peer intervention. The goals of the course include building a “healthy culture that expects and accepts intervention, at all ranks, to prevent mistakes, misconduct and to promote wellness.”⁴⁹ The course discusses circumstances that may require intervention, including misconduct, unethical and discriminatory behaviour, racism, bullying, and microaggressions.

The training discusses intervention techniques that include non-verbal communication, verbal de-escalation, calling for backup and, if necessary, physically restraining a fellow officer.⁵⁰ Examples of circumstances for intervention explicitly include racism and discrimination.

The above steps demonstrate a positive shift in training following the start of the Inquiry. However, some gaps in training remain that must be addressed.

Gaps in training

Integrating anti-Black racism into other areas of training

More needs to be done to ensure that race, including anti-Black racism, is woven throughout the ISTP. It is not enough to talk about these concepts in the classroom, without ensuring that these discussions continue in every aspect of the simulation training.

In the 2023 ISTP, anti-Black racism was only involved in one scenario – a judgment training video that required officers to draw on what they learned from their anti-Black racism classroom training. The scenario encouraged officers to examine stereotypes and bias both from their own perspectives as well as that of the Black complainant. While other concepts from Day 1 like de-escalation and mental health were integrated throughout the ISTP, anti-Black racism was only found in one simulation shared with the OHRC. In addition, other forms of racial and or Indigenous stereotypes were not found in the documents reviewed.

The OHRC participated in a scenario that mimicked the shooting death of Andrew Loku. Yet, our review of the training documents did not identify any discussion of anti-Black racism in relation to the scenario.

Intersection of race and mental health

The TPS’s training engages elements of mental health and race, but as separate concepts. More can be done to address the unique issues arising at the intersection of race and mental health.

In the Centering Black Experiences course, for example, the materials cover racial stress and trauma, and list culturally responsive resources, but do not cover the topic of mental health disorders at the intersection of race.⁵¹ 

Similarly, TPS’s Crisis and Mental Health Awareness training does not discuss the concept of race, and culturally responsive resources are not included in the list of resources.⁵²

As mentioned above, one of the dynamic simulations includes a scenario that appears to mirror the circumstances around the death of Andrew Loku: a person in crisis, holding a blunt object, in an empty hallway with the officer positioned at one end. However, the materials we reviewed in relation to this scenario – including the learning objectives and teaching points provided to instructors – do not address race. Another scenario mimicked the shooting death of Sammy Yatim, yet race and mental health were not discussed in the materials related to the scenario.

One of the dynamic simulation scenarios did address the intersection of 2SLGBTQ+ and mental health. However, the judgment training video scenario (the only one that involved race) did not involve mental health or any other intersectionality. Given the death of Andrew Loku, and other Black people experiencing mental health disorders who have died during interactions with police, it is critical that TPS training and simulations include a specific and detailed discussion of this intersection.⁵³

Evaluation

Effective evaluation includes assessing an individual officer’s understanding of relevant concepts from training, and whether anti-racism training as a whole has an impact on officer behaviour or community outcomes (e.g., whether initiatives reduce racial disproportionalities and disparities). The TPS should take steps to strengthen evaluation of officers and evaluation of all of its training programs.

Officer evaluation

The ISTP is a series of courses over three days that all officers take each year. The courses vary in content and format. As noted above, officers are required to attend lectures on anti-Black racism and officer well-being, participate in firearms training, and undergo dynamic simulation training.

Each course evaluates its attendees differently, if at all. For example, we were advised by the TPC that in the firearms training, officers are tested on their accuracy by evaluating how many times they hit a target. They must pass a threshold to continue to use their firearm.⁵⁴

 For the classroom components of the ISTP, there is no standardized, objective method of evaluating an officer on each learning objective. Superintendent Barredo stated that officers are evaluated on their classroom knowledge during other areas of training, such as dynamic simulation training where they are asked to physically demonstrate and explain actions that reflect their classroom learning.⁵⁵

In response to the Loku recommendations, the TPS noted that:

In 2018, the Service implemented an incoming knowledge check on day one of I.S.T.P. … Upon completion of day one, officers were required to complete a 14 question outgoing examination. When officers failed to show competence in certain areas, they were required to receive additional training in the identified area. In addition[,] failure to show competence in the remaining two days … resulted in officers having their use of force options removed/suspended[.]”⁵⁶

However, the material provided for the 2023 ISTP does not appear to have objective criteria that an officer must complete to pass each component of the ISTP. Instead, there is a list of general learning objectives and teaching points. The evaluation standard states:

The instructor will evaluate the learner and their ability to deal with the situation. The learner should display a high-level confidence and competence when faced with this scenario. The learner is expected to abide by all service policies and procedures as well as meet all legal requirements.

• Instructor observation
• Debrief of scenario
• Discussion and feedback from students
• A thorough debrief was held at the end of each scenario to ensure that learning objectives were retained.

It is imperative that the TPS consider implementing standardized and objective testing throughout ISTP. Officers should be required to pass a rigorous evaluation and demonstrate that lessons have been absorbed and retained.

Evaluation of training in reducing racial disparities

In addition to evaluating officers, training in anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination must be evaluated for its effectiveness to determine whether it has helped to reduce racial disparities. This level of evaluation was also recommended by the jury of the coroner’s inquest into the death of Andrew Loku.⁵⁷

To provide more public interest remedies and to capitalize on ongoing efforts by the TPS to address human rights concerns, the TPSB and TPS partnered with the OHRC to launch the Human Rights Project Charter (Project Charter) in May 2007.  The Project Charter was designed to apply a human rights lens to all aspects of policing.⁵⁸

In 2014, an independent evaluation of the Project Charter recommended that the Toronto police:

• Ensure that subsequent strategies or initiatives in human rights are based on a strong logical model with evaluation tools built in. Establish baseline data prior to the implementation of new initiatives to allow complete assessments.
• Regularly evaluate all existing diversity related training to ensure human rights elements are pertinent and effective. Include a tracking system to measure levels of participation in all mandatory and elective courses.⁵⁹

The evaluation report also stated that “evaluation of the impact of training on behaviour is required. Implementing feedback loops and evaluation strategies will ensure continuous revisions and improvement to training.”⁶⁰

TPS training on anti-Black racism and anti-racial discrimination has not been effectively evaluated. Officers taking part in such training have also not been effectively evaluated.

Before 2017, it appears that there was no external evaluation of the effectiveness of training in racial profiling, racial discrimination, or anti-Black racism, and its impact and outcomes on the community.⁶¹ 

At an October 11, 2022 TPSB meeting, Superintendent Barredo stated that the TPC had requested an external review that would conduct this level of evaluation, but they did not receive any bids. The TPSB passed a motion for the Chief of Police to report back in Q1 2023 on “[t]he efforts undertaken to attempt to retain an expert third party resource to externally evaluate training programs offered by the Toronto Police College.”⁶²

While improvements have been made over the last several years, gaps remain that must be addressed in order to ensure that training on anti-Black racism and racial discrimination results in meaningful change.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on training, see Recommendations 40–49.

Chapter 8 Endnotes

_{[1] TPSB, “Making Progress Together on Police Reform by the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police: A Six-Month Update,” online: https://tpsb.ca/mmedia/news-release-archive/listid-2/mailid-221-81-recommendations-six-month-update.}

_{[2] TPS, “Equity Inclusion & Human Rights”, online: https://www.tps.ca/organizational-chart/corporate-support-command/human-resources-command/equity-inclusion-human-rights/.}

_{[3] TPSB, “Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP)”, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/advisory-panels/24-panels-and-committees/94-arap.}

_{[4] TPSB, Race and Ethnocultural Equity Policy (15 November 2010), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/176-race-and-ethnocultural-equity-policy.}

_{[5] TPSB, Policy on Human Rights (17 December 2015), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/165-human-rights.}

_{[6] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 17, 2015” (17 September 2015), at 26–27 online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=183&catid=7&m=0.}

_{[7] OHRC, “Backgrounder – Project Charter: Ontario Human Rights Commission / Toronto Police Service / Toronto Police Services Board”, online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/backgrounder-project-charter-ontario-human-rights-commission-toronto-police-service-toronto-police.}

_{[8] TPS, “Neighbourhood Community Officer Program”, online: https://www.tps.ca/neighbourhood-community-officer-program/.}

_{[9] OHRC interview of Suelyn Knight, Manager, EIHR unit, TPS (5 March 5, 2020); responses of the Toronto Police Services Board to written questions asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19.}

_{[10] Nassiah v Peel (Regional Municipality) Services Board, 2007 HRTO 14 at paras 208–212.}

_{[11] California Department of Justice, Racial & Identity Policing Advisory Board Annual Report, (2019) at 2, online (pdf): https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2019.pdf.}

_{[12] California Department of Justice, Racial & Identity Policing Advisory Board Annual Report, (2019) at 28, online (pdf): https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2019.pdf.}

_{[13] California Department of Justice, Racial & Identity Policing Advisory Board Annual Report, (2019) at 28, online (pdf): https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2019.pdf.}

_{[14] Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, “Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department” (10 August 2016) at 8 and 62, online: www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download.}

_{[15] Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, “Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department” (10 August 2016) at 8, 47, 62, 68 and 129, online: www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download.}

_{[16] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety at 7 and 46 (10 August 2020), online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[17] OHRC, Policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2019), online (pdf): https://www3.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/RACIAL%20PROFILING%20Policy%20FINAL%20for%20Remediation.pdf.}

_{[18] Responses of the TPSB to written questions at 30, asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19.}

_{[19] OHRC, Policy on eliminating racial profiling in law enforcement (2019) at 4.1.2., online: Ontario Human Rights Commission www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-eliminating-racial-profiling-law-enforcement#_Toc17977371.}

_{[20] Nassiah v. Peel (Regional Municipality) Services Board (2007) HRTO 14}

_{[21] Diversity Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014) at 43, online (pdf): https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf.}

_{[22] TPC, “Overview of In-service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission” (23 March 2023).}

_{[23] Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para 33; Stewart v Elk Valley Coal Corp, 2017 SCC 30 at para 69 [Elk Valley]; Shaw v Phipps, 2010 ONSC 3884 at paras 11–15, 76, aff’d Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155; Peel Law Association v Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396 at paras 53–62 and 111–25; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras 40–54.}

_{[24] The EIHR unit replaced the former Diversity Management unit. The EIHR unit’s current operational priorities include the TPS’s race-based data collection strategy; gender, diversity and trans inclusion project; and “systemic review of recruitment to identify any barriers in being able to recruit from all communities.” The EIHR unit is also supporting the Toronto Police College with diversity, inclusion and human rights training. It will also conduct an enterprise-wide accessibility audit and develop a TPS equity strategy. See OHRC interview of Suelyn Knight, Manager, EIHR Unit (5 March 2020); TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: October 22, 2020” (22 October 2020), Report from Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights Unit – Progress Update on the Unit’s Work” (14 September 2020) at 77, online (pdf): https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/637-2020-oct-22-agenda; report from Chief Saunders to the TPSB re Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights Unit Structure (27 March 2019) (Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board, May 30, 2019), see Equity, Inclusion & Human Rights Unit Structure minutes and report, online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/613-may-30.}

_{[24] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 2.}

_{[26] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 2.}

_{[27] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Report from Jim Hart, Chair, regarding Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), Recommendations 52 and 53 at 47, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[28] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Report from Jim Hart, Chair, regarding Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), Recommendations 52 and 53 at 47, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[29] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the Toronto Police College (29 November 2022).}

_{[30] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the Toronto Police College (29 November 2022).}

_{[31] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the Toronto Police College (29 November 2022).}

_{[32] Letter from the TPS to the OHRC arising from the interview of Suelyn Knight, Manager, EIHR Unit (13 June 2020).}

_{[33] TPC, Learning Development and Standards section – 2020 In-Service Training Program Day One Course Training Standards; training slide presentation and instructor’s notes re anti-Black racism and its effects on policing.}

_{[34] In an interview with Suelyn Knight, Manager, EIHR Unit (5 March 2020), she stated: “This year, there’s anti-Black racism [training] throughout the three days, instead of the just one day – to recognize anti-Black racism training on the academic side [with] theory for one day and on use of force for two days; and putting that thinking into action -  through scenarios, videos, and conversations on de-escalation.”}

_{[35] De-escalation and dealing with people in crisis appear to be integrated into use of force/simulation training. TPC, In-Service Training Program – Day 2 and Day 3 Course Training Standard (2020); TPS, In-Service Police Training Manual (2020).}

_{[36] TPS, In-Service Police Training Manual (2020).}

_{[37] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: October 22, 2020” (22 October 2020), Report from Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights Unit – Progress Update on the Unit’s Work” (14 September 2020) at 77, online (pdf): https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/637-2020-oct-22-agenda.}

_{[38] OHRC interview of Inspector Stacy Clarke (5 March 2020).}

_{[39] TPS, E-Learning Module: Let’s Talk How Anti-Black Racism Affects Impartial Policing (2021).}

_{[40] Intersectionalism is the terminology used by the TPS in its ISTP training.}

_{[41] TPS, 2022 In-Service Training Program for Anti-Black Racism; The Black Experiences slide deck.}

_{[42] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the Toronto Police College (29 November 2022).}

_{[43] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023).}

_{[44] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023).}

_{[45] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023).}

_{[46] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the Toronto Police College (29 November 2022).}

_{[47] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023).}

_{[xlviii] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023) at 33.}

_{[48] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023) at 15.}

_{[49] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023) at 46.}

_{[50] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023).}

_{[51] TPC, Crisis and Mental Health Awareness training (23 March 2023).}

_{[52] TPC, Overview of In-Service Training to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (23 March 2023) at 17–19.}

_{[54] TPS, Incident Response Training (2023) at 51.}

_{[55] OHRC interview of Staff Sergeant Patrick Coyne and Superintendent Frank Barredo of the TPC (29 November 2022).}

_{[56] TPS, “Police Reform Recommendation Summary – PRR#77 (LOKU)” at 6–7, online (pdf): https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R77_-_Inquest_into_the_death_of_Andrew_Loku_-_Report_to_TPSB.pdf.}

_{[57] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 2.}

_{[58] Diversity Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014) at vii, online (pdf): https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf.}

_{[59] Diversity Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014) at 44, online (pdf): https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf.}

_{[60] Diversity Institute at Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), “Evaluation of the Human Rights Project Charter” (February 2014) at 32–33, online (pdf): https://www.torontomu.ca/content/dam/diversity/reports/HRPC_Report_WEB_2014.pdf.}

_{[61] Letter from the TPS to the OHRC arising from the interview of Christopher Kirkpatrick (3 September 2020). For example, officers were not evaluated on the Fair and Impartial training program and there was no evaluation of the impact of the training on officer behaviour or community outcomes.}

_{[62] TPSB, “Minutes of the Public Meeting: October 11, 2022” (11 October 2022), online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=754&catid=62&m=0.}

As detailed in Chapter 8, it is critical that the TPSB and TPS have a clear and distinct policy and procedure on racial profiling. While this is an important step to fight discrimination, more is required. For policies and procedures to make real change, there must be strong accountability mechanisms in place to monitor and analyze their effect.

Accountability and monitoring mechanisms ensure that organizations effectively:

• collect objective data about their practices
• discuss and analyze the data in a transparent manner, and
• act in response to that analysis.

Data collection is a key component of an effective accountability system. The TPS must appropriately and effectively collect data related to racial profiling and discrimination from a variety of sources. The collection and resulting data must be transparent and available to the public.

Senior TPS officers and the TPSB must review and analyze the data to fulfill their supervisory and oversight functions. As reflected in our recommendations, there must be independent analysis and evaluation of the data to inform the TPS and TPSB about events, trends, and issues within the community and their impact on the effectiveness of police services.

Where the data indicate progress, the contributing factors should be recognized and applied more broadly. Similarly, where the data suggest concerns, the TPSB and TPS senior officers must respond quickly to address them and do so effectively.

Turning to accountability more broadly, when officers are found to have engaged in discriminatory behaviour (whether through data analysis or otherwise), there must be a consequence. If officers can engage in racial profiling and/or discrimination with impunity, then the policies and procedures are meaningless, and the relationship between the TPS and Black communities will not improve. The absence of appropriate discipline, when warranted, helps perpetuate patterns of racism and misconduct, and contributes to the mistrust of police among Black people.

The OHRC finds that there are significant gaps in the TPS and TPSB’s accountability mechanisms in relation to anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination.

Data collection systems

Prior to 2019, the TPS and TPSB did not implement data collection systems or compile or analyze existing data to identify, monitor, and address racial profiling or racial discrimination of Black people – despite many documented concerns about anti-Black racism and recommendations to collect race-based data.¹

In September 2019, after having conducted significant community engagement on race-based data collection, the TPSB adopted its Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting (RBDC Policy). The policy requires the police to collect data on an individual’s race in a wide variety of interactions, including stops, questioning and searches, Use of Force Reports, and charges, arrests, and discrete interactions between an individual and an officer that lead to a “decision that determines an outcome for the individual.”²

On January 1, 2020, the TPS began collecting race-based data on Use of Force Reports and strip searches in line with Phase 1 of the RBDC Policy.³

On January 1, 2021, the TPS began collecting race-based data on arrests, apprehensions, releases and youth diversions under Phase 2 of the RBDC Policy.⁴

In June 2022, the TPS released its analysis on race, use of force, and strip searches.⁵

These are significant steps forward. However, some limitations in the TPS’s data collection need to be addressed. In particular, the scope of the Phase 2 data collection is too narrow.

Scope of Phase 2 data collection

As noted above, Phase 2 began in January 2021 with the collection of data in apprehensions, arrests, charges, releases, and youth diversion. However, Phase 2 does not include data collection for all stops,⁶ in particular:

• investigative detentions
• protective searches (formerly Level 1 searches),⁷ and
• frisk searches (formerly Level 2).⁸

Phase 2 data collection also does not include all use-of-force incidents. Specifically, it does not include use of force resulting in physical injury that does not require medical attention.

The OHRC notes that the TPS’s analysis of race-based data on use of force included “persons in crisis calls for service,” but does not appear to broadly capture whether the person involved had a noted history of mental health issues or was perceived to have a mental health disability.⁹

The community chairs of the Mental Health and Addictions Advisory Panel (MHAAP) suggested that race-based data be collected from crisis services providers from the Community Crisis Support Services Pilot. They also stressed the importance of collecting race-based and mental health data to examine intersectionalities (e.g., in conducted energy weapon use and Mental Health Act apprehensions).¹⁰

In September 2021, the TPS advised it was working on updating its systems’ capacity and resource workflow to collect stop data, including both traffic and pedestrian stops, and lower-level uses of force.¹¹ 

The scope of data collection should be expanded. The current scope is too narrow and does not address longstanding concerns about systemic anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination in all stops and all uses of force. Nor does it allow for sufficient monitoring and accountability.¹²

There must be human rights-based data collection, analysis, and public reporting on the full range of police–civilian interactions, including all stop and search activities, traffic and pedestrian stops that do not result in formal action, charges, arrests, releases, and use of force.¹³

This expansion is consistent with the intent of the TPSB’s RBDC Policy, and the Anti-Racism Act. It is also supported by the TPA465F¹⁴ and the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC).¹⁵

Race-based data should be collected when people are not charged, and where criminal incidents are “cleared otherwise” as defined in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey. “Cleared otherwise” means there was a criminal offence and a chargeable suspect, but the suspect was ultimately processed by other means. For example, the police may have decided not to charge, or diverted the case through an alternative mechanism, or charged under a regulatory statute instead of the Criminal Code.

Race-based data collection by the TPS on “cleared otherwise” cases will provide greater insight into the use of TPS discretion and how discretion is exercised.

This broader scope of data collection should be implemented not only by the TPS, but across Ontario. A province-wide approach to comprehensive data collection, analysis, and public reporting is important. Consistent with the OHRC’s Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing, the TPSB should urge the provincial government to mandate province-wide race-based data collection, analysis, and reporting across the spectrum of officer activities, including all stop and question practices, charges and arrests, and uses of force.¹⁶

For the OHRC’s recommendations for data collection, analysis, and public reporting, see Recommendations 52–60.

Early intervention systems and the use of race-based data for officer accountability

Early intervention systems (EIS) – also known as early warning systems – involve a data-driven management process. EIS allow supervisors to identify officers who engage in problematic behaviour, and to intervene through counselling, education, and additional training.

EIS have been identified as a positive strategy for reducing or preventing racial profiling, by using race-based data to alert supervisors to potential racial profiling and racial discrimination by individuals and platoons/units/divisions.

The idea behind EIS is that officers may not recognize problematic behaviour unless it is identified and brought to their attention by supervisors. Once identified, officers have the ability to improve their performance and correct the conscious or unconscious behaviour, such as racially biased traffic enforcement.¹⁷

EIS can review trends in officers, partnerships, units, and geographic areas to identify issues and inform improvements through policy changes, supervision, education and training, and accountability.¹⁸

EIS have been recommended as a promising practice by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the U.S. Department of Justice, and many policing experts.470F¹⁹ In the United States, approximately 65% of police agencies with 250 or more officers had an EIS as of September 30, 2007.²⁰

The TPS and EIS

In 2013, the Police and Community Engagement Review (PACER Report)472F²¹ recommended the implementation of EIS related to bias and racial profiling.²²

The PACER Report also recommended that the TPS should:

Proactively design and conduct unit level reviews of performance trends and indicators that may relate to systemic and/or individual bias, prejudices and/or racial profiling. This may be accomplished by comparative analysis of Officers and unit performance. Recognizing such analysis does not in itself indicate bias-based policing, the trend indicator should be utilized as part of a more comprehensive analysis of the individual or unit level performance to ensure consistency with the unit and Service priorities.

The report further recommended that the TPS Professional Standards Unit “develop new risk thresholds specifically designed and implemented with respect to bias and racial profiling,” and “design and conduct reviews at both the Unit and Professional Standards Unit level, examining all ranks of the Service to proactively assess and address Officer performance trends and indicators that may relate to bias, prejudices and/or racial profiling.”²³

As of 2020, the development of new risk thresholds was still in progress,²⁴ and there appear to have been no further developments since that time.

The TPS previously implemented a limited form of EIS in 2008, which has since been updated and revised.²⁵ However, at time of writing, the EIS does not include race-based data.²⁶ The performance indicators do not appear to capture bias, prejudice, or racial profiling, but do include complaints.²⁷

In August 2020, the TPSB adopted the 81 recommendations from its report on Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (Police Reform Report).²⁸

Recommendation 45 directed the Chief to report by November 2020 on:

1. How the TPS identifies police officers who are repeated subjects of conduct complaints or negative findings by the courts, or those who disproportionately use force, even where no specific instance amounts to allegations of misconduct;
2. How identified officers are monitored for compliance with TPS policy and procedure and receive additional training where necessary; and
3. How the TPS determines what other interventions are appropriate or required for officers that are identified as part of the service’s efforts as per a) and b).

On November 4, 2020, then-Interim Chief James Ramer presented his report to the TPSB. The report confirmed that the EIS performance indicators do not include indicators of racial discrimination or racial profiling by individual officers and platoons/units/divisions, and important and related indicators described in detail in the OHRC’s recommendations in this report.480F²⁹

It is imperative that the TPS fully adopt a comprehensive EIS that includes indicators of racial discrimination/profiling.

For the OHRC’s recommendations for effective EIS, see Recommendations 65, 66, 67, and 95.

EIS and officer discipline

Although not intended to be disciplinary, EIS do not preclude discipline for individuals' repeated negative behaviour. For example, the LAPD has disposition options for interventions that include no action, commendation, informal meeting, training, modified field duties, directed health and wellness referral, notice to correct, and a complaint.³⁰

Discussions at the OHRC policy roundtable also supported using race-based data for remedial or disciplinary purposes.³¹

TPS objections to the use of such data to investigate individual misconduct are not sustainable. On June 15, 2022, then-Interim Chief Ramer stated that the “privacy commission” and the Anti-Racism Act require that race-based data be anonymized and therefore prevent the TPS from investigating individual officer conduct.³² However, the IPC of Ontario stated:³³

Based on the information available to date, it is our view that neither the [Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act] nor the [Anti-Racism Act] prevent police service boards or police services from using race-based data or employee information to supervise, discipline, train, or monitor police divisions.³⁴

Indeed, the Data Standards for the Identification and Monitoring of Systemic Racism created under the Anti-Racism Act specifically contemplates that the failure to monitor the impact of discretionary decision-making may itself constitute a form of systemic racism where it leads to significant racially inequitable outcomes.³⁵

However, the TPSB’s RBDC Policy prohibits race-based data from being used for performance management.³⁶ Therefore, the TPS and TPSB have been unable to effectively identify, monitor, or address racial profiling or racial discrimination by individual officers.

On June 22, 2022, the TPSB passed a motion:

1. Directing the Chief of Police to assess how the Service’s approach to race-based data collection and analysis can be modified to enhance the Service’s ability to identify, investigate and address specific instances of potential inequitable policing, including with respect to Use of Force, strip searches and other interactions, and to report back to the Board by Q4 2022 with the results of this assessment and any next steps, as well as areas for consultation with the Police and Community Engagement Review, other community stakeholders, and the Toronto Police Association; and
2. Directing the Executive Director and Office of the Police Services Board to undertake a review of the Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy, in consultation with the Board’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel, key stakeholders and community partners, and to report back to the Board by Q2 2023 concerning any suggested revisions to the Policy, and in particular, revisions that relate to the Chief of Police’s assessment in item 1.³⁷

However, in his April 28, 2023 update to the TPSB on these and several other motions related to the RBDC Policy, Police Chief Myron Demkiw noted that “The challenge is that attempting to identify trends based on too little information (too few data points using the Use of Force report alone) is an unreliable means of indicating bias or … identifying a pattern of racism or racial bias.” He further stated:

The early risk intervention process involves identifying use of force trends that can be used to initiate a broader review, leveraging body-worn and in-car camera systems, notes, and other reports such as complaints data. As there are now mandatory reviews of this nature, the amount of information available about an incident is increasing. It is in this mandatory review that the appropriateness of the intervention and any indication of racism or bias can be determined. Conversation in the town halls centres on making the process more transparent and robust; ensuring events are captured; and on actions the Service should take in the event of an abuse of authority.³⁸

While mandatory reviews of body-worn and in-car camera systems, notes, and other reports such as complaints data are critical, it is not clear at this time how they will be incorporated as data that can be used in an EIS for performance management. Based on concerns that there are not enough data points in use-of-force reports, the EIS should incorporate indicators of racial discrimination or racial profiling by individual officers and platoons/units/divisions, and other related indicators, which are currently missing.

The April 28, 2023 update did not address the second item from the TPSB’s motion.

Issues with performance analysis and management of police services, including EIS, exist across Ontario, a fact appropriately recognized by the TPSB. On June 22, 2022, the TPSB passed a further motion to:

Request that the Ministry of the Solicitor General create a new Adequacy and Effectiveness Standard, under the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, that mandates a consistent approach to performance analysis and management of police services that is designed to identify inequitable policing, including in relation to Use of Force, and which includes an early-warning system [EIS] built to identify instances where systemic bias may be operating, and a requirement that supervisory staff take appropriate action.³⁹

The OHRC agrees that a province-wide approach to EIS informed by race-based data is required. Consistent with the OHRC’s Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing, the TPSB should urge the provincial government to mandate the implementation of EIS consistent with its recommendations.

In his April 28, 2023 update on this motion, Chief Demkiw stated that the TPS had “engaged with the Province to improve and introduce enhanced use-of-force reporting requirements that support identifying and addressing systemic patterns and trends to advance racial equity in policing.”⁴⁰ He also noted that the provincial government indicated its intention to convene a working group to develop an anti-racism strategy for policing in Ontario, which includes discussions of priority areas for race-based data collection and reporting.

In addition, following the implementation of the updated Use of Force Report, a Race-Based Data Working Group was formed by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, and discussions around how the Ministry of the Solicitor General would be involved were ongoing.⁴¹

The OHRC looks forward to the results of the TPS’s engagement with the Province to improve and introduce enhanced reporting requirements that lead to a consistent province-wide approach to an EI system.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on the use of race-based data in EIS and officer discipline, see Recommendations 61, 68, and 69.

Body-worn cameras

Between February 2015 and March 2016, the TPS conducted a body-worn camera (BWC) pilot project.⁴²

On August 18, 2020, the TPSB approved a contract to roll out BWCs to all front-line officers. The TPSB directed the Chief to ensure that BWCs were not deployed fully to all front-line members until the Board approved a BWC policy and the relevant Service Procedures had been developed and/or amended to ensure consistency with the Board policy.⁴³

On November 24, 2020, the TPSB passed a Policy on Body Worn Cameras. The purpose of the policy includes enhancing the commitment to anti-racist, bias-free service delivery by the TPS. It also directs the Chief of Police to establish a framework for reviewing the recordings by supervisors on a regular basis to, among other things, identify and address evidence of explicit or implicit bias and discrimination.495F⁴⁴

By the end of 2021, 2,111 BWCs were deployed to front-line officers, which amounted to 92% of front-line officers.⁴⁵

In June 2022, the TPSB directed the Chief of Police to:

Implement mandatory reviews by supervisors of body-worn camera footage and in-car camera system footage for all Use of Force incidents, as contemplated by the new Service Procedure, and to initiate a disciplinary investigation where excess force is deemed to have potentially occurred.⁴⁶

On July 6, 2022, the TPS issued a Procedure 15-20, Body Worn Camera. It requires that supervisors review a video from each BWC-equipped police officer a minimum of once per month and conduct regular random reviews of videos to:

• Ensure officers are using the BWC in accordance with the law and BWC training;
• Determine if any additional training is required;
• Identify material that may be appropriate for training; and
• Comply with section 15 of the Board Policy on Body Worn Cameras.⁴⁷

Section 15 of the Board Policy on Body Worn Cameras states:

The Chief of Police, in consultation with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario and other relevant stakeholders, will develop Procedure(s) that:

15. Establish a framework for reviewing of recordings by supervisors on a regular basis to:

1. Ensure compliance with Procedures;
2. Identify and address evidence of explicit or implicit bias and discrimination; and
3. Determine the need for additional training or other measures.

The IPC’s BWC Model Governance Framework also supports regular (e.g., monthly and annual) and event-based audits of BWC records to assess compliance with all applicable laws, policies, procedures, and professional standards, including those related to discrimination and the use of force.⁴⁸

Concerns

The OHRC has maintained that BWCs can be an important tool for accountability, if their use is accompanied by robust procedures.

However, the OHRC has also heard the concerns raised by Black communities and others that BWCs do not capture a complete and accurate visual or audio record of what may have transpired in individual cases.

Recent studies have called into question the utility of BWCs because they often present only one perspective of an interaction or incident.⁴⁹ Specifically, BWCs record from the officer’s perspective, and officers have been trained to narrate events while they are being recorded, which can present a skewed version of events. For example, yelling at a suspect to “stop resisting” may mislead one to believe an individual was resisting when they were not.⁵⁰

We have also heard directly from Black people that BWCs will not prevent the deaths of Black persons by the police, and that more meaningful action is necessary.

Given the concerns, it is important that the use of BWCs be properly monitored and supervised. BWCs can be a helpful tool to learn about officer conduct and, where appropriate, enhance officer accountability for misconduct.

The OHRC recommends that supervisors review the BWC footage of all use-of-force incidents. In conducting these reviews, supervisors should consider additional information, including data from use-of-force reports (if completed), injury reports, subject and witness officer notes, and other relevant reports. The supervisor should also assess whether there was a credible, non-discriminatory explanation for the use of force.⁵¹

BWCs and the mug shot database

The OHRC is concerned about using footage from BWCs in conjunction with the TPS mug shot database and facial recognition technology. Its use in these circumstances could exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal justice system.

The Chief Information Officer of the TPS explained that the use of facial recognition together with BWCs is rare. He maintained that the combined use would only arise in circumstances where a crime was captured on a BWC, but the suspect was not captured or identified. In such circumstances, the footage from the BWC could be entered into the mug shot database to see if they could identify the suspect.⁵²

Although the combined use of BWC footage and the mug shot database may be rare, there must be a comprehensive consultation and study of the various human rights, due process, officer accountability, and public access and privacy implications of deploying these technologies together.

If the TPSB and TPS continue to allow BWC footage to be used in conjunction with the mug shot database, the OHRC supports the recommendation from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) that a dedicated consultation, privacy impact, and human rights impact assessment be undertaken.

Similarly, the IPC recommended that police services not adopt biometric technology (including facial recognition) in conjunction with BWCs until a full risk assessment is completed and the IPC is consulted.⁵³

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding BWCs, see Recommendations 70 and 71.

Performance management systems, including supervision and discipline

The TPS currently uses the Uniform Performance Appraisal and Development Plan as its performance management system. Officers are assigned a rating by their next-level supervisor under several categories of evaluation, including:

• human rights
• personal qualities
• technical skills
• core competencies.

Former Deputy Chief responsible for Human Resources Command, Barbara McLean, stated that the next-level supervisor:

… reviews calls, work, [and] assess[es] things like complaints and training. A lot of it is observation, being around them in the workplace. That gets translated. So, there’s that assessment and room for comments by their supervisor. An active participation is what is expected from the supervisor.⁵⁴

Evaluation of the human rights category is unclear and limited. It includes whether the officer:

• has attended and/or completed human rights training as required
• shows knowledge and understanding of the Ontario Human Rights Code and human rights issues as they apply to policing
  
  • examples include but are not limited to knowledge of racial profiling, racial bias in policing, racism, sexual harassment, sexism, ageism), and
• delivers policing services in a fair, respectful, and unbiased manner.⁵⁵

Unfortunately, the TPS Uniform Performance Appraisal and Development Plan has not prevented systemic racial discrimination against Black people, as described throughout the Inquiry’s report. Indeed, under the TPSB’s RBDC Policy, race-based data are prohibited from being used for performance management.

The OHRC believes that the TPSB should immediately amend this policy to permit the use of race-based data in performance management. Similarly, the TPS should provide more explicit direction to supervisors on assessing compliance with anti-racism and anti-discrimination policies, procedures, and practices when evaluating officer performance.

In its 2020, Police Reform Report, the TPSB proposed changes to the performance management system. The TPSB directed the Chief to:

Develop and implement a formal annual performance review process for uniformed Service Members, in consultation with any relevant experts, that will assist in identifying the strengths and areas for improvement of each police officer, and which will include an individualized annual performance plan that identifies the education, training and experiences to be completed in the coming year in order to build on their identified strengths and address their identified areas for improvement.⁵⁶

However, the proposed changes do not provide specific guidance to address anti-Black racism, racial profiling, or racial discrimination.

The TPSB’s implementation dashboard for the recommendation does not describe how officers will be evaluated in relation to anti-Black racism, racial profiling, or racial discrimination. Nor does it indicate related qualitative or quantitative measures. The dashboard states that the new performance review process:

Provides performance evaluation to members based on the responsibilities of their roles and the competency behaviors tied to their level of leadership in the Service. Members will be required to examine the responsibilities of their roles and share:

• the “what” of what they delivered, and
• the manner in which they delivered it, the “how”.⁵⁷

Any new performance management system must include a meaningful review of officers’ performance in human rights, including anti-Black racism, racial profiling, or racial discrimination. An officer’s act of racial discrimination should be included in their evaluation and lead to progressive discipline, up to and including dismissal, where warranted.

Dr. Wortley stated, “any anti-racism policy is doomed to failure unless specific accountability mechanisms are put into place.” He encouraged specific disciplinary consequences for personnel found guilty of racial bias, and a policy that would hold supervisors accountable for the racially biased behaviour of those under their supervision.⁵⁸

This approach is broadly supported and has been endorsed by at least 22 community and advocacy groups.⁵⁹

For the OHRC’s recommendations on performance management, supervision and discipline, see Recommendations 74, 75, and 76.

Accountability mechanisms

Third-party findings

The OHRC identified eight Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) and court decisions between 2009 and 2017 that found that Black people were the victims of racial profiling or racial discrimination by TPS officers.⁶⁰ These cases involved multiple officers, and the misconduct included unnecessary stops, searches, charges, arrests, and the use of force. The HRTO and courts also found instances of biased and untrustworthy testimony from some of the officers.

This Inquiry revealed that none of the officers who were found to have engaged in racial profiling or discrimination by the HRTO were subjected to any formal discipline by the TPS. None were the subject of Notices of Hearing or brought before the TPS Disciplinary Tribunal under the Police Services Act.

TPS mechanisms to track cases

The OHRC asked the TPS why none of these cases was the subject of a Notice of Hearing or proceeded to a TPS Disciplinary Tribunal. The TPS advised that it could not provide an explanation for individual cases because of the statutory confidentiality provisions in the Police Services Act.⁶¹

However, the evidence examined by the OHRC demonstrated that the TPS has no formal mechanism to track, review, or act upon adverse findings of racial profiling and/or discrimination against officers by the HRTO or the courts.

TPSB mechanisms to track cases

The TPSB has a statutory responsibility to establish guidelines for dealing with complaints and to review the Chief’s administration of the complaints system. This includes internal complaints.⁶²

Notwithstanding this responsibility, it appears that like the TPS, the TPSB does not have any formal mechanism to track individual cases where racial profiling or discrimination is found, or how many TPS officers are disciplined for racial profiling or racial discrimination.⁶³ The TPSB advised the OHRC that it:

Does not have a system for monitoring every decision of the criminal courts, many of which are not reported, to identify cases where there have been findings of Charter violations by TPS officers.

However, the Board Office has established a system where reported decisions identifying issues of a systemic nature that involve the Board or the Service are identified and brought to the Board’s attention.

On occasion, a criminal decision involving the TPS will also come to the Board Office’s attention through legal counsel. These may include Charter breach cases. In most cases, these cases come to the Board’s attention because legal counsel has identified it as a decision that substantially alters the law of policing, could have impact on police governance or affect the public’s trust in policing. In such cases, the Board’s lawyers will bring the case to the attention of the Board’s Executive Director [and] Chief of Staff, and a report may be prepared for the Board where appropriate. In other circumstances, the Board’s Executive Director & Chief of Staff may raise the matter with the Chief or Chief’s Office for further exploration, and then, if appropriate, discussion with the Board.⁶⁴

The TPSB also advised the OHRC that it receives monthly reports from the Chief on officer discipline, which summarize the disposition of cases investigated and prosecuted under Part V of the Police Services Act, and “where particular systemic or other issues arise or are identified with the administration of the complaints system, the Board addresses them on a case-by-case basis.”⁶⁵

However, if cases are not investigated or prosecuted under the Police Services Act, they will not come to the attention of the TPSB.

To promote a service environment free of racial profiling and racial discrimination, the TPS and TPSB should take proactive steps to ensure officer accountability following decisions of the HRTO, courts or tribunals. Proactive steps should include an automatic investigation by Professional Standards when the HRTO or a court finds that an officer engaged in racial profiling or racial discrimination, regardless of whether the officer’s conduct was the subject of the litigation.

Where the investigation reveals racial profiling or discrimination, the TPS must ensure there are appropriate transparent and meaningful consequences consistent with progressive discipline, up to and including dismissal.

The TPS should:

• determine the race of the alleged victim in allegations of officer misconduct
• investigate potential racial profiling or discrimination in all allegations of officer misconduct that involve Black people as victims, and
• identify tribunal/court decisions with findings of racial profiling or discrimination by officers (whether or not the officer’s conduct was the subject of the litigation), and include them in an EIS and in performance management.

SIU investigations

SIU investigations are required whenever an officer is involved in an incident that results in death, serious bodily harm, or allegations of sexual assault.

When the SIU is notified of such an incident, the Chief of Police of the relevant police Service is also required to conduct an investigation. The purpose of the Chief’s investigation is to review the policies or services provided by the Service and the conduct of its police officers.

The SIU is required to report the result of its investigation to the Attorney General, and notify the Chief of Police that they have done so. The SIU letter to the Chief of Police usually identifies any concerns about the conduct of the officer(s).

Within 30 days of receiving the SIU letter, the Chief of Police is required to report the findings of its internal investigation and any action taken or recommended to the Board.⁶⁶

The OHRC identified 27 cases⁶⁷ where the SIU flagged problematic conduct in its letter to the Chief. None of them resulted in a hearing before the TPS Disciplinary Tribunal.

The OHRC is concerned by the lack of accountability where issues of potential misconduct are raised in SIU letters to the Chief. This is consistent with an observation by former TPSB Chair, Dr. Alok Mukherjee, in his book Excessive Force:

In reality, these reviews follow the letter rather than the spirit of the law. They are largely paper exercises involving the checking off of a bunch of boxes in a report to the board to say that the officer complied with policies, procedures and training; that the equipment used was also in compliance; and that there were no conduct issues. When the SIU says it had no reason or lack sufficient grounds to lay [criminal] charges, the Chief’s review invariably repeats that conclusion. To me, the review is a classic example of how the systems of accountability put in place by law are manipulated to protect police interest.⁶⁸

The absence of TPS Disciplinary Tribunal hearings where the SIU identified problematic behaviour is symptomatic of a larger problem. Police officers are rarely disciplined for misconduct. According to a report by the CBC, only 1% of complaints made to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) about Toronto police officers between 2014 and 2019 has led to a disciplinary hearing.⁶⁹

The lack of transparency is also concerning in that the complaints investigated by the OIPRD and the TPS (internally) investigated appear to be resolved informally by the TPS, and remain confidential. As noted in the OHRC’s Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing:

The Police Services Act’s current confidentiality provisions prevent the public from knowing when and whether an officer was subject to some form of discipline for engaging in racial profiling, racial discrimination or other police misconduct. Only decisions from police service disciplinary tribunals are not confidential. This severely undermines public confidence in a system that must be transparent and grounded in the values espoused by the Human Rights Code.

The TPS must establish a process to fully investigate misconduct flagged by the SIU about racial profiling or racial discrimination. The TPS procedures should require the Chief or their designate to investigate each issue of problematic conduct the SIU Director raises in letters to the Chief. The Chief should report publicly to the TPSB on the findings and outcome of these investigations, subject to the confidentiality provisions of the Police Services Act.

The TPSB should also review the SIU letter and the findings of the Chief’s internal investigation. The TPSB acknowledged that comparing these reports would:

• assist in the Board’s oversight role
• allow the Board to ask questions where the SIU identifies potential misconduct
• allow the Board take appropriate policy action where potential systemic issues are identified.⁷⁰

In his interview with the OHRC, SIU Director Joseph Martino stated that these recommendations made sense and he did not take issue with them.⁷¹

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding the SIU, see Recommendations 105, 106 and 107.

Tracking disciplinary decisions

The OHRC did not find any publicly available information on the number of officers disciplined for racial profiling, discrimination, or harassment as a result of a Police Services Act disciplinary hearing.

The OHRC asked the TPS for the relevant statistics. However, the TPS could not confirm whether, since 2010, the TPS Disciplinary Tribunal has found that any officers engaged in racial profiling, discrimination, or harassment. This suggests that the TPS does not track Disciplinary Tribunal findings for cases where officers have been found to have engaged in racial discrimination or racial profiling.

The TPS stated that it was unable to provide an answer on relevant statistics without reviewing all disciplinary tribunal decisions since 2010 and that it was unable to undertake the labour-intensive task of sorting, scanning and vetting TPS Disciplinary Tribunal decisions.  The TPS noted that the OHRC could make a request to the Tribunal Office for these decisions.⁷² The TPS also stated that the system for TPS complaints and reports of investigation is not designed to capture an individual’s specific race.⁷³

The TPS did confirm that from 2017 - 2020, there has only been one internal or public complaint alleging anti-Black racism in service delivery that the TPS has substantiated.⁷⁴

This low number is concerning because of the evidence of systemic anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination detailed in the Inquiry’s reports. This raises a real concern that incidents of anti-Black racism are not being captured and/or investigated by the TPS. 

For the OHRC’s recommendations on accountability, see Recommendations 76 and 77.

Transparency and accountability in discipline

Police services should promote greater accessibility and understanding of police discipline by routinely collecting and publishing information about allegations of police misconduct, the results of investigations into them, and disciplinary outcomes. This transparency is important for reassuring communities that the police are serious about investigating and punishing misconduct by their officers.⁷⁵

The OHRC joins community agencies and the IPC in their support for greater transparency by police services. During this Inquiry, the IPC advised the OHRC that:

Public trust in policing requires a strong commitment to transparency through … the proactive disclosure of de-identified information and other information capable of informing the public about critical police decisions, activities, and practices, including in relation to the effectiveness of oversight and disciplinary systems. Therefore, the IPC would welcome recommendations, including any necessary legislative amendments, to increase proactive disclosure of statistical, anonymized or de-identified data, as long as it does not involve personal information. Public reporting of this nature would support the public’s ability to hold police agencies to account by helping the public better understand how policing is being conducted and the extent to which reform efforts are progressing.⁷⁶

Notably, the lack of transparency in police discipline is not limited to the TPS. A province-wide approach to transparency in police discipline is an important requirement. Consistent with the OHRC’s Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing, the TPSB should urge the provincial government to amend the Police Services Act and/or the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019 to include a requirement for greater transparency in police discipline.⁷⁷

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding transparency, see Recommendations 72, 73, 78, 79 and 82.

Community oversight

Community can and should play an integral role in policing oversight, whether that comes in the form of consultations, ongoing working groups or committees, and/or integrated positions in policing services. However, this oversight must not be in name or appearance alone. Rather, community involvement in policing activities should carry weight, and community recommendations should be implemented and properly evaluated by an external party.

Community oversight should also be properly resourced so that community members are not expected or required to meet onerous time and work requirements without appropriate compensation.

Police and Community Engagement Review

In 2012, the TPS established the Police and Community Engagement Review (PACER) committee “to assess and address issues of racial profiling and bias in community engagements (at both the individual and systemic levels) to enable the delivery of bias-free police services.”⁷⁸

PACER’s vision was to establish the TPS as “a world leader in bias-free service delivery.” PACER’s work included a “comprehensive review of Service governance, business processes, and the culture of policing[,]” and resulted in 31 recommendations.⁷⁹

In 2013, the Committee released the PACER Report: Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations, which recognized that:

To properly evaluate the success of the recommendations presented in this report requires a formal and impartial third party to design and oversee the evaluation project. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of the evaluation must be filtered through an objective lens that ensures they accurately assess the outcomes of the recommendations.⁸⁰

In response to PACER, the TPS entered into partnership with the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) and Dr Phillip Goff to evaluate the implementation of the recommendations in the PACER Report. Dr. Goff’s final report was due on March 31, 2017. However, the evaluation was never completed. In its 2018 update on the PACER recommendations, the TPS stated that the CPE’s policy assessment is “ongoing.”⁸¹

The TPS advised the OHRC that they have not had contact with the CPE since January 2020, at which time CPE advised that there is no timeline for the completion of this report.⁸² In other words, there was no independent evaluation to determine whether the PACER recommendations were implemented and what if any change resulted from their implementation.

It is concerning that  implementation of some recommendations remain pending at time of writing this report – ten years following the release of the PACER Report. It is also concerning that  the TPS has failed to follow through with an independent evaluation of its implementation of the recommendations. This demonstrates a lack of accountability. As noted above, community involvement is an important part of policing, but only if it is taken seriously, and any resulting recommendations are implemented with external evaluation of progress and effectiveness.

Anti-Racism Advisory Panel

The Andrew Loku inquest jury recommended that the TPSB:

Establish a new committee to consider possible or identified disparities in services and outcomes for racialized persons and consider interventions to address any such disparities. The committee should include representatives of the Toronto Police Service, subject matter experts and members of racialized communities, including the Black community. The committee should consider the intersectionality of mental health and race both in terms of member composition and issues to be addressed.⁸³

In 2018, the TPSB formed the Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP) to advise the TPSB on its role in “overseeing and monitoring the response to and implementation of the recommendations directed both to the Toronto Police Service and to the Toronto Police Services Board, by the jury in the Inquest into the Death of Andrew Loku.”⁸⁴

The terms of reference for the ARAP were to establish a monitoring framework for the TPSB to use to assess the response to and implementation of the inquest recommendations, “including the creation of key benchmarks and performance indicators addressing each recommendation.”⁸⁵

The TPSB selected applicants with lived experience and a background in anti-racism, anti-Black racism, mental health and addictions, as well as people familiar with the issues raised at the Loku inquest.⁸⁶

On August 18, 2020, ARAP became a permanent advisory committee of the TPSB. Its role is to “advise and support the Board in relation to policing and racism, anti-Black racism and anti-Indigenous racism,” which includes:

• identifying current issues relating to racism, anti-Black racism, anti-Indigenous racism and policing, including developing and/or recommending policies, strategies, and action plans for approval by the TPSB
• monitoring the implementation of Toronto Council’s Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism
• monitoring the implementation of the Board’s RBCD Policy, including reviewing the data analysis and any interventions developed by the TPS to address racial disparities for feedback and recommendations for enhancement
• monitoring the implementation of the recommendations from the Andrew Loku inquest through the monitoring framework previously developed by ARAP
• reviewing the development and implementation of all TPS training and offering recommendations for enhancement, including training on anti-racism
• monitoring the implementation of the 81 recommendations in the TPSB’s Police Reform Report.⁸⁷

ARAP was involved in a number of important issues, including assisting with drafting the RBDC Policy for the Board and the development of a framework to monitor the implementation of the Loku inquest recommendations.⁸⁸ The monitoring framework established performance targets and benchmarks that the TPSB and TPS could use to measure implementation of the Loku inquest recommendations, and hold themselves accountable.⁸⁹

ARAP did not review the “means of implementation” of the Loku recommendations. For example, ARAP did not review any training programs or procedures that were developed or revised in response to the jury recommendations.⁹⁰ Whether that was the result of a lack of resources or a narrow mandate, this is an important missed step in ensuring that the recommendations were effectively implemented.

Among other things, this highlights the need for ARAP to be empowered and resourced adequately, including compensating its members for their time and work similar to the civilian members of the TPSB. It also highlights the need for independent monitoring of the implementation of any recommendations. The OHRC recommends that the TPSB provide ARAP with additional resources to take on an expanded role that would include assisting with the implementation of the OHRC’s recommendations.

ARAP is a novel and commendable approach that brings together community members, academics, and police Service members to develop police governance policy. The OHRC also recognizes the important role that should be played by ARAP members in the robust approach to implementation discussed later in this chapter

For the OHRC’s recommendations on community oversight, see Recommendations 2, 3, 70(b), 85, and 86.

Independent monitoring and enforceability

For decades, members of Black communities in Toronto have raised alarms about anti-Black racism, both individual and systemic, within the TPS and the TPSB. Multiple reviews and reports have confirmed the existence of anti-Black racism, and recommended changes to TPSB policies and TPS practices and procedures to eliminate racial profiling and discrimination.

The TPS recently acknowledged the existence of anti-Black racism. This acknowledgement is an important and welcome development.

The TPS has also implemented some of the recommendations and made some improvements.

However, the required progress has been slow and insufficient.

The TPS and TPSB systems have not provided effective monitoring and accountability for anti-Black racism, racial profiling, and racial discrimination against Black people. There are few examples of officers being evaluated, investigated, or disciplined for racial profiling or discrimination. There has been structural impunity for systemic racism within the TPS and TPSB.

Not surprisingly, the outcomes for Black people have not changed.

The TPS and TPSB have demonstrated that they alone cannot assess, monitor, and change their systems to eliminate anti-Black racism, which is why the OHRC recommends that the Inquiry’s recommendations be independently monitored and legally binding.

Independent monitoring and effective and expeditious legally binding enforcement measures are necessary to help restore trust among Black communities. They provide communities with mechanisms for input, monitoring and transparency, and accountability.

Community stakeholders such as the Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC) and Canadian Association of Black Lawyers (CABL) support legally binding enforcement measures, given their concerns about the ability of the TPS and TPSB to address systemic racism using traditional measures such as non-binding recommendations, or directions from the TPSB.⁹¹

Similarly, the IPC recognized:

the importance of an approach to rights protection that, whenever possible, is informed by meaningful public engagement, supported by effective enforcement mechanisms, and capable of producing concrete results that can be assessed and verified by an independent and expert reviewer in a transparent manner. A commitment to such an approach by the Board and the Service could play a significant role in helping build citizen trust in policing.⁹²

Legally binding measures between parties can take various forms. In Ontario for example, the OHRC has previously entered into a model of enforcement, known as a consent order.⁹³ This is an agreement between parties, made legally binding by filing it with the HRTO. Recently the OHRC and the Peel Regional Police Service entered into a Memorandum of Understanding which built in an agreement to ultimately file a consent order with the HRTO.

Another model of legally binding enforcement is arbitration.  In the current context, this would involve an agreement in which disputes over implementation of the OHRC’s recommendations would be addressed through binding arbitration. This, too, can represent an alternative to potentially lengthy contested legal proceedings. This model gives the TPS, TPSB, and the OHRC input to select the final arbiter, which can facilitate the timeliness of resolutions to any matter in dispute.

The OHRC’s inquiry has confirmed that Black communities have little confidence in a process that does not result in accountability for the TPS and TPSB. Legally binding measures are an important step in building confidence in policing and promoting a fundamental shift in practices and culture.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on independent monitoring and enforceability, see Recommendations 1, 2, 4, 5, 50, 51, 85, and 86.

Chapter 9 Endnotes

[1] See Appendix 6 – Historical timeline of racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the TPS, OHRC initiatives related to the TPS, and the OHRC’s work on racial discrimination in policing.

2 TPSB, Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting (19 September 2019), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/177-race-based-data-collection-analysis-and-public-reporting.

3 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: September 17, 2020” (17 September 2020), Report of Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Quarterly Progress Update on Implementation – Third Quarter” (6 August 2020) at 54, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/635-setpember-17-2020-agenda.

4 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: June 24, 2021” (24 June 2021), Report of Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Services Board’s Race-Based Data Collection (R.B.D.C.), Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Progress Update on Implementation” (15 June 2021) at 260, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/694-2021-06-24-agendaNULL; Letter from the TPS to the OHRC re OHRC Inquiry into Racial Profiling Benchmarking Data and Phase II Race Based Data Collection (8 September 2021); Toronto Police Service, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022) at 10, online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.

5 TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022), online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.

6 Letter from Chief Commissioner Chadha to Chief Ramer re Toronto Police Service Consultation with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on Race-Based Data Collection (25 January 2021); TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Pubic Meeting: June 24, 2021” (24 June 2021), Report of Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Services Board’s Race-Based Data Collection (R.B.D.C.), Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Progress Update on Implementation” (15 June 2021) at 260, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/694-2021-06-24-agenda. See for example, TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: September 17, 2020” (17 September 2020), Report of Chief Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Quarterly Progress Update on Implementation – Third Quarter” (6 August 2020) at 54, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/635-setpember-17-2020-agenda; Toronto Police Services Board, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: December 15, 2020” (15 December 2020), Report of Chief Ramer regarding “Recommendation #73 – Status of Implementation of the Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Reporting Policy and Analysis of Gaps with the OHRC’s Recommendations” (3 November 2020), online (pdf): https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/653-december-15-2020-agenda.

7 A Protective search is “used generally during Investigative Detention and involves a limited search of a person who has been detained by policy when there is reasonable belief the person poses a safety risk. The scope of the search is limited to exterior patting of clothing such as pockets, waistband or areas that may reasonably conceal such items as weapons or implements that may be used as weapons, usually with open hands to maximize the ability to detect weapons through clothing. This search may also be described as a ‘safety search’, as that is the purpose and objective.” Toronto Police Service, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.

8 A Frisk search is “used generally for Search Incident to Arrest and means a more-thorough search that may include emptying and searching pockets as well as removal of clothing, which does not expose a person’s undergarments, or the areas of the body normally covered by undergarments. The removal of clothing such as belts, footwear, socks, shoes, sweaters, extra layers of clothing, or the shirt of a male would all be included in a Frisk search. A Frisk search may be commenced in the field and concluded at the station.” Toronto Police Service, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.

9 For example, see OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service, Use of Force by the Toronto Police Service Report (Toronto: OHRC, 2020) at 109-110, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf; TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (June 2022), “Appendix A: Action Plan” at 92, online: www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf.

10 OHRC interview of Steven Lurie and Jennifer Chambers (Community Co-Chairs of MHAAP) (9 June 2022).

11 Letter from the TPS to the OHRC re OHRC Inquiry into Racial Profiling Benchmarking Data and Phase II Race Based Data Collection (8 September 2021).

12 Letter from Chief Commissioner Chadha to Chief Ramer re Toronto Police Service Consultation with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on Race-Based Data Collection (25 January 2021).

13 For example, see U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (4 March 2015) at 91–92, online (pdf): https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf; Consent Decree between the United States (i.e. the DOJ) and the City of Ferguson (April 2016) at 102, 103, 108–115 online (pdf): https://www.justice.gov/d9/ferguson_consentdecree_4-19-16.pdf Consent Decree between the United States (i.e., the DOJ), the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the Police Department of Baltimore City (January 2017) at 28-30, 67 and 72–74 online (pdf): https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925056/download

14 OHRC Roundtable interview with the TPA (10 November 2022).

15 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Additional comments and recommendations on the OHRC’s draft recommendations to eliminate racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (10 November 2022).

16 OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (29 July 2021) at number 2, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing.

17 Institute on Race and Justice, Northeastern University, Promoting Cooperative Strategies to Reduce Racial Profiling, COPS Evaluation Brief No 1 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008) at 7, online: https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/promoting-cooperative-strategies-reduce-racial-profiling.

18 Christi Guillon & William King, “Early intervention systems for police: a state-of-the-art review” (2020) 43:4 Policing: An Intl J 643 at 644.

19 Christi Guillon & William King, “Early intervention systems for police: a state-of-the-art review” (2020) 43:4 Policing: An Intl J 643 at 644.

20 Christi Guillon & William King, “Early intervention systems for police: a state-of-the-art review” (2020) 43:4 Policing: An Intl J 643 at 644.

21 For further information regarding the PACER Report, see Appendix 4.

22 TPS, The Police and Community Engagement Review (The PACER Report): Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations (2013) at 56, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/The%20PACER%20Report.pdf.

23 TPS, The Police and Community Engagement Review (The PACER Report): Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations (2013) at 57-58, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/The%20PACER%20Report.pdf.

24 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: November 24, 2020” (24 November 2020), Report from Chief Ramer regarding “Police Reform in Toronto: Toronto Police Service Initial Response” (12 November 2020), Appendix regarding recommendation #74 – PACER Report at 160, online (pdf): https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/650-november-24-2020-agenda.

25 Report from Chief James Ramer to TPSB, regarding “Recommendation 45 – Early Intervention Program” (4 November 2020), online (pdf): https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R45_-_Conduct_Early_Intervention_Reporting_-_Report_to_Board.pdf.

26 OHRC Interview with then Staff Superintendent Myron Demkiw (Corporate Risk Management) (6 July 2020). See Also, TPSB ”Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: July 27, 2023” (July 27, 2023), Report from Chief Myron Demkiw regarding ”Report: Professionalism and Accountability ” (June 2023) at 173-174 online:  https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=795&catid=69&m=0  Note: There does not appear to be any inclusion of race-based data within an EIS in any document publicly available or made available to the OHRC

27 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: June 19, 2020” (19 June 2020), Corporate Risk Management Annual Report (2019) at 175, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/628-june-19-2020-revised-agenda.

28 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Report from Chair Jim Hart regarding Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020) at 7, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.

29 Report from Chief James Ramer to TPSB, regarding “Recommendation 45 – Early Intervention Program” (4 November 2020), online (pdf): https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R45_-_Conduct_Early_Intervention_Reporting_-_Report_to_Board.pdf.

30 Christi Guillon & William King, “Early intervention systems for police: a state-of-the-art review” (2020) 43:4 Policing: An Intl J 643 at 647.

31 See Chapter 4 – Consultations: policy roundtable, officer survey and OHRC engagement with Black communities and community calls for “detasking, defunding and disarming.” 

32 Paola Loriggio, “Toronto police to look into whether race-based data could be used differently,” Toronto Star (22 June 2022), online: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2022/06/22/ontario-law-doesnt-prevent-police-from-using-race-based-data-to-assess-officers-ipc.html.

33 The Canadian Press, “Ontario law doesn’t prevent police from using race-based data to assess officers: IPC,” The Globe and Mail (22 June 2022), online: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/toronto/article-ontario-law-doesnt-prevent-police-from-using-race-based-data-to-assess/.

34 Letter from Patricia Kosseim (Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario) to Patricia DeGuire (Chief Commissioner of the OHRC) – The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario’s submission regarding the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s public inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (10 November 2022).

35 Ontario, Data Standards for the Identification and Monitoring of Systemic Racism – Context: Understanding racism and Standards for Participant Observer Information (POI) of race (guidance under standard #39); Anti-Racism Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 15, s 6(1); O Reg 267/18.

36 TPSB, Policy on Race-based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting (19 September 2019), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/177-race-based-data-collection-analysis-and-public-reporting.

37 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022), Report from Chief James Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Phase 1 Report on Use of Force and Strip Search Data Analysis” at 312, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.

38 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 28, 2023” (28 April 2023), Report from Chief Myron Demkiw regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Update” at 188, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=787&catid=69&m=0.

39 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022), Report from Chief James Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Phase 1 Report on Use of Force and Strip Search Data Analysis” at 312, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.

40 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 28, 2023” (28 April 2023), Report from Chief Myron Demkiw regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Update” at 183, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=787&catid=69&m=0.

41 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 28, 2023” (28 April 2023), Report from Chief Myron Demkiw regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Update” at 183—184, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=787&catid=69&m=0.

42 TPS, Body-worn cameras: A report on the findings of the pilot project to test the value and feasibility of body-worn cameras for police officers in Toronto (2016).

43 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Report from Chief Mark Saunders “Approval of Body Worn Camera (B.W.C.) Contract Award and Project Implementation” (29 July 2020) at 144, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.

44 TPSB, Policy on Body Worn Cameras (24 November 2020), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/154-body-worn-cameras.

45 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: March 31, 2022” (31 March 2022), Report from Executive Director and Chief of Staff, Ryan Teschner regarding “The Board’s 2022-23 Business Plan” (10 March 2022), Appendix A, “A Time of Change: Toronto Police Services Board Business Plan 2022-23” at chapter 13, “Information Technology and Innovation – Key Projects” at 40—41, online(pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=721&catid=32&m=0.

46 TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022), Report from Chief James Ramer regarding “Toronto Police Service Board’s Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting Policy – Phase 1 Report on Use of Force and Strip Search Data Analysis” at 312, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.

47 TPS, Procedure 15-20 Body Worn Camera (6 July 2022), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/98/c8/98c8e176-4b51-4415-b55c-be3b8f7c853c/15-20_body-worn_camera_20220706_ext.pdf.

48 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Model Governance Framework for Police Body-worn Camera Programs in Ontario” (June 2021) at 17, online (pdf): www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/model-governance-framework-police-body-worn-camera-programs.pdf.

49 David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar & Alexander Coppock, “Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras: A Randomized Controlled Trial” (20 October 2017), The Lab @ DC, online (pdf): https://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/TheLabDC_MPD_BWC_Working_Paper_10.20.17.pdf.

50 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, “Policing Body Cameras: Policies and Procedures to Safeguard the Rights of the Accused” (2017) at 22–24, online (pdf): www.nacdl.org/getattachment/4163cc7b-1f4e-4e6c-9a60-a76794390d94/policing-body-cameras-policies-and-procedures-to-safeguard-the-rights-of-the-accused.pdf.

51 OHRC, “Letter to Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board on its policy and procedure on body-worn cameras” (28 October 2020), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-toronto-police-service-and-toronto-police-services-board-its-policy-and-procedure-body-worn#_edn1.

52 OHRC Interview with Colin Stairs (Chief Information Officer) and Ian Williams (Director of Information Management) (16 June 2022).

53 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Model Governance Framework for Police Body-worn Camera Programs in Ontario” (June 2021) at 1—2, online (pdf): www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/model-governance-framework-police-body-worn-camera-programs.pdf; Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Additional comments and recommendations on the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s draft recommendations to eliminate racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (10 November 2022).

54 OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Barbara McLean (Human Resources Command) (12 March 2020)..

55 Toronto Police Service 809 Uniform Performance Appraisal and Development Plan, Rank: Constable (2018); OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Barbara McLean (Human Resources Command) (12 March 2020).

56 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Report from Chair Jim Hart regarding “Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020) at 46, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.

57 TPS, recommendation 46 completion report (13 January 2022) – Toronto Police Service Board Police Reform Implementation Dashboard (retrieved 27 October 2022) https://data.torontopolice.on.ca/pages/tpsbimplementation.

58 Scot Wortley, “Police Use of Force in Ontario: An Examination of Data from the Special Investigations Unit, Final Report” (2006) at 79–80, online (pdf): www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/projects/pdf/AfricanCanadianClinicIpperwashProject_SIUStudybyScotWortley.pdf.

59 OHRC, “Submission to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services on the Strategy for a Safer Ontario” (29 April 2016), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/strategy-safer-ontario-%E2%80%93-ohrc-submission-mcscs.

60 Abbott v Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 1909; Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220; Shaw v Phipps, 2012 ONCA 155; R v Ahmed, [2009] OJ No 5092 (ONSC); R v K(A), 2014 ONCJ 374; R v Smith, 2015 ONSC 3548.

61 Letter from the TPS to OHRC – Answers to follow-up requests and questions arising from OHRC interview of Superintendent Domenic Sinopoli (Professional Standards Unit) (3 June 2020); OHRC Interview of Peter Code (Staff Superintendent, Professional Standards Unit) (7 June 2022); Roberts v Toronto Police Services Board, 2016 HRTO 1464; Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15 at s 95:

   Confidentiality

   95 Every person engaged in the administration of this Part shall preserve secrecy with respect to all information obtained in the course of his or her duties under this Part and shall not communicate such information to any other person except,

   (a) as may be required in connection with the administration of this Act and the regulations;

   (b) to his or her counsel;

   (c) as may be required for law enforcement purposes; or

   (d) with the consent of the person, if any, to whom the information relates.

62 Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15 at s 31(1)(i) and (j).

63 Responses of the TPSB to written questions at 78 and 81, asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19. Further, according to the TPSB, to the extent that the TPSB considers the specifics of a civil or criminal case, its discussions would be confidential due to solicitor-client privilege or the statutory confidentiality provisions of the Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15.

64 Responses of the TPSB to written questions at 84, asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19.

65 Responses of the TPSB to written questions at 78, asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19.

66 Section 11 of O Reg 267/10 under the Police Services Act states that the Chief of police shall cause an investigation into any incident where the SIU has been notified. O Reg 267/10 was revoked on December 1, 2020. The Special Investigations Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 1 Sch 5 and O Reg 268/10 came into effect on the same day. Section 32 of O Reg 268/10 states that the chief of police shall “cause an investigation to be conducted into any incident involving a police officer in the chief’s police force that becomes the subject of an investigation by the SIU Director[.]” The purposes of the investigation are the same as under O Reg 267/10.

⁶⁷ Between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2017: see Appendix 5 – Methodology.

68 Alok Mukherjee with Tim Harper, Excessive Force: Toronto’s Fight to Reform City Policing (Madeira Park: Douglas & McIntrye, 2018) at 205–206.

69 Nicole Brockbank, “Only 1% of public complaints against Toronto Cops led to a disciplinary hearing in past 5 years“, CBC News (28 October 2020), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/public-complaints-police-disciplinary-hearings-1.5778459.

70 Responses of the Toronto Police Services Board to written questions at 99, asked under s. 31(7)(c) of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19. Note that officer accountability for misconduct flagged by the SIU director does not appear to be addressed in the TPSB’s report on Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety found in: Toronto Police Services Board, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020) at 7, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.

71 OHRC interview of Joseph Martino (Director of the SIU) (26 May 2022).

72 Letter from the TPS to the OHRC – Answers to follow-up requests and questions arising from OHRC interview with Superintendent Domenic Sinopoli (Professional Standards Unit) (3 June 2020).

73 Letter from the TPS to the OHRC (15 June 2021).

74 Letter from TPS to the OHRC – Additional information arising from the OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Barbara McLean (Human Resources Command) (9 July 2020).

75 David H Bayley, Michael A Davis and Ronald L Davis, “New Perspectives in Policing – Race and Policing: An Agenda for Action” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2015) at 10, online (pdf): www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248624.pdf.

76]Letter from Patricia Kosseim (Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario) to Patricia DeGuire (Chief Commissioner of the OHRC) – The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario’s submission regarding the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s public inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (10 November 2022).

77 OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (29 July 2021) at number 7, online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing.

⁷⁸ TPS, The Police and Community Engagement Review (The PACER Report): Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations (2013) at 4–5, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/The%20PACER%20Report.pdf.

79 TPS, The Police and Community Engagement Review (The PACER Report): Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations (2013) at 3–6, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/The%20PACER%20Report.pdf.NULL

80 TPS, The Police and Community Engagement Review (The PACER Report): Phase II – Internal Report & Recommendations (2013) at 80, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/The%20PACER%20Report.pdf.

81 TPS, PACER Recommendations Update (December 2018).

82 TPSB, Agenda for the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board (24 November 2020), at 195 states: "Note – 2018.05.18 was the last contact with the CPE until contacted by the PACER team on January 17, 2020, at which point CPE provided no timeline for completion of their report." Online: https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/650-november-24-2020-agenda

83 Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 17.

84 Report from the ARAP Interim Steering Committee to the TPSB re ARAP – Recommendations of the Interim Steering Committee (5 April 2018); Toronto Police Services Board, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 18, 2018” (18 April 2018), online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=588&catid=49&m=0.

85 Report from the ARAP Interim Steering Committee to the TPSB re ARAP – Recommendations of the Interim Steering Committee (5 April 2018); Toronto Police Services Board, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 18, 2018” (18 April 2018), online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=588&catid=49&m=0.

86 Report from the ARAP Interim Steering Committee to the TPSB re ARAP – Recommendations of the Interim Steering Committee (5 April 2018); Toronto Police Services Board, “Minutes of Public Meeting: April 18, 2018” (18 April 2018), online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=588&catid=49&m=0; Report from the ARAP Interim Steering Committee to the TPSB re ARAP Membership (10 August 2018); “Minutes of Public Meeting: August 23, 2018” (23 August 2018), online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=598&catid=49&m=0.

87 TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), regarding Police Reform Initiatives, online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/57-2020/634-august-18.

88 TPSB, “Anti-Racism Advisory Panel (ARAP)”, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/advisory-panels/24-panels-and-committees/94-arap.

89 OHRC interview with Uppala Chandrasekera (former member of the TPSB and former co-chair of ARAP) (1 October 2020).

90 OHRC interview of Uppala Chandrasekera (former member of the TPSB and former co-chair of ARAP) (1 October 2020).

91 Black Legal Action Centre, “Ontario Human Rights Commission’s releases report A Disparate Impact, the second interim report on racial profiling & racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (TPS)” (11 August 2020), online: https://twitter.com/blac_ontario/status/1293173166035152898; Canadian Association of Black Lawyers, “Statement of the Canadian Association of Black Lawyers in response to A Disparate Impact, the Ontario Human Right Commission’s Second Interim Report on the Inquiry into Racial Profiling and Racial Discrimination of Black Persons by the Toronto Police Service, released on August 10, 2020” (19 August 2020), online (pdf): https://cabl.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CABL-response-to-OHRC-and-TPSB.pdf.

92 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Additional comments and recommendations on the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s draft recommendations to eliminate racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service” (10 November 2022).

⁹³ OHRC v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2018 HRTO 60.

The OHRC’s finding of systemic racial discrimination, racial profiling, and anti-Black racism in policing in Toronto is not controversial. It has been experienced by Black communities for decades and acknowledged by the TPS and TPSB.

To ensure real change, the TPS and TPSB must commit to effective and expeditious legally binding enforcement measures. The decades of reports and calls for action from Black communities show that if the TPSB and TPS are committed to change, they must legally bind themselves to that change.

The need for a legally binding commitment does not imply that the TPS or TPSB will otherwise act in bad faith. Instead, it is a recognition that the systemic changes required to fully address anti-Black racism and discrimination in policing are significant and will necessarily come into conflict with entrenched aspects of the status quo. Legally binding enforcement measures will ensure the changes proposed here are adopted and implemented, even when short-term pressures may weigh against them.

The OHRC’s final report on its Inquiry into anti-Black racism by the Toronto Police Service sets out a path of meaningful actions that will change outcomes for Black communities.

A path informed by:

• OHRC’s findings
• research into best practices
• engagement with Black communities, organizations, and community leaders
• subject matter experts, and
• the TPS, TPSB and TPA

A path that the TPS and TPSB must be held accountable to follow. A path that will build trust between Toronto police and Black communities.

Anti-Black racism and systemic discrimination exist in society broadly. The TPS and TPSB cannot eliminate all discrimination in society, but they can – and the Code requires them to – make sure their own work does not create or perpetuate the disadvantage experienced by Black people. Policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms must be adopted and strengthened to ensure the conduct of police narrows the gap between Black people and the rest of society, rather than widening it.

The OHRC believes that by adopting its recommendations, the TPS and TPSB can provide policing services in a way that complies with the Code.

This report is the first of its kind. It combines hard data with the lived experiences of Black communities, chronicling the extensive and long-standing harm suffered by Black people and communities as a result of discriminatory policing over the past decade, and for many years prior.

The impacts of such harm at a societal level are incalculable. The evidence of systemic racial discrimination and anti-Black racism cannot be ignored. The TPS and TPSB have the opportunity to take decisive action to do their part to end this cycle. They have the opportunity to build trust with the communities they serve, and move From Impact to Action.

Appendicies