Chapter 5 - Stop and search: gaps in regulations, policies, and procedures

As set out with data and evidence in Chapter 3, Black persons across Toronto are disproportionately stopped and searched by the TPS.

This systemic problem is a result of significant gaps in the provincial regulations, TPSB policies, and TPS procedures that govern police interactions with the public – especially in situations not involving arrests.

Chapter 5 identifies these gaps and ways to close them to reduce random stops and searches.

 

Support for reforming police stops

In Ontario and internationally, there is ample support for providing greater and more detailed guidance in relation to stops and searches.

In 2022, then-Interim Police Chief Ramer stated, “There is absolutely no place for carding … I know there [are] proponents out there … there is no basis for carding and I would never apologize for not supporting it.”¹

The Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System found that “wherever broad discretion exists, racialization can influence decisions and produce racial inequality in outcomes.”² The Commission recommended that guidelines be created “for the exercise of police discretion to stop and question people, with the goal of eliminating differential treatment of [B]lack and other racialized people.”³

In New York City (NYC), part of the ruling in Floyd vs City of New York found that the disproportionate use of stop and frisk constituted a pattern of racial profiling and violated the U.S. Constitution. Judge Scheindlin ordered the NYC Police Department to revise its stop and frisk policies to meet constitutional standards and New York state law.⁴ This change contributed to a dramatic reduction of stops while crime rates in NYC continued to fall.⁵

In Baltimore, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) found that systemic deficiencies, including in policies, contributed to unconstitutional searches by the Baltimore Police Department (BPD).⁶ The consent decree between the DOJ and BPD includes criteria for conducting searches to adhere to constitutional standards.⁷

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance recommended that governments of member states “introduce a reasonable suspicion standard, whereby powers relating to control, surveillance or investigation activities can only be exercised on the basis of a suspicion that is founded on objective criteria.”⁸

 

Ontario Regulation 58/16: stops in non-arrest circumstances

As noted in Chapter 3, Ontario Regulation 58/16: Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties (O. Reg. 58/16) was enacted in January 2017.

Its goal was to ensure that police–public interactions are conducted without bias or discrimination, and to prevent random stops of individuals to collect identifying information.⁹ O. Reg. 58/16 applies when an officer is:

1. inquiring into offences that have been or might be committed;
2. inquiring into suspicious activities to detect offences; or
3. gathering information for intelligence purposes.

However, O. Reg. 58/16 does not apply in many non-arrest circumstances. For example, it does not apply where the officer is:

1. talking to a driver during a traffic stop;
2. investigating a specific crime;
3. not asking for identifying information; or
4. executing a warrant.¹⁰

The OHRC has repeatedly maintained that O. Reg. 58/16 has not achieved its purpose and should be broadened in scope.¹¹ There cannot be accountability for racial profiling in policing if only a small portion of interactions is captured under the regulation.

The evidence demonstrates that racial profiling can and often does occur when police are talking to a driver, investigating a specific offence (which can be interpreted very broadly), or when officers do not ask for identifying information. Excluding such interactions undermines the goal of identifying and eliminating racial profiling in police interactions with the public.

Before O. Reg. 58/16, thousands of TPS street checks¹² were documented. Since it came into effect, the TPS has reported conducting only 28 street checks: 25 in 2017, two in 2018, and one in 2019.¹³

When asked to explain the decline, then-Chief of Police Mark Saunders said that front-line officers are not doing a lot of proactive policing because they do not have a lot of opportunities to do so. He said that the TPS had examined whether street checks were continuing, “under a different methodology and calling it something else so it could get hidden, and we didn’t find any of that.”¹⁴

However, A Collective Impact and this report substantiate that the TPS continues to stop and search civilians at a high rate (much higher than other cities in Ontario), and that Black people in Toronto continue to be stopped and searched at a rate far higher than people from other racial groups.¹⁵ See also Dr. Wortley’s findings summarized in Chapter 3 and in Appendix 2.

Given the discriminatory history of carding and street checks, the circumstances where TPS and other police officers in Ontario are allowed to approach individuals in a non-arrest scenario should be narrowed and set out in O. Reg. 58/16. Placing tighter restrictions on the circumstances when officers can or cannot stop individuals would help eliminate random stops – a consistent demand from Black communities and human rights organizations.¹⁶

Improper and disproportionate stops and searches of members of Toronto’s Black communities are compounded because O. Reg. 58/16 does not require police to provide individuals with a full explanation of their rights after being detained.

Section 6(1) of the regulation only requires police to inform the individual that they are not required to provide identifying information to the officer and explain why the police officer is attempting to collect identifying information about the individual.¹⁷ This is insufficient.

According to s. 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), all people have certain rights that are triggered by a police detention. Those rights should be fully explained to the individual being stopped, who may or may not be aware of their rights, or might be too scared or intimidated to assert them.

This is especially so for Black persons who may feel that they cannot disregard police directions or assert their right to walk away, because police will consider it evasive and use it to constitute sufficient grounds for an investigative detention.¹⁸

O. Reg. 58/16 should be amended to provide clear criteria when police officers can and cannot stop members of the public in non-arrest circumstances. It should also be amended to require a full explanation of detained persons’ rights.

For the OHRC’s recommendation related to amending O. Reg. 58/16, see Recommendation 87.

 

TPSB policies and TPS procedures: stops in non-arrest circumstances

Deficiencies identified in O. Reg. 58/16 are reflected in TPSB policies and TPS procedures guiding police interactions with the public. Specifically, the TPSB’s Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information, and TPS Procedure 04-14, Regulated Interactions share the limited scope of O. Reg. 58/16. They do not adequately restrict police officers’ discretion to stop – leaving space for the police to use their stop-and-search powers in a discriminatory manner.¹⁹

Policies and procedures also do not require officers to advise individuals about their rights upon detention, including their right to leave. This may give rise to arbitrary detentions, contrary to s. 9 of the Charter.²⁰

TPSB policies and TPS procedures should provide clear criteria for police stops in non-arrest circumstances. The TPSB and TPS should not wait for the provincial government to implement these changes. Given their acknowledgements of anti-Black racism, the TPSB and the TPS can act immediately. The acknowledgements are an important first step, but concrete and immediate change is required.

For the OHRC’s recommendation for revising TPSB policies and TPS procedures guiding police interactions with the public under O. Reg. 58/16, see Recommendation 14.

 

Right to search

Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

To be reasonable and therefore consistent with s. 8 of the Charter, a search must meet three requirements:

1. The search must be authorized by law;
2. The law authorizing the search must be reasonable; and
3. The search must be conducted reasonably.²¹

Broadly speaking, this means that the police do not have the right to search someone unless there is some legal justification.

For example, the police are not legally entitled to randomly stop individuals and search them or their vehicles. Such searches would constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charter, as well as the s. 9 protection against arbitrary detention.

 

Investigative detention and pat-down searches

The police are entitled to stop people briefly to conduct an investigative detention.  An investigative detention is legal if the police have reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime, and that the detention is reasonably necessary based an objective view of the circumstances. 

The detention should be brief, and the individual must be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention. Where a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that their safety or the safety of others is at risk, the officer may engage in a protective or pat-down search of the detained individual.²²

The scope of the protective or pat-down search is limited to exterior patting of clothing such as pockets, waistband, or areas that may reasonably conceal such items as weapons or implements that may be used as weapons. The search is usually performed with open hands to maximize the ability to detect weapons through clothing. This search may also be described as a “safety search.”²³

 

Search incident to arrest and frisk searches

The police are also permitted to conduct a “search incident to arrest.” A valid search incident to arrest requires that:

1. The individual searched has been lawfully arrested;
2. The search is truly incidental to the arrest in the sense that it is for a valid law enforcement purpose related to the reasons for the arrest; and

3. The search is conducted reasonably.²⁴

In practical terms, this means that when the police lawfully arrest someone for an offence, they are permitted to search or frisk them for evidence of crime that may be on their person, or for safety reasons.

This may include emptying and searching pockets as well as removing clothing, which does not expose a person’s undergarments, or the areas of the body normally covered by undergarments. Removing clothing such as belts, footwear, socks, shoes, sweaters, extra layers of clothing, or the shirt of a male would all be included in a frisk search. A frisk search may be started in the field and concluded at the station.²⁵

 

Search criteria

O. Reg. 58/16 does not address police searches. Police searches are addressed by TPSB’s policy on searches²⁶ and the TPS Search of Persons Procedure (01-02).²⁷ However, they do not provide sufficient guidance on the circumstances where protective searches (formerly Level 1) and frisk searches (formerly Level 2) are appropriate.

TPS’s Search of Persons Procedure reminds officers that they must have legal authority and grounds for conducting a search. The procedure notes that a search must be reasonable and justified given all the circumstances, but offers little guidance on how to identify appropriate circumstances for conducting a protective search.²⁸

The risk assessment included as an appendix to the procedure does not address this concern.²⁹ The appendix focuses on searches incident to arrest, strip searches and body-cavity searches. It sets out case law relevant to searches incident to arrest and risk factors to be considered prior to conducting a strip search. The appendix does not include a similar list of factors for protective searches that occur in non-arrest scenarios.

Furthermore, the procedure fails to remind officers that race should not be a factor when considering the grounds conducting a search.

 

Race-based data collection

TPS and TPSB’s data collection efforts do not mandate race-based data collection on the full range of searches that officers conduct.³⁰  TPSB’s Policy on Searches, the TPS Search of Persons Procedure, TPS Procedure on the Collection, Analysis and Reporting of Race and Identity-Based Data, and TPS Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy do not require race-based data collection on protective searches, frisk searches or cavity searches.³¹

In response to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director’s report, “Breaking the Golden Rule: A review of strip searchers in Ontario,” race-based data on strip searches was included in the TPS Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy.³²

However, the TPS chose to exclude protective searches and frisks from the strategy. Their reasoning is unclear, given the wide range of information being collected about searches. For example, the Search of Persons Procedure notes that, where practical, all protective and frisk searches should be recorded.

In addition, there are forms that officers complete once a search has been conducted – a "search in the field only" form if the person is not brought into the station and a "booking hall search" form if they are. Officers are also required to make notes in their memo books. Each of these tasks provides the TPS with an opportunity to mandate the collection of relevant race data. 

For further discussion and recommendations on data collection, please see Chapter 9.

The absence of guidance gives TPS officers too much discretion and broad scope to engage in improper searches. Given the disproportionate number of strip searches³³ and impact of other searches on members of Black communities in Toronto, the absence of detailed criteria for searches and robust data collection contributes to systemic discrimination. Accordingly, these policies and procedures must be amended to have clear criteria for when a search is lawful.

For the OHRC’s recommendation to improve the TPS Search of Persons procedure, see Recommendation 15.

 

Street check data collected prior to 2017

The TPS should destroy personally identifiable information from carding/street check data collected before January 1, 2017, unless it is being used for a purpose set out in subsection 9(10)(2) of O. Reg. 58/16, in which case it should be destroyed once it is no longer being used for that purpose.

As documented previously, the TPS engaged in discriminatory carding and street checks for many years prior to (and after) the enactment of O. Reg. 58/16 in 2017.

It is concerning that the TPS collected and retains significant personal data, in particular about Black persons, obtained through racial profiling.³⁴

Many, including the OHRC,³⁵ argued that the data should be destroyed on the basis that it was improperly collected, and the police were never entitled to collect or maintain such personal information. Others argued it should be maintained for future litigation purposes or for possible missing persons investigations.

To date, the provincial government, the TPSB, and the TPS have not purged the information from police databases. Rather, they implemented a regime that restricts access to the data but does not require it to be destroyed.³⁶

 

Justice Tulloch’s recommendation

In 2018, then-Justice Michael Tulloch examined this issue as part of his Independent Street Checks Review. He recommended that all historical data should be automatically destroyed five years after it was collected, unless it is being used for a purpose set out in subsection 9(10)(2) of O. Reg. 58/16, in which case it should be destroyed once it is no longer being used for that purpose. He also noted that a police service may choose to destroy historical data earlier than five years after it was collected.³⁷

 

The Regulated Interactions Review Panel recommendations

As required under the TPSB’s policy, the TPSB established a Regulated Interactions Review Panel (RIRP) composed of three persons: a Board member, a retired judge, and a community member. The mandate of the RIRP includes reviewing the Chief’s quarterly report for compliance with the TPSB’s policy provisions on access to historical street check data, identifying trends, and making recommendations.³⁸

The RIRP reviewed the following data in the Chief’s quarterly reports from 2018 about access to historical street check data, which included the following statistics regarding operational access:³⁹

 

Operational access to historical street check data

	Legal	Investigative	Total
2017	11	17	28
2018	5	3	8

 

The RIRP determined that the information complied with the policy requirements for access to historical street check data. However, the RIRP asked, “What types of investigative reasons are leading to these operational access requests being made?”⁴⁰ The small number of requests for investigative access, particularly in 2018, reinforced the Review Panel’s view that:

• The number of people with access to the data does not seem to align with the requests being made; and

• Based on the trends related to operational access, there is a live question whether maintaining operational access, remains necessary.⁴¹

The RIRP recommended that:

• The TPSB review its policy in light of Justice Tulloch’s, as he was then, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review, with particular attention to the portion of its Policy that currently requires the retention of Historical Contact Data; and

• If the TPSB determines that retaining historical street check data remains necessary (in whole or in part), the Chief eliminate operational access to the data while maintaining access for legal and other related purposes.⁴²

Privacy considerations for race-based data are always important. This is especially true for data collected in the absence of any regulatory framework, as was the case with street check data for several years leading up to 2017. Given that more than five years have passed since 2017 and the passing of O. Reg. 58/16, there is no reason for the TPS to maintain this personal information.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on data collected from carding/street check data, see Recommendation 64.

 

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Chapter 5 Endnotes

 

^{[1] OHRC interview with the then-Interim Chief James Ramer (26 October 2022).}

^{[2] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at iv, ix and 359. Similarly, in R v Brown, the Ontario Court of Appeal determined that “racial profiling can be a subconscious factor impacting on the exercise of a discretionary power in a multicultural society”; R v Brown, [2003] 64 OR (3d) 161 at para 81.}

^{[3] Margaret Gittens et al, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995) at iv, ix and 359.}

^{[4] Floyd et al v City of New York et al, (2013) 8 Civ 1034 (SAS); 12 Civ 2274 (SAS).}

^{[5] Michael D White and Henry F Fradella, Stop and Frisk: The Use and Abuse of a Controversial Policing Tactic (New York: NYU Press, 2016).}

^{[6] U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (10 August 2016) at 30–34 and 129–130, online (pdf): https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download.}

^{[7] City of Baltimore, “City of Baltimore Consent Decree” (2017), online: https://consentdecree.baltimorecity.gov.}

^{[8] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “ECRI General policy recommendation no. 11 on combating racism and racial discrimination in policing adopted on 29 June 2007” (Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2007), online (pdf): https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-11-on-combating-racism-and-racia/16808b5adf.}

^{[9]The Honourable Michael H. Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) at Appendix B Order in Council and Terms of Reference, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf. The Report of the Independent Street Checks Review notes that the purpose or objective of the Regulation is not reflected in the Regulation. Nonetheless, the purpose is described in the Street Checks Review as the prevention of arbitrary or random stops of individuals for the sole purpose of collecting their identifying information (at page 83). From the start of the process of drafting the regulation, the OHRC made several submissions to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS) geared towards reducing racial profiling in street checks and other police practices. See OHRC, “Joint Response to Ontario Draft Regulation” (28 October 2015), online: https://studylib.net/doc/9676903/doc---ryerson-university; OHRC, “OHRC Submission to the MCSCS on street checks” (11 December 2015), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-ministry-community-safety-and-correctional-services-street-checks-0; OHRC, “Strategy for a Safer Ontario – OHRC submission to MCSCS” (29 April 2016), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/strategy-safer-ontario-%E2%80%93-ohrc-submission-mcscs; OHRC, “Letter to Minister David Orazietti regarding Street Checks Regulation” (10 August 2016), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-minister-orazietti-regarding-street-checks-regulation.}

^{[10] TPSB, Policy on regulated interaction with the community and the collection of identifying information (17 November 2016), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information; TPS, Procedure 04-14 Regulated Interactions (3 January 2020), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/2e/19/2e194193-4e37-44d5-b151-1432715dcb3c/5060f77e-187d-428c-b753-12145560bb50.pdf; Government of Ontario, “New changes to policing: When and how a street check (also known as carding) can be done” (21 December 2016), online: www.ontario.ca/page/street-checks; Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties, O Reg 58/16, ss 1, 4.}

^{[11] OHRC, “OHRC Submission to the Independent Street Checks Review” (1 May 2018), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-independent-street-checks-review.}

^{[12] Street checks are defined as “identifying information obtained by a police officer concerning an individual, outside of a police station, that is not part of an investigation.” See The Honourable Michael H Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) at xiv, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf.}

^{[13] Scot Wortley, Racial Profiling and the Toronto Police Service: Evidence, consequences and policy options (OHRC, September 2021) at 55. See Appendix 3.}

^{[14] OHRC interview with Chief Mark Saunders (23 July 2020).}

^{[15] see 5, p. 62.}

^{[16] See also; OHRC, Framework for change to address systemic racism in policing (29 July 2021), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/framework-change-address-systemic-racism-policing.}

^{[17] Sections 6(2) and 6(3) also set out several exceptions to this requirement.}

^{[18] R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para 169.}

^{[19] OHRC, OHRC Submission to the Independent Street Checks Review (1 May 2018), online: www.ohrc.on.ca/en/ohrc-submission-independent-street-checks-review.}

^{[20] Legal opinion letter from J. Michael McDonald and Jennifer Taylor to Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission (15 October 2019) regarding “NS Human Rights Commission – Independent Legal Opinion on Street Checks,” online (pdf): https://humanrights.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/editor-uploads/independent_legal_opinion_on_street_checks.pdf.}

^{[21] R v Caslake, [1998] 1 SCR 51 at para 10.}

^{[22] R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52.}

^{[23] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.}

^{[24] R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77.}

^{[25] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/a0/f9/a0f91c6c-e992-4036-badb-1f14fe1a6980/8e76ce5e-27b3-465d-b31a-60e580a1de8a.pdf.}

^{[26] TPSB, Adequate standards compliance policy, XXXIXLE-012 – Search of persons, online: https://tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/adequacy-standards/38-part-5/242-xxxix}

^{[27] TPS, Procedure 01-02 Search of Persons (24 November 2021) at Appendix B (8 February 2016), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf.}

^{[28] TPS, 01-02 Appendix B: Risk Assessment – Type of Search (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf sets out case law relevant to searches incident to arrest and risk factors to be considered prior to conducting a strip search. The appendix does not include a similar list of factors for protective searches.}

^{[29] TPS, 01-02 Appendix B: Risk Assessment – Type of Search (24 November 2021), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/fb/89/fb89bb92-f2c3-45a9-8548-c125cfaf1d80/d2e139f8-de9e-4fb9-ae0f-225f3d4e34e7.pdf.}

^{[30] TPS procedure notes that officers may conduct protective searches, frisk searches, strip searches, and body cavity searches. TPS race data collection strategy only reports on strip searches.}

^{[31] Pursuant to the TPS’s Search of Persons procedure, all protective and frisk searches must be recorded on audio and video, and captured in the officer’s memorandum book.}

^{[32] https://www.oiprd.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/OIPRD_Breaking-the-Golden-Rule_Report_Accessible.pdf.}

^{[33] Despite a decline in the overall number of strip searches conducted in 2021, TPS data confirms that there were “slightly higher” strip search rates for Black persons compared to the overall average. See TPS, 2020 Race & Identity-Based Data Collection Findings, online: https://www.tps.ca/race-identity-based-data-collection/2020-rbdc-findings/.}

^{[34] The OHRC defines racial profiling as any act or omission related to actual or claimed reasons of safety, security or public protection, by an organization or individual in a position of authority, that results in greater scrutiny, lesser scrutiny or other negative treatment based on race, colour, ethnic origin, ancestry, religion, place of origin or related stereotypes.}

^{[35] OHRC, “Letter to Minister Orazietti regarding Street Checks Regulation” (10 August 2016), online:}

^{https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/letter-minister-orazietti-regarding-street-checks-regulation.}

^{[36] See Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties, O Reg 58/16, s 9; TPSB, Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information (17 November 2016) at ss 13–21, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information; TPS, Procedure 04-14 Regulated Interactions (3 January 2020) at 3, online: https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/2e/19/2e194193-4e37-44d5-b151-1432715dcb3c/5060f77e-187d-428c-b753-12145560bb50.pdf.}

^{[37] The Honourable Michael H. Tulloch, Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Ontario: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018) see Recommendations 8.12 and 8.13 at 230, online (pdf): https://opcc.bc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/StreetChecks.pdf.}

^{[38] TPSB, Policy on Regulated Interaction with the Community and the Collection of Identifying Information (17 November 2016), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/178-regulated-interaction-with-the-community-and-the-collection-of-identifying-information.}

^{[39] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[40] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[41] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}

^{[42] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: March 26, 2019” (26 March 2019), Report from Audrey Campbell, Thea Herman (retired judge) & Chair Andry Pringle regarding “Regulated Interactions Review Panel: Review of Chief’s Reports – Access to Historical Contact Data, Third Quarter 2018 (July – September) & Fourth Quarter 2018 (October – December)” (14 March 2019) at 50, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/54-2019/610-march-26.}