Chapter 7 - Use of force: gaps in policies and procedures

 

For decades, Black communities, mental health advocates, the OHRC and others have been calling for action to reduce discriminatory, excessive, and inappropriate use of force.

Multiple reports and coroner’s juries have recognized the disproportionate use of force employed by the TPS against marginalized persons – Black communities in particular. The following reports offer important recommendations to address this problem:

• Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Clare Lewis, 1989)¹  
• Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario (Stephen Lewis, 1992)²
• The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence (Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling, 2008)³  
• independent review of the use of lethal force by the TPS (Honourable Frank Iacobucci, 2014)⁴
• the jury in the inquest into the deaths of Reyal Jardine-Douglas, Sylvia Klibingaitis, Michael Eligon (2014)⁵  
• the jury in the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (2018).⁶

These reports and juries called for, among other things, substantial changes to TPS policies and procedures regarding the use of force, changes to the use-of-force model, a greater focus on de-escalation, and improvements in how police officers are trained and monitored concerning the use of force.

Those calls for change have done little to date. The data examined by the OHRC shows that Black people remain disproportionately represented in all instances of use of force by the TPS, including cases that result in death or serious physical injury, and in cases of lower-level use of force.

It is critical that the TPS and TPSB move urgently to implement all recommendations from previous reports and coroner’s juries that addressed police use of force and its impact on Black communities.

The intersection between race and mental health is of particular concern for Black communities because of the impact police use-of-force practices can have on the mental health of community members.  These practices are exacerbated for those Black persons already living with mental health or addiction issues.⁷ The delay in implementing reforms on use of force has resulted in preventable harm and racial discrimination.

This chapter will analyze use-of-force data, review recent and proposed policy and procedural changes by the TPSB and TPS, and make recommendations to strengthen efforts to eliminate discriminatory use of force. It will begin with a review of the findings on use of force in from the OHRC’s previous interim inquiry reports.

 

Death and serious injury data (SIU Investigations)

Despite making up only 8.8% of Toronto’s population, Black people were overrepresented in:

• SIU use-of-force cases (28.8%)
• police shootings (36%)
• use-of-force cases that resulted in civilian death (61.5%)
• police shooting deaths (70%).

Between 2013 and 2017, a Black person in Toronto was nearly 20 times more likely than a White person to be involved in a fatal shooting by the TPS.

Black men comprise 4% of Toronto’s population, yet were complainants in 25% of SIU cases alleging sexual assault by TPS officers.

The Inquiry’s experts conducted further analysis to assess whether other commonly cited factors could explain the significant racial disparities in the data. In addition to neighbourhood crime rates, they identified several factors that arguably could be at play when an officer chooses to use force. These included civilian characteristics (e.g., age, gender) and situational factors (e.g., community setting, civilian behaviour, mental illness, civilian impairment, the presence of a weapon).

Our experts found that these factors could not explain the overwhelming overrepresentation of Black people in SIU investigations and shooting deaths.

They analyzed other factors that some might argue have an influence on the use of force, including the person’s behaviour toward the police at the time of the incident, and if they had a criminal history. However, the experts found that these factors did not account for the overrepresentation of Black people in use-of-force data.

This analysis debunks several commonly held, seemingly neutral or non-discriminatory explanations for the overrepresentation of Black people in these statistics.

 

Lower-level use of force

SIU cases account for only a small percentage of police use-of-force incidents. Many serious forms of force do not meet the SIU’s threshold, which focuses on the nature of a person’s physical injury (e.g., broken bones meet the threshold, but severe bruises or lacerations may not). Lower-level use-of-force incidents can still have significant adverse physical and emotional impacts on the person subjected to that force.

Our experts found that between 2016 and 2017, Black people were grossly overrepresented in lower-level use-of-force incidents, even more than in incidents that resulted in an SIU investigation.

Specifically, Black people were involved in 38.9% of the cases included in the lower-level use-of-force dataset.

Black males were particularly overrepresented, accounting for 34.5% of all lower-level use-of-force cases. Although Black females were underrepresented in the dataset, the Black female rate was still 3.6 times greater than the rate for White females, and 25 times greater than the rate for women from other racialized groups.

 

Summary of overrepresentation in use-of-force categories

Although they represent only 8.8% of Toronto’s population, Black people were grossly overrepresented in almost all use-of-force categories:

• 32.2% of cases involving a police firearm
• 36% of cases involving police use of pepper spray
• 36.7% of cases involving police strikes
• 41.1% of cases involving police grounding (i.e., bringing a person to the ground) /other force
• 45.5% of cases involving police Taser use
• 57.1% of cases involving a police dog.

As well, compared to their representation in the general population, Black people were:

• 2.7 times more likely to suffer from broken bones from a police use-of-force incident
• 3.8 times more likely to suffer an injury from pepper spray
• 4.2 times more likely to suffer abrasions or scratches
• 4.4 times more likely to suffer a head injury
• 4.6 times more likely to experience body pain or soft tissue damage
• 4.7 times more likely to experience cuts or lacerations
• 4.7 times more likely to experience a Taser-related injury
• 6.6 times more likely to experience chest pains as the result of a police use-of-force incident.

Several commonly held beliefs that might provide a non-discriminatory explanation were considered, such as the belief that this happens because Black people live in high-crime patrol zones. However, even accounting for factors such as low-crime and high-crime patrol zones, average income, and the percentage of single-mother households, the experts found that Black people were still grossly overrepresented in both serious and lower-level use-of-force incidents.

Even when accounting for these alternative factors, there were significant disparities in the relative risk that Black people will experience serious and lower-level police use of force relative to White people.

For instance, relative to their representation in the general population in a patrol zone, the odds that a Black person would experience force were 4.9 times greater than the odds of a White person. The odds that people belonging to other racialized groups would experience force were 0.6 times (or 40%) less than the odds for White people.

Although patrol zone, violent crime rate, and median household income may be predictors of the likelihood of experiencing police use of force, these indicators cannot explain why Black people were overrepresented. The experts concluded that being Black is a strong predictor of police use of force, accounting for both crime rate and median household income.

The OHRC urges the TPS to review and adopt the multiple recommendations made in previous reports, and by juries’ decisions. This Inquiry recommends additional changes – presented in the following pages – that the TPS should implement immediately.

 

Recent procedure and policy changes by the TPS and TPSB

The OHRC recognizes that the TPS and TPSB have recently taken positive steps in their procedures and policies regarding the use of force that may address some of the community’s concern about the disparate application of force. Recent shifts are summarized below.

 

TPS 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) procedure

In June 2022, the TPS issued Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation).⁸ Key changes in the Incident Response procedure, and amendments made to it in 2021, include the emphasis on de-escalation, the inclusion of a duty to intervene, and expanded data collection requirements. In addition, upon receipt of a use-of-force report, supervisory officers are required to ensure that the reports are accurate, and review all body-worn camera and in-car camera footage from the officer involved.

 

De-escalation

De-escalation is defined by the TPS as verbal and non-verbal strategies intended to reduce the intensity of a conflict so as to gain compliance without the application of force, or if force is necessary, reducing the amount of
force used. 

The Incident Response procedure identifies de-escalation and communication as core tools that must be considered continuously and utilized, where possible, even after use of force has occurred. The rationale section of the current procedure also notes that disengagement is among the de-escalation tactics that should be considered in use-of-force situations.

In addition, officers are now required to intervene and take reasonable steps to prevent the behaviour from continuing if they have clear reason to believe that another officer is engaging in misconduct – including, but not limited to, assault or physical abuse (i.e., excessive use of force) involving any person.

The intervening officer must record details of the incident and substance of the officer’s complaint, including dates, times, locations, other persons present and other relevant information, including the presence of video and/or other evidence. Officers are required to report the incident forthwith to their immediate supervisor or another supervisor. If they fail to do so, they may be disciplined for misconduct.

 

Changes proposed in the draft Incident Response procedure 

The draft Incident Response procedure provides further guidance on the steps officers can take to intervene. For example, the duty to intervene may include using verbal instructions or reasonable soft or hard physical control that is proportional to the perceived risk, with the goal of “preventing further harm to the members of the public.”⁹

The draft states that officers will not be retaliated against for intervening, and that they can make a confidential report to a third party if they intervene against a superior officer. Furthermore, where an incident of excessive force is under investigation, a witness officer who did not intervene will be investigated to determine whether they should be subject to training or discipline.

The draft sets out disciplinary measures that may flow from an officer's failure to intervene. For example, “failure to report the misconduct of another member, may constitute misconduct and may be subject to discipline as outlined in Service Procedure.” To strengthen the duty to intervene, the OHRC recommends that the TPS take immediate steps to enact this provision.

The TPS may make further amendments to the Incident Response procedure. A draft update has been posted on the TPSB’s website, which could replace the current version.

 

Reporting requirements

The Incident Response procedure requires that the TPS collect, analyze, and publicly report data on the race of individuals against whom officers use force.¹⁰ This requirement is in accordance with O. Reg. 267/18 of the Anti-Racism Act, 2017, O. Reg. 926/90 Equipment and Use of Force of the Police Services Act and the TPSB’s policy on Race-based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting. In accordance with the TPSB’s procedure and O. Reg. 267, officers shall record the perceived race of the individual(s) about whom the use-of-force report is completed.

In accordance with O. Reg. 926, use-of-force reports must be submitted to the Chief of Police when an officer:

• draws a handgun in the presence of a member of the public;
• points a firearm at a person;
• discharges a firearm;
• uses a weapon on another person;
• draws and displays a conducted energy weapon to a person with the intention of achieving compliance;
• points a conducted energy weapon at a person;
• discharges a conducted energy weapon; or
• uses force on another person, including through the use of a horse or a dog, that results in an injury requiring the services of a physician, nurse or paramedic and the member is aware that the injury required such services before the member goes off-duty. (s.14.5(1))

O. Reg. 926/90 also states that “The chief of police shall submit an annual report to the police services board … analyzing the data from the reports submitted.” (s. 14.8(6))¹¹

The Incident Response procedure does not require officers to collect race data on lower-level use-of-force incidents. The draft procedure also fails to include this requirement. This gap appears to be addressed by the TPSB’s draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy.

 

TPSB Draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy

The TPSB has also posted a draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy. It has some important changes.

In February 2023, a representative of the TPSB stated that the proposed updates to TPSB’s use-of-force policy were made in response to recommendations from the 2020 Police Reform in Toronto report. More specifically, the representative noted that the Police Reform Report recommended:

…the Executive Director, in consultation with the Chief of Police, to review the Board’s Use of Force Policy, consult with internal and external experts, and propose to the Board by November 2020, amendments to the Policy that will align it with best practices to reduce death and injuries[.]¹²

As part of the policy development process, the Board conducted research and internal consultations, and engaged stakeholders, including the OHRC. 

The stated broad goals of the draft policy are to:

• Prioritize de-escalation in all appropriate circumstances

• Produce positive outcomes arising from interactions between members of the Service [i.e., TPS officers] and the public, and

• Minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the degree of force used by Service members, as well as injury or death where a Service member is justified in using force, while ensuring the safety of the community and Service members.

The stated purposes of the draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy include:

• eliminating the use of excessive force

• ensuring that the Service’s training, procedures, and practice prioritize a Service [m]ember pursuing de-escalation options to the greatest extent possible without endangering officer safety

• ensuring that Service [m]embers employ de-escalation and communication tactics in all appropriate circumstances by continuously assessing incidents as they unfold for opportunities to effectively de-escalate a conflict without force or with a lesser degree of force, including after a [m]ember has begun the lawful use of force

• ensuring that any force option will be used against a member of the public only where it is necessary, without bias, and in a manner proportionate to the circumstances to effectively protect public safety

• ensuring that where Service [m]embers are present during an interaction where another member is using inappropriate or excessive use of force, they will intervene to stop it, and report it to their supervisors.

 

Reporting requirements

The TPSB’s current use-of-force reporting requirements were consistent with provincial requirements until January 1, 2023. On this date, the Province implemented changes to O. Reg. 926 that expanded use-of-force reporting to include instances where an officer uses force on a person through a horse or dog, points a firearm at a person, or displays a conducted energy weapon (CEW) with the intent to achieve compliance.¹³ These are not reflected in the current policy. However, the TPSB’s new draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy includes these changes and goes a step further by requiring officers to collect race-based data on a wider range of use-of-force incidents.

For example, the TPSB’s draft policy uses a definition of “physical force” that captures a broader range of incidents than the reporting requirements set out in the Equipment and Use of Force regulation. The TPSB’s policy defines physical force as:

… techniques intended to control or stop a subject’s behaviour, which exceed mere physical contact (e.g., handcuffing a resisting individual, punches, armlocks, tackles, oleoresin capsicum [OC] aerosol spray, baton, firearms). Physical force includes drawing a firearm or displaying a Conducted Energy Weapon [CEW], whether or not the firearm or [CEW] were discharged at the subject …¹⁴        

In contrast, the Equipment and Use of Force regulation requires officers to complete a use-of-force report when an officer, “uses force on another person, including through the use of a horse or a dog, that results in an injury requiring the services of a physician, nurse or paramedic[.]”¹⁵  

The definition proposed by the TPSB captures the lower-level use-of-force incidents examined during this Inquiry. According to the draft policy, the Chief of Police will create procedures to ensure officers report on physical force incidents, and provide the Board with an annual report on physical force incidents that includes the total number of reports that year, a breakdown of the reasons for the use of physical force, the perceived race of the members of the public involved, and the number of persons in crisis involved in these incidents.¹⁶ 

 

Progress and gaps in draft policy

The OHRC is encouraged by the TPSB’s new draft policy. By placing a greater emphasis on de-escalation, it potentially reduces the number of use-of-force encounters. It can also help the TPS build trust with Black and other communities.

The draft policy also makes progress towards addressing decades-long concerns from Black, Indigenous, and other vulnerable communities by:

• placing the highest value on protecting the life and the safety of the public

• underscoring the importance of ensuring that TPS members employ de-escalation and communication tactics in all appropriate circumstances, and continuously assess incidents as they unfold

• prohibiting the use of excessive force, prohibiting chokeholds, carotid holds,¹⁷ or any other techniques intended or likely to restrict breathing capacity unless no other reasonable alternatives exist to prevent grievous bodily harm or death of police officers or a member of the public

• requiring the TPSB to publish on its website anonymized data on all use-of-force incidents reported by TPS members, and

• giving supervisors a more robust role in identifying and responding to inappropriate use of force, missed opportunities for de-escalation, and/or discriminatory conduct.

These are important policy shifts that respond to community concerns and some recommendations advanced by the OHRC in its racial profiling policy, and the best practices shared with TPS throughout the TPS Inquiry.

The OHRC hopes that when implemented with additional reforms recommended by the OHRC, the revised policy will reduce use-of-force rates and respond to unique concerns from racialized communities, persons in crisis, and other Code-protected groups.

 

Scope of incidents subject to use-of-force reporting

There is more to be done to ensure that the draft policy and draft procedure work in harmony to reflect leading practices, reduce disparities in use of force, and achieve the TPSB's vision of establishing bias-free policing. The policy should include the following:

• Expand use-of-force reporting to lower-level uses of force.

• Expand use-of-force reporting to include the use of handcuffs (mechanical restraints) to obtain subject compliance that occurs outside of an arrest, and the application of handcuffs to persons under 18.

• Clarify the steps the TPSB can take in response to data that establishes disparities between racialized groups.

• Investigate when a CEW is discharged.

• Direct that officers avoid using force when engaged with a youth.

• Provide clear guidance on circumstances where deadly force is prohibited.

• Use a comprehensive definition of use of force to guide use-of-force reporting.

Use-of-force incidents that must be reported are narrowly defined. They do not include the full context surrounding the use of force, or instances the public would consider use of force by the police.

The TPSB’s draft policy on De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force has the potential to improve race-based use-of-force data collection and analysis because it captures incidents where physical force is used. However, the OHRC is concerned that the definition of physical force proposed by the TPSB’s draft policy, which captures some lower-level use-of-force incidents, is not reflected in TPS’s draft Incident Response procedure.¹⁸

More importantly, the TPSB’s draft policy has not been implemented at the time this report was drafted. This is concerning as the OHRC released findings about the disparate impact of lower-level use of force on Black communities in 2020.  

Unfortunately, policies and procedures currently issued by the TPS and TPSB require use-of-force reports when an officer uses “physical force on another person that results in an injury requiring medical attention” among other criteria.¹⁹ This approach ties the reporting requirement to the presence of a physical injury. As such, circumstances where TPS members use measurable force are not reportable if they do not result in a physical injury. This method results in an underreporting of relevant use-of-force incidents, and will undermine efforts to address concerns in this area.

For example, the current reporting requirements would not capture uses of force that would attract public scrutiny, such as chokeholds. The TPSB’s draft policy prohibits the use of chokeholds, or any other technique intended or likely to prevent respiration. Yet, the prohibition is not absolute.

These holds are prohibited unless “no other reasonable alternatives exist to prevent grievous bodily harm or death.” Based on current requirements, an officer’s use of a chokehold would not be subject to reporting if it did not result in injury or hospitalization. This result undermines the danger associated with the use of this technique and the TPSB’s efforts to place tighter restrictions on its use. Similarly, if a civilian experienced multiple kicks or punches during an interaction with police, the use of force would not be reported if they did not cause injury or hospitalization.

Furthermore, reporting requirements that are based on injury or hospitalization do not account for the mental health or psychological impact and trauma that police use of force has on an individual.

In Maynard v. TPSB, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) accepted evidence about the psychological impact of a use-of-force incident where Mr. Maynard, a Black man, was taken down at gunpoint by police. In that case, the HRTO stated, “There was no dispute that Mr. Maynard carries with him to this day a lasting sense of anxiety and fear whenever he sees a police officer[.]” The HRTO went on to state, “… it comes as no surprise that he [Maynard] finds himself unable to completely recover his sense of the man he was before the incident.”²⁰ 

As observed in the case of Mr. Maynard, the impact of a use-of-force incident on an individual’s dignity, self-respect, or overall mental health is not contingent on the physical injury. As such, TPS should seek to collect race data on a wide range of force incidents that fall below the injury or hospitalization threshold.

The OHRC’s report, A Disparate Impact, uncovered some of the problems associated with using a limited definition of use of force. In that report, lower-level use of force is described as incidents where physical force was used by TPS officers, but did not result in serious civilian injury or death. Using this definition, the OHRC found that Black people were significantly overrepresented in use-of-force cases involving the TPS.²¹

To understand the impact of use-of-force practices, incidents where lower-level use of force is used should be monitored and publicly reported. Leaving these incidents out of the monitoring and reporting obligations creates a gap in the oversight process.

Use-of-force reports should contain additional contextual information. Relevant context includes whether the subject was experiencing a mental health crisis or was perceived to have a mental health disability, whether the civilian was charged with an offence, and the length of time the subject was detained.

To effectively monitor use-of-force disparities, a robust definition that includes lower-level use of force is needed. The OHRC supports a definition that captures all instances where physical force is used, including “coercive touches such as wrist or arm locks, or striking the subject with the hands or feet.”²² Use of force that falls within the scope of this definition should be reported to a supervisor and form part of the TPS annual use-of-force report.

For the OHRC’s recommendations on use-of-force reporting, see Recommendations 30, 31, and 32.

 

Handcuffs (mechanical restraints), physical restraints and zip ties 

The proposed De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy should require reporting on the use of restraints such as handcuffs, mechanical restraints, or zip ties where they are used for adults. This excludes routine handcuffing that occurs during an arrest.  All applications of these restraints on persons under 18 years old should be reported.

There have been high-profile incidents where officers have used restraints on members of Black and Indigenous communities that have attracted criticism from human rights tribunals, police disciplinary panels, and members of the public. These incidents have sparked important policy shifts that are in line with the OHRC’s recommendation to expand reporting requirements.

For example, in response to an incident where officers unjustly handcuffed an Indigenous man and his grandchild, the Vancouver Police Board developed an interim Use of Handcuffs policy after conducting its own extensive review.²³ In subsequent disciplinary police proceedings, the officers were found to have acted “recklessly using unnecessary force on Mr. Johnson and his granddaughter by applying handcuffs to the parties on arrest without good and sufficient cause.”²⁴

In 2020, the HRTO found Peel police officers violated section 1 of the Code when they handcuffed and shackled a Black six-year-old girl at her elementary school.²⁵ The Tribunal stated, “The handcuffing of an individual by police epitomizes a use of force that is a potent symbol of the authority of the state. Quite simply, the use of handcuffs by police restricts the individual’s freedom and therefore amounts to adverse treatment.”²⁶

In response to this case and other concerns about systemic racial discrimination, the Peel Regional Police has entered into a Human Rights Project with the OHRC to develop a strategy to appropriately address use-of-force incidents involving youth.³¹  

These incidents support the calls to monitor the use of handcuffs and mechanical restraints to ensure that they are applied without bias.

For the OHRC’s recommendation on use of handcuffs and mechanical restraints, see Recommendation 31.

 

TPSB’s role in responding to TPS data and reports that disclose racial disparities

Sections 43 and 47 of the TPSB’s draft policy require the Chief of Police to present an annual report on use of force to a public meeting of the TPSB. The report should include:

• the number of use-of-force incidents, reports and applications of force in that year

• trends for the previous four years

• numbers and types of injuries to members of the public and officers sustained during use-of-force incidents, and

• perceived race of members of the public involved in use of force.

The report should also include an “analysis to identify any broad patterns or trends in incidents of use of force and/or de-escalation and their impacts, that could indicate the degree to which the Policy is effective in achieving its purposes as defined above, as well as training needs, equipment upgrade needs, and/or Policy modification needs.”²⁷

Where the analysis discloses disproportionalities or disparities for Code-protected groups, the TPSB should be required to act.  As it stands, the policy does not clearly state the action the TPSB will take, or the actions that it will require from TPS, when problematic trends emerge.

The OHRC recommends that the TPSB direct the TPS to establish and implement action plans where disparities arise for all Code-protected groups. The action plans should be based on established benchmarks, and set targets to address the disparities or disproportionalities identified in the annual report. This recommendation is consistent with the requirements in the Anti-Racism Act and its data standards. But it goes beyond this framework by recommending the TPS take action where the data uncovers disparities for Code-protected groups not covered by the Anti-Racism Act, such as persons in crisis.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding race-based disparities in reports to the TPSB, see Recommendation 34.

 

Discharged conducted energy weapons and subsequent investigations

The draft policy mandates an investigation²⁸ when an officer discharges their firearm. However, it does not mandate an investigation when an officer discharges a conducted energy weapon (CEW). Discharging a CEW should be subjected to the same investigative standards as a firearm. Both weapons are potentially lethal, and Code-protected groups remain disproportionately subjected to their use.

According to the TPS’s draft procedure, when a firearm is discharged, an investigator is assigned to conduct a thorough investigation and submit a report. While CEW use is subject to reporting and review, it is not subject to the same scrutiny as the discharge of a firearm.

The policy and training framework currently in place has not dispelled human rights concerns related to CEWs. For example, in 2017 the OHRC’s written deputation to the TPSB on CEWs referred to a Canadian study finding that people with addictions may be more likely to die after being struck by a CEW.²⁹

The Inquiry’s 2020 report, A Disparate Impact, found that Black people were grossly overrepresented in most use-of-force categories, including CEW use. Black people represented 8.8% of Toronto’s population, and 45.5% of cases involving police CEW use.³⁰ The TPS should be directed to investigate instances when CEWs are discharged and identify trends, in an effort to combat the persistent disparities in this area.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding the use of CEWs, see Recommendation 35.

 

Use of force and youth

TPS and TPSB’s respective incident response and de-escalation policies do not provide much guidance on incidents involving youth.

The TPS’s draft policy states that the Chief of Police will establish a process to ensure that officers are “trained to take into account individual physical, developmental and mental characteristics of persons in crisis, individuals with mental or developmental issues, and youth, so as to enable the Service Members to more successfully de-escalate incidents where such information is available.”

The TPSB should clarify the policy and training objectives that would guide officers when they are engaged with vulnerable populations such as youth. The OHRC takes the position that officers should always:

• Use de-escalation techniques when engaged with young persons.

• Implement training that emphasizes the child’s overall psychological and physical well-being.³¹

• Seek intervention from trained mental health or child and youth professionals to address non-criminal behaviours.

As part of these efforts, the TPS should ensure that officers use a trauma-informed approach that acknowledges that “racialized and equity-seeking groups are at greater risk for experiencing four or more types of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) that result in trauma.”³² This is particularly important for children under the age of 12.

When young persons over 12 are engaged, officers should “employ developmentally appropriate and trauma informed tactics”³³ that include using a calm and natural demeanour and avoid threatening language.³⁴ Officers should employ the least intrusive interventions that consider the child’s physical and mental development. In addition, heightened training for 911 dispatchers (discussed later in this chapter) will help streamline the number of incidents involving children that warrant a police response.

Considering the findings from JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board,³⁵ mechanical restraints like handcuffs should not be used on children.³⁶

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding youth and the use of force, see Recommendations 36 and 37.

 

Use of lethal force

To place the highest value on the protection of life and the safety of the public, the TPSB should provide clear guidance to the TPS on circumstances where the use of deadly force is prohibited.

For example, the Camden County Police use-of-force policy defines deadly force and sets out circumstances where it should not be used.³⁷ Among other prohibitions, the Camden policy prohibits the use of deadly force as a means to prevent property damage or loss, to prevent the destruction of evidence, or against a person who poses a threat only to themselves and not to others.

A similar policy should be adopted by the TPS.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding the use of lethal force, see Recommendations 27 and 28.

 

Commitment to “zero harm and zero death”

The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, stated in unequivocal terms that the goal of the TPS should be “zero harm and zero death.” This means that the goal should be no harm and no deaths when police interact with a member of the public.

On October 18, 2017, the TPS stated that it “striv[es] every day to achieve zero harm/zero death in all interactions with the public.”³⁸ Sadly, this goal remains elusive, particularly for Black people.

Considering this Inquiry’s finding of systemic anti-Black racism and that Black persons are more likely to be subject to police force, including lethal force, the commitment to zero harm and zero death must be reaffirmed and clarified. It must be implemented in a manner that takes into account the unique experiences of Black communities.

For the Inquiry’s recommendations regarding the use of lethal and less-lethal force, see Recommendations 23, 25, 26, 27, and 28.

 

Disarming front-line officers in appropriate circumstances

Being a police officer can be a dangerous job. Police officers are often asked to deal with high-stress situations where their health and safety, and that of the persons they encounter, may be at risk. The presence of guns in Toronto makes police work even more dangerous and, as such, there are times when an armed response is required.

However, there may be circumstances where police officers do not need to be armed, and where the presence of an armed officer may be unnecessarily frightening or intimidating, and/or escalate a situation rather than de-escalate. The OHRC believes that the TPS should consider disarming some front-line officers in appropriate circumstances.

This Inquiry found that between 2013 and 2017, a Black person in Toronto was nearly 20 times more likely than a White person to be involved in a fatal shooting by the TPS. This disparity warrants a serious exploration of changes to policies or procedures that can reduce the number of shooting incidents involving TPS officers, while preserving the safety of all parties during interactions with police.

Members of Black communities and police accountability advocacy groups have long pushed for disarming. For example, the TPSB’s Anti-Racism Advisory Panel recommended that the TPSB “commit to undertake a study of jurisdictions where police do not routinely patrol with firearms, to determine if and how such a model could be adopted in whole or in part within Toronto.”³⁹

There is no statutory requirement for police officers to carry guns. It is not mandated in the Police Services Act or any other legislation or regulation. Rather, O. Reg. 283/08 (3.1)(2): Equipment and Use of Force grants Chiefs of Police the power to exercise their discretion to authorize an officer to carry a firearm by enacting a procedure.⁴⁰

Thus, Chiefs of Police appear to have the discretion to determine whether and which officers carry firearms.

In Toronto, the possession of a firearm is authorized by Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation), which states that officers be “issued a firearm.” Notably, there is no stated requirement that officers “carry” that firearm while on patrol.

At a TPSB meeting in April 2021, counsel for the TPS acknowledged that the requirement that all officers carry a firearm was not set out in the Police Services Act or any legislation or regulation, but rather was a matter of occupational health and safety and collective bargaining, based on the tasks officers are required to perform.⁴¹

The TPSB’s former Chair Jim Hart and former Executive Director Ryan Teschner reaffirmed this position during an interview with the OHRC. They further emphasized that if the issue of disarming was to be reviewed, it would need to be at a provincial level.⁴²

However, there is no express language in TPS collective agreements indicating a legal requirement for officers to carry a firearm at all times, nor does there appear to be any case law where the courts or arbitrators have confirmed that police officers in Ontario must carry firearms.⁴³   

TPSB’s collective agreement with the TPA includes sections that state that all uniform patrol cars, except those assigned to traffic duties, shall be manned by two fully trained and armed police officers while on patrol during specified hours.⁴⁴ It could be argued that the decision to arm officers is an implied term of the collective agreement. Nonetheless, these provisions do not expressly preclude the TPS or TPSB from exploring whether officers can be deployed unarmed in low-risk situations.⁴⁵

Contrary to the stereotype of a criminal armed with a gun, in most TPS use-of-force cases, regardless of race, the civilians were not in possession of a weapon at the time of their encounters with police.⁴⁶

The TPS and TPSB should urge the provincial government to publicly review whether there are situations where officers can be deployed with non-lethal weapons instead of guns, and engage with the provincial government as part of this review.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding use of force, non-lethal weapons and de-escalation, see Recommendations 23, 26,  and Recommendations 91 and 92.

 

Supervision to address systemic racial discrimination in TPS use of force

This Inquiry’s finding that Black people are disproportionately impacted by TPS’s use of force shows that supervision within the TPS must
be strengthened.

TPS’s current policies and procedures may capture individual instances of discrimination, but it is unclear whether there are systems in place to effectively monitor the connection between these incidents and
systemic barriers.

The Incident Response procedure should provide more guidance in this area. For example, in his interview with the OHRC, Superintendent of Professional Standards, Domenic Sinopoli, indicated that if he was reviewing a case alleging excessive force involving a Black complainant, he would not examine whether race was a factor unless there was something to trigger a review. However, specific allegations of racial profiling or a statement by a complainant or witness would trigger further analysis.⁴⁷

TPS’s issued Incident Response procedure sets out a process for reviewing each use-of-force report. As part of this process, a supervisory officer will notify the Unit Investigation Officer and/or the Unit Complaint Coordinator and review all body-worn camera and in-car camera footage of the officers involved in the incident.⁴⁸ This review considers the principles of fair and impartial policing to recognize implicit biases.

The draft Incident Response procedure also stipulates that upon being notified, a Unit Investigating Supervisor shall review a use-of-force report for the purpose of identifying instances of inappropriate or excessive use of force that requires additional training, discipline, or notification of the SIU, and to “identify and address any evidence of the use of force based on Human Rights Code protected grounds.”⁴⁹

However, based on a review of TPS procedures, and interviews with TPS leadership about supervision, the OHRC found gaps in TPS’s ability to monitor systemic discrimination. For example, the issued Incident Response procedure states that the Unit Commander – Professional Standards will conduct an annual study that includes an analysis of use-of-force trends for the entire Service.⁵⁰ This section of the procedure does not expressly direct the Unit Commander to identify trends related to racial discrimination. Nor does it direct the Unit Commander to advance recommendations to the TPS or TPSB in response to the trends identified.

Progress has been made to increase the scope of the Equity, Inclusion and Human Rights Unit’s work, and to further support officers in their ability to identify racial profiling, discrimination, and anti-Black racism. This work must continue to be prioritized.

Effective early warning or early intervention systems (EIS) based on race data and other important indicators are particularly important to enhance screening for racial profiling and racial discrimination in TPS use of force. Further discussion of EIS can be found in Chapter 9.

Finally, day-to-day supervision of officers and performance management should be strengthened to identify, monitor, and address the racial profiling, discrimination and systemic factors that may contribute to the overrepresentation of Black person in use-of-force data.

The OHRC reviewed over 140⁵¹ Use of Force Reports made between July 2016 and June 2017. Despite the reports having a field to indicate a recommendation for additional training, the OHRC did not find any incidents where it was recommended as a result of a use-of-force incident, including training on racial profiling or racial discrimination.⁵²

When asked, the TPS was unable to provide the number of officers for whom additional training was recommended during the period of the Inquiry.⁵³ Deputy Chief Shawna Coxon advised that additional training would depend on the context of the situation and the officer’s history.⁵⁴ Although TPS supervisors conduct regular reviews of use-of-force incidents, the OHRC is concerned that officers do not appear to be referred for training to address issues. This suggests a fundamental flaw in this accountability mechanism.

See OHRC’s recommendations regarding supervision, see Recommendations 33, 34, and 61(b).

 

Transfer of public safety functions to other agencies or organizations

During the Inquiry, there was considerable public discourse on the concept of detasking. It was consistently suggested that reducing the number of incidents with which police are tasked would reduce use-of-force incidents, racial disparities in use-of-force data, and improve public safety.

University of Toronto Professor Akwasi Owusu-Bempah characterized detasking as:

…a reallocation or a reassignment of certain tasks and functions that we recognize that the police aren't performing very well, that there are negative outcomes to their involvement in those activities such as increased risk for the use of violence and potential for criminalization…⁵⁵

In a report issued in early 2023, the British Columbia Office of the Human Rights Commissioner stated that detasking may result in greater safety and better outcomes:

Detasking the police in key areas would improve community safety and particularly the safety of Indigenous, Black and other racialized communities who are disproportionately impacted by biased policing by investing in evidence-based services that reflect community needs.

Improving community safety requires a shift in focus from the police as default responders to other community safety strategies. Key steps include detasking police as first responders to mental health crises, substance use crises and homelessness, and reallocating funding towards health-based services and housing supports.⁵⁶

Former Mayor of Toronto John Tory spoke positively about the potential for detasking to address systemic racism in policing:

We must fix that model by changing the way policing is done in order to stamp out systemic racism within our police service, and to re-think, in some cases, whether police are the right community response at all.⁵⁷

Justice Gloria Epstein in her Report of The Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations recommended that certain tasks previously performed by police be transferred to civilians.⁵⁸

 

The TPS and TPSB response to community calls for transfer of public safety functions

The TPSB and TPS have taken some positive steps towards detasking. In 2020, the TPSB published Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (Police Reform Report).

Responding to community calls for detasking, the TPSB adopted the following recommendations from its Police Reform report:

1. The Executive Director to work with the Service, City Manager and other stakeholders to identify the categories of calls that might be addressed by a non-police response.
2. The Executive Director to work with the City Manager, Government of Ontario, community based mental health and addictions service providers, organizations representing people with mental health and/or addictions issues and other stakeholders to develop new and enhance existing alternative models of community safety response, including mobile mental health and addictions crisis intervention.
3. The Executive Director to work with the Service, and others including the Auditor General, to identify non-core policing services that can be delivered by alternative service providers.
4. The Executive Director to work with the Service, and others including the Auditor General, to identify funding or areas of funding currently allocated to policing that can potentially be re-allocated to support alternative community safety models and/or fund other City of Toronto programming and services that contribute to community safety.
5. The Chief of Police to work with the Chair and Executive Director to develop and implement a line-by-line approach to reviewing the police budget in order to identify opportunities for service delivery improvement and efficiencies, including the possible redirection of non-core policing functions and their associated funding to alternative non-police community safety providers or community safety services or programming.
6. The Executive Director to engage the Service to detail potential reductions to the Toronto Police Service budget that would result from any proposed changes to the current community safety response model, once the details of this alternative model are developed.

The TPS and TPSB have made considerable progress implementing Recommendations 1 and 2 through the launch of two pilot projects:

1. Community Crisis Support Services Pilot (CCSSP), and

2. 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot (CCDP).

These programs are described below.

At time of writing, the TPS had made the following progress on Recommendations 3–6:

3. In progress with a “targeted due date” of September 24, 2024.

4. In progress with the details “under assessment” and the targeted due date to be determined. According to the Staff Superintendent responsible for Strategy and Risk Management, which includes the implementation of the recommendations in the TPSB’s Police Reform Report, the Auditor General has been working with the TPS for over a year to identify categories of calls the TPS should not be involved with (see below). Before divestment can occur, “there has to be an entity that will pick it up that is able to fill the gap.”³⁷

5. Is “being organized and timelines are being established.” The “targeted due date" is December 2023. According to the Staff Superintendent responsible for Strategy and Risk Management, (5) overlaps with (3) and (4).

6. Appears to be partially contingent on the CCSSP being expanded across Toronto, which is expected in 2025.  

 

Mental health and alternative community safety models

During the Inquiry, the OHRC heard community calls to improve outcomes for vulnerable segments of Black communities during encounters with the police. Throughout our consultations with many stakeholders, including TPS leadership, mental health crisis response was identified as a task that mental health professionals could perform more effectively. Such a shift could also reduce use-of-force encounters involving vulnerable people.

Within this context, the inquest into the death of Andrew Loku, which examined race and mental health, recommended the TPS use the Gerstein Crisis Centre police telephone line when interacting with a person in crisis.⁵⁹ 

The OHRC is pleased to see that there has been significant work on civilian-led mental health crisis responses over the past year, which culminated in the City of Toronto’s CCSSP, the 9-1-1 CCDP, and the expansion of the Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITs).

The OHRC supports these pilot projects and the expansion of the MCIT program. However, the TPS and TPSB should address community calls to expand civilian-led mental health crisis responses to reduce police interactions with people in crisis. These services should also be culturally responsive to Black and other racialized communities. Improvements to these programs and funding are discussed below.

 

Community Crisis Support Service Pilot

In February 2021, the Toronto City Council approved the Community Crisis Support Service Pilot (CCSSP) program.

The CCSSP provides an alternative to police enforcement, creating a community-based, client-centred, trauma-informed response to non-emergency crisis calls and wellness checks. The program focuses on health, prevention, and well-being.

On February 2, 2021, Toronto City Council voted unanimously to implement the CCSSP, with the original budget, including a direction to the “City Manager to consult with the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Chief on the potential reallocation of funds from the Toronto Police Service budget to ensure that the funding of the Community Crisis Support Services Pilot will not result in new financial burden to Toronto residents and to report the outcomes of this consultation through the City’s budget process.”⁶⁰

The program began with a budget of $1.7 million in 2021, which will increase to $7.2 million in 2024.⁶¹

In its submission to the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, the Gerstein Crisis Centre stated in relation to the CCSSP that it was:

… concerned that the financial commitments expressed by the city to support the new initiatives will not be sufficient and fall short of what is needed to achieve the intended outcomes … We strongly urge the City to re-examine their own budget and secure further funding in collaboration with the province.⁶²

A January 12, 2022 report from the City Manager to the Executive Committee states that “city-wide implementation is expected in 2025, if not sooner.”⁶³

Programs like the CCSSP should be further expanded to allow room for other proactive mental health services.

For example, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is a program that provides intensive support services for individuals with serious mental illness who have very complex needs and find engaging with other mental health services challenging.⁶⁴ ACT teams can be another resource to help prevent mental health crises that currently engage a police response.⁶⁵ 

The OHRC notes the following recommendation from the Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto report:

The City recognize that policing is not the most appropriate means of addressing community safety in all settings, and shift responsibility and resources to more appropriate strategies as follows:

[…] Initiate the necessary processes to plan and implement the reallocation of approximately $150 million in funds currently used to police people with mental health challenges and invest those funds in the expansion of civilian crisis response programs, safe beds, ACT teams, Intensive Case Management, and other crisis services.⁶⁶

 

9-1-1 Community Crisis Diversion Pilot

On June 24, 2021, the 9-1-1 Community Crisis Diversion Pilot (CCDP) budget of $522,000 was approved by the TPSB for a one-year term from August 1, 2021 to July 31, 2022.

In his report to the TPSB at the September 13, 2022 meeting, then-Interim Chief Ramer noted:⁶⁷

At its meeting of July 27, 2022, the [Toronto Police Services] Board received a six-month mid-term evaluation of the 9-1-1 C.C.D. in relation to the results of the pilot over the first 6 months. The mid-term evaluation reported on the success of the 9-1-1 C.C.D. having diverted 117 events from a police response.

Because of its success, the Chief recommended extending the 9-1-1 CCDP from October 1, 2022 to September 30, 2023, with an increased budget of $1,002,300. The budget enhancement provides for expanded services, including:⁶⁸

[…] expanding the catchment area from 14, 51 and 52 Divisions to anywhere in Toronto, and increasing staffing from one crisis worker operating in the 9-1-1 CCDP for 20 hours each day (between 07:00 a.m. and 03:00 a.m.) to a second crisis worker to overlap with the first during the peak hours of demand for 24 hours each day. This avoids any gap in alternative response option service.

The TPSB approved the recommendation on September 13, 2022.⁶⁹

In the TPS news release, Susan Davis, Executive Director of the Gerstein Crisis Centre, noted:

Gerstein Crisis Centre welcomes the expansion of the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project with our Toronto Police Service partners as we continue to build purpose-built infrastructure for mental health support across the City of Toronto. Our communities are facing complex issues and solutions will require innovative and collaborative models that work across sectors to create a strong support network for all Torontonians connecting people to the right supports when they need them and wherever they reach out.⁷⁰

The OHRC also welcomes the expansion and extension of the 9-1-1 CCDP. The TPS and TPSB should consider making the program permanent so that vulnerable people in crisis can be assisted in the safest and most culturally responsive way possible.

For the OHRC’s recommendations regarding non-police crisis response and an independent civilian review or commission to address community calls for de-tasking, see Recommendations 7 and 8.

 

Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams

Mobile Crisis Intervention Teams (MCITs) are collaborations between participating Toronto-area hospitals and the TPS. A mental health nurse and a specially trained police officer respond to situations involving people experiencing a mental health crisis.⁷¹

The program has been in place for many years. However, it has been limited to certain divisions and times of day. Over the years, there have been clear and consistent requests and recommendations to make the program available across the city around the clock.

On August 18, 2020, the TPSB directed the Chief to create a plan to implement an “immediate expansion of the MCIT program … with a view to providing MCIT services 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and across all Divisions.”⁷² Then-Interim Chief Ramer confirmed that the TPS would have 24-hour coverage from MCITs by the end of the first quarter of 2021.⁷³

At its April 22, 2021, meeting, the TPSB received a report from Chief Ramer stating that MCITs would be expanded to run 14.5 hours a day (9:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m.)⁷⁴ However, the report also noted:⁷⁵

Expansion to provide [MCIT] coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and across all divisions will require on-going advocacy in collaboration with hospital partners for more funding from the Ontario Ministry of Health to increase the number of nurses in the program and support their salaries. Program nurses are employed by the hospitals and their salaries are, therefore, paid through provincial health care funding allocations.

The Divisional Crisis Support Officer (D.C.S.) Program has been developed to provide additional support to those in crisis when the M.C.I.T.s are unavailable or not working. The D.C.S. will be a 1 officer car deployed daily in each division throughout the city on each platoon. The D.C.S. officer will have specialized training in de-escalation techniques, communication skills, the role intersectionality plays in mental health disorders and common mental health disorders.

By the completion of the M.C.I.T. expansion plan in [April 2021], the M.C.I.T.'s and D.C.S. officers together will provide 24-hour coverage for mental health response and support to the community and divisional officers[.]

The increase in MCIT coverage by the TPS and TPSB is important for the safety of marginalized communities in Toronto. Divisional Crisis Support officers appear to provide useful support in lieu of 24-hour MCIT coverage.

There continue to be issues that frustrate MCIT coverage. According to an internal memo obtained by CBC News, the TPS temporarily suspended the deployment of Divisional Crisis Support officers in September 2021, citing "staffing pressures." These officers were intended to assist with MCITs exclusively to ensure coverage. However, now they are expected to attend any emergency calls regardless of their nature. The memo states that the “intent is to return to the original program deployment model as soon as staffing allows.”

When asked to comment on the memo, a spokesperson for the TPS stated: “Specifically, instead of having only one dedicated police officer on each shift, we are training more [primary response unit] officers in order for them to be better prepared to respond to mental health calls for service.”⁷⁶

The OHRC urges the TPS and TPSB to maintain its original goal in the 81 Recommendations arising from the Police Reform Report. The OHRC encourages the TPS and TPSB to engage Ontario’s Ministry of Health to achieve full 24-hour MCIT coverage across Toronto.

For the OHRC’s recommendation regarding MCIT expansion, see Recommendations 24 and 103.

 

Auditor General Reports

In January 2021, as part of its Police Reform decisions, the TPSB entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Toronto’s Auditor General to have independent audits of several areas of the Service’s operations. At the June 2022 Board meeting, the Auditor General presented three reports.⁷⁷

The Auditor General’s first report deals with an audit of the 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations, with a focus on staffing, and improved information management.⁷⁸

The second report reviews certain types of calls-for-service that police currently respond to, and makes recommendations to support more effective responses. In doing so, the Auditor General identified six “event types” of calls for service where police attendance is likely “not essential.”⁷⁹ The report found that 40% of calls for service in six lower-priority event types “could have been handled by alternative responses if proper alternative responses were in place.”⁸⁰

The Auditor General published a third report to identify key common themes and findings across the two projects.⁸¹

It is important to note that the Auditor General did not conduct a race-based analysis in completing the three reports.

These reports identify several key areas for change and action, such as undertaking reviews and evaluations, and improving information and data collection so that the Service can better allocate resources and improve its workforce management.⁸²

These actions would strengthen alternative community safety models – especially in responding to people facing mental health crises.

During the June 2022 TPSB meeting, then-Chair Jim Hart commented on the Auditor’s recommendations as follows:

…the Service, in its management response, accepted all recommendations and committed to implementing them, and work with the city and other stakeholders where necessary. The Board strongly supports the Service in its dedication to quickly moving forward to implement these recommendations and looks forward to seeing progress in this regard.

I believe that working to quickly implement the recommendations contained in these significant reports is a clear demonstration of our commitment to ensuring that policing is delivered to Torontonians in the most efficient and effective way possible.

I view the recommendations made by the Auditor General as another step in our ongoing work to evolve and modernize the Service to meet the complex needs of the City, by understanding when police services are needed, recognizing when the public would be better served by another agency or stakeholder, and allocate the Service’s and other resources to deliver community safety, and ensure community wellbeing, most efficiently and effectively. This is complex, collaborative work that will take time and effort, but the result will be better, more effective services for everyone. ^[83]

The TPA also supported the Auditor’s reports in a public statement:

The Toronto Police Association is thanking City of Toronto Auditor General Beverly Romeo-Beehler and her team for their thorough, evidence-based examination of 9-1-1 Operations and Police Response to Calls for Service and is asking the Toronto Police Service and all levels of government to move quickly on the AG’s recommendations …

The TPA and its members have known for years that without a proper investment in other social services, calls for help will continue to fall at the feet of policing; this cannot continue. As the AG notes, our members want to help people, but we are also open to different ways of doing business, including having a non-police entity respond to certain calls for service, where and when it’s appropriate.” ^[84]

The OHRC supports the findings and recommendations made in the Auditor General’s reports, and is encouraged by the TPS, TPSB and TPA’s decision to acknowledge the reports’ findings.

The OHRC encourages the TPSB and TPS to continue their efforts to detask, and empower community agencies/organizations to play a more significant role in promoting public safety, particularly with respect to calls for mental health support.

The alternative service delivery models discussed in this section have the strong potential to address critical gaps in police service delivery. First, the alternative service delivery models provide experts in areas such as mental health with the resources and funding required to improve the response to persons in crisis. In doing so, outcomes for these Code-protected groups, including Black persons experiencing crisis, may be improved. Secondly, the availability of alternative service providers will reduce the demand for police services. In turn, police resources may be directed to other tasks.

 

---

 

Chapter 7 Endnotes

 

_{[1] Clare Lewis, The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General, 1989), online: https://archive.org/details/mag_00066901.}

_{[2] Stephen Lewis, Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario, Bob Rae (Toronto: 9 June 1992), online (pdf): www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/report_of_the_advisor_on_race_relations_to_the_premier_of_ontario_bob_rae.pdf.}

_{[3] The Honourable Roy McMurtry and Alvin Curling, The Review of the Roots of Youth Violence, vol 1 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2008) at 119, online (pdf): https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn30240-vol1-eng.pdf.}

_{[4] The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, Police Encounters with People in Crisis: An Independent Review Conducted by The Honourable Frank Iacobucci for Chief of Police William Blair, Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Toronto Police Service, 2014) at 17, 18, 153–155, 205–209, online (pdf): Global News https://globalnews.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/police-encounters-with-people-in-crisis.pdf.}

_{[5] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Reyal Jardine-Douglas, Sylvia Klibingaitis, and Michael Eligon (February 2014) at Recommendation 10.}

_{[6] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendations 1, 8.}

_{[7] For example, there have been a number of fatal shootings by TPS involving persons with mental health issues, including Andrew Loku, Michael Eligon, Lester Donaldson, and Albert Johnson. Fatal encounters that did not involve a shooting include the death of Regis Korchinski-Pacquet.}

_{[8] TPS, Procedure 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/De-Escalation) (27 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf.}

_{[9] TPS, “15-01 – Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) Consultation Draft” at 4—5 online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[10] The TPSB’s policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis, and Public Reporting explains the scope of interactions that will be subject to race-based data reporting. The policy states that TPS has “chosen a phased implementation of this Policy, with a focus on a single area for collection first: Use of Force. After this first phase, the Board will, as soon as possible, expand the application of this Policy …”. See TPSB, Policy on Race-Based Data Collection, Analysis and Public Reporting (19 September 2019), online: https://www.tpsb.ca/policies-by-laws/board-policies/177-race-based-data-collection-analysis-and-public-reporting.}

_{[11] RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5 (1).}

_{[12] TPSB, Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), at Appendix A, recommendation 49 online (pdf): online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[13] Equipment and Use of Force, RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5, online: https://canlii.ca/t/tv8#sec14.5. The provincial use of force report is to be completed by a Service member when the use force in the circumstances specified by section 14.5(1) of the Equipment and Use of Force regulation (RRO 1990, Reg 926).}

_{[14] TPSB, “De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Consultation Draft”, at section 45, online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0}

_{[15] Equipment and Use of Force, RRO 1990, Reg 926, s 14.5, online: https://canlii.ca/t/tv8#sec14.5.}

_{[16] TPSB, “De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Consultation Draft,” at section 47 online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[17] Chokeholds are a neck restraint which constrict a person’s airway. The “carotid hold” technique obstructs blood flow to the brain, but not the airway, causing a person to become unconscious: OHRC, “OHRC letter and submission on the Equipment and Use of Force Regulatory Amendment and Implementation of Modernized Use of Force Report” (30 October 2022), online: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/ohrc-letter-and-submission-equipment-and-use-force-regulatory-amendment-and-implementation.}

_{[18] The OHRC reviewed a TPS draft procedure, which was shared publicly in early 2023, TPS, “15-01 – Incident Response (Use of Force/De-escalation) Consultation Draft” online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[19] TPS, Incident Response Procedure (15-01) (27 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf. The procedure also requires members to complete a use of force report when an officer: draws a handgun in the presence of a member of the public; discharges a firearm or less lethal weapon; points a firearm regardless if the firearm is a handgun or long gun; uses a weapon other than a firearm on another person; uses a CEW as a demonstrated force presence, in drive stun mode or full deployment. The TPSB’s Use of Force policy approved March 22, 2007 does not require use of force reporting where the physical force used does not result in an injury requiring medical attention.}  

_{[20] Maynard v Toronto Police Services Board, 2012 HRTO 1220 at para 196.}

_{[21] This includes lower-level use-of-force cases that resulted in physical injury (such as bruises and lacerations) but did not rise to the level of the SIU’s “serious injury” threshold. OHRC, A Disparate Impact: Second interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: OHRC, 2020), Executive Summary at 3, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/A%20Disparate%20Impact%20-%20TPS%20inquiry%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[22] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Definitions at 2—6, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[23] Vancouver Police Department, “Vancouver Police updates handcuffing policy” (7 April, 2023), online: https://vpd.ca/news/2023/04/07/vancouver-police-updates-handcuffing-policy/#:~:text=The%20Vancouver%20Police%20Board%20undertook,devices%20used%20by%20VPD%20officers.}

_{[24] “Vancouver police acted ‘oppressively’ during arrest of BMO customer and his granddaughter”}

 _{APTN National News (6 April 2022), online: https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/vancouver-police-acted-oppressively-during-arrest-of-bmo-customer-and-his-granddaughter/.}

_{[25] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040.}

_{[26] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 34.}

_{[27] TPSB, “Consultation Draft: De-Escalation and Appropriate Use of Force” (22 March 2007) at s 43(h), online: https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=756&catid=68&m=0.}

_{[28] Section 41 of the TPSB’s De-Escalation and Appropriate Use of Force policy states that the Chief of Police will “[i]mmediately cause an investigation to be made where a member unintentionally or intentionally discharges their firearm, except on a target range or in the course of weapon maintenance.”}

_{[29] Temitope Oriola, Nicole Neverson and Charles T Adeyanju, “‘They should have just taken a gun and shot my son’: Taser deployment and the downtrodden in Canada” (2012) 18:1 Soc Identities 65 at 65, 74. The researchers found that 16 of 26 Taser-related deaths in Canada involved persons with “chronic drug problems.”}

_{[30] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 95, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[31] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 98.}

_{[32] “Trauma is the response to a deeply distressing or disturbing event that overwhelms an individual’s central nervous system and their ability to cope.” See Thrive Toronto and Wellesley Institute for the City of Toronto, “Safe TO: Roadmap to become a Trauma-Informed City” at 1, online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-168554.pdf.}

_{[33] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Children and Youth at 10, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[34] Baltimore Police, “Policy 1115, Use of Force” (24 November 2019), Children and Youth at 10, online (pdf): https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/51042.}

_{[35] JKB v Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board, 2020 HRTO 1040 at para 98.}

_{[36] TPS, Race & Identity Based Data Collection Strategy: Understanding Use of Force & Strip Searches in 2020 – Detailed Report (Toronto: TPS, 2022), online (pdf): www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/93/04/93040d36-3c23-494c-b88b-d60e3655e88b/98ccfdad-fe36-4ea5-a54c-d610a1c5a5a1.pdf includes an appendix with 38 action items at 93. One of the action items calls for the expansion of “Adverse Childhood Experience Training to all uniform members. Currently, training is provided to Neighbourhood Community Officers.” It is unclear how the draft policy on de-escalation and use of force informs this training as the policy does not address youth.}

_{[37] See Camden County Police, Use of Force Policy at sections 4.5–4.8 online: https://www.policingproject.org/camden.}

_{[38] TPSB, “Discussion Paper for Public Consultation” delivered at Achieving Zero Harm/Zero Death – An Examination of Less-Lethal Force Options, including the Possible Expansion of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs) (18 October 2017), online: www.tpsb.ca/images/TPSBCEWConsultation_Agenda_DisPaper.pdf#:~:text=The%20Toronto%20
Police%20Service%20strive,and%20safest%20place%20to%20be.}

_{[39] ARAP, Submissions to the Toronto Police Services Board on the Draft De-escalation and Appropriate Use of Force Policy, online: https://tpsb.ca/43-consultations-and-publications/dauf/370-anti-racism-advisory-panel}

_{[40] Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P15; Equipment and Use of Force, O Reg 283/08.}

_{[41] TPSB, “Virtual Public Meeting: April 22, 2021” (22 April 2021), at 2:11:10 online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQJ-0lzM8xE.}

_{[42] OHRC Interview with former Chair Jim Hart and then-Executive Director Ryan Teschner (Toronto Police Service Board) (14 October 2022).}

_{[43] Ontario Ministry of Labour, Training and Skills Development “Collective Agreements” (9 June 2021), online: https://sp.ltc.gov.on.ca/sites/mol/drs/ca/search/pages/results_en.aspx?k=Toronto%20Police#Default=%7B%22k%22%3A%22Toronto%20Police%20Services%20Board%22%2C%22r%22%3A%5B%7B%22n%22%3A%22LTCIMEmployer%22%2C%22t%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22ǂǂ546f726f6e746f20506f6c696365.}

_{[44] Toronto Police Service Collective Agreement between the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Association 2019-2023 at articles 7.08, 8 online: https://ws.lr.labour.gov.on.ca/CA/doc/913-22339-23%20(951-0222)?library=Public%20Administration .}

_{[45] The Occupational Health and Safety Act applies to policing and may raise some points to consider. For example, officers have the right to refuse unsafe work. However, “if the hazard is inherent in the work and if the work refusal puts someone else in danger, then the worker cannot refuse unsafe work.” See Public Services Health & Safety Association, “This National Police Week, Consider OHS in Your Police Agency” (19 May 2022), online: https://www.pshsa.ca/blog/this-national-police-week-consider-ohs-in-your-police-agency#home-pshsa-logo. See also Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1, s 43, online: https://canlii.ca/t/2km#sec43.}

_{[46] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 64 and 102, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf. Between 2013 and 2017, the dataset reveals that very few SIU cases involved armed attacks on TPS officers. In fact, most civilians involved in police use of force cases were unarmed during their encounter with the police. Like the SIU cases, in lower-level use-of-force cases, eight out of 10 cases (80%) involved unarmed civilians, and even when armed, civilians rarely used weapons to threaten or assault police officers.}

_{[47] OHRC interview with Superintendent Domenic Sinopoli (Professional Standards Unit) (25 February 2020).}

_{[48] This policy provision is in accordance with the 38 action items arising from the TPS’s analysis of its 2020 Race Based Data Collection. Specifically, the TPS has committed to implement mandatory reviews of body-worn cameras and in-car camera systems for all use-of-force incidents (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9).}

_{[49] TPS, 15-01 Incident Response (Use of Force/ De-escalation) Consultation Draft at s.19, online https://tpsb.ca/consultations-and-publications/items-of-interest?task=download.send&id=771&catid=68&m=0}

_{[50] TPS, Incident Response Procedure (15-01) (27 June 2022) at 12 online (pdf) https://www.tps.ca/media/filer_public/3c/44/3c44bb8e-f95b-4d98-b02d-9ac61650e5f3/15-01_incident_response_-_use_of_forcede-escalation_20220627ext.pdf.}

_{[52] Due to limitations of the TPS data collection systems, the OHRC and Dr. Wortley were only able to identify 141 Use of Force Reports containing sufficient information to allow for meaningful analysis. For a detailed description of the identification process, see Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 93, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[52] Scot Wortley, Ayobami Laniyonu and Erick Laming, Use of force by the Toronto Police Service: Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020) at 86, online (pdf): https://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/Use%20of%20force%20by%20the%20TPS%20report%20%28updated%20January%202023%29.pdf.}

_{[53] Letter to the OHRC with answers and materials from Superintendent Christopher Kirkpatrick (3 September 2020) at 9.}

_{[54] OHRC interview with Deputy Chief Shawna Coxon (Communities and Neighbourhood Command) (28 February 2020).}

_{[55] Brooklyn Neustaeter, “What defunding the police could look like in Canada’s largest city” CTV News (10 June 2020), online: CTV News www.ctvnews.ca/canada/what-defunding-the-police-could-look-like-in-canada-s-largest-city-1.4977969.}

_{[56] British Columbia’s Office of Human Rights Commissioner, Equity is safer: Human rights considerations for policing reform in British Columbia (November 2021) at 49, online: www.bchumanrights.ca/publications/scorpa/.}

_{[57 Nick Boisvert “Toronto Mayor John Tory calling for police reform in bid to ’stamp out systemic racism,” CBC News online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/tory-police-reform-motion-1.5626549}

_{[58] The Honourable Gloria J. Epstein, Missing and Missed: Report of the Independent Civilian Review into Missing Person Investigations, Independent Reviewer at p. 727 and 869.}

_{[59] Office of the Chief Coroner, Jury Recommendations Inquest into the death of Andrew Loku (30 June 2017) at Recommendation 14.}

_{[60] Toronto City Council, “EX20.1 – Community Crisis Support Service Pilot” (2 February 2021), online: http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2021.EX20.1.}

_{[61] City of Toronto, “EX20.1 – Report for Action – Community Crisis Support Service Pilot” (13 January 2021) at 18, online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-160016.pdf.}

_{[62] Gerstein Crisis Centre, “Deputation to City of Toronto Executive Committee Re: Community Support Service Pilot (Ex20.1)” (26 January 2021) online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2021/ex/comm/communicationfile-126274.pdf.}

_{[63] City of Toronto, “Report for Action – 2022 Launch of Community Crisis Support Service Pilots and Policing Reform Updates” (12 January 2022), online (pdf): www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-175060.pdf.}

_{[64] Canadian Mental Health Association, “Assertive Community Treatment (ACT)”, online: https://toronto.cmha.ca/programs-services/assertive-community-treatment-act-teams/.}

_{[65] Toronto Neighbourhood Centres et al, Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto (2021) at 10, online (pdf): https://ccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Rethinking-Community-Safety-A-Step-Forward-For-Toronto-Full-Report-12.pdf.}

_{[66] Toronto Neighbourhood Centres et al, Rethinking Community Safety: A Step Forward for Toronto (2021) at 23–24, online (pdf): https://ccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Rethinking-Community-Safety-A-Step-Forward-For-Toronto-Full-Report-12.pdf.}

_{[67] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project from James Ramer, Chief of Police at 4, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[68] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), “Toronto Police Services Board Report: Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project”, James Ramer, Chief of Police (29 August 2022) at 13, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[69] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: September 13, 2022” (13 September 2022), Request to Extend Term of 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project from James Ramer, Chief of Police at 4, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=752&catid=62&m=0}

_{[70] Blue Line Staff and Toronto Police Service, “Toronto Police and Gerstein Crisis Centre extend the 9-1-1 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot Project for another year”, Blue Line (2 November 2022), online: Blue Line https://www.blueline.ca/toronto-police-and-gerstein-crisis-centre-extend-the-9-1-1-crisis-call-diversion-pilot-project-for-another-year/.}

_{[71] TPS, “Mobile Crisis Intervention Team”, online: https://www.tps.ca/organizational-chart/communities-neighbourhoods-command/field-services/community-partnerships-engagement-unit/mobile-crisis-intervention-team-mcit/.}

_{[72] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: August 18, 2020” (18 August 2020), Police Reform in Toronto: Systemic Racism, Alternative Community Safety and Crisis Response Models and Building New Confidence in Public Safety (10 August 2020), recommendation 4 at 17, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/32-agendas/631-august-18-2020-agenda.}

_{[73] TPSB, “Virtual Public Meeting: December 15, 2020” (15 December 2020) at 19:00 online:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pKAkNc7lgk0 See also:  TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: December 15, 2020” (15 December 2020), Remarks from Chief Ramer at the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board, online: https://www.tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/57-2020/656-december-15.}

_{[74] TPSB, “Minutes of Virtual Public Meeting: April 22, 2021” (22 April 2021), online: https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories/send/59-2021/690-april-22.}

_{[75] TPSB, "Report on Mobile Crisis Intervention Team (M.C.I.T.) Program Expansion Plan and 911 Crisis Call Diversion Pilot” (6 April 2021), online (pdf): https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/tpsb-reform-implementation/docs/R1b_4_MCIT_Expansion_plan_and_911_Crisis_Call_Diversion_Pilot.pdf.}

_{[76] Adam Carter, “Toronto police temporarily suspending program for officers meant to assist on mental health calls,” CBC News (20 October 2021), online: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-police-suspension-1.6218283.}

_{[77] TPSB: June 22, 2022 (22 June 2022) at 9, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[78] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228260.pdf.}

_{79] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022) at 5, online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf. The six event types include: check address, check well-being, unwanted guest, dispute, landlord and tenant dispute, noisy parties.}

_{[80] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf.}

_{[81] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022) at 9, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Key Common Themes: Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Operations & Review of Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228367.pdf.}

_{[82] Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Toronto Police Service – Audit of 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point Operations” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228260.pdf; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Review of Toronto Police Service – Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228234.pdf; Auditor General of the City of Toronto, “Key Common Themes: Toronto Police Service – Audit of 911 Operations & Review of Opportunities to Support More Effective Responses to Calls for Service” (14 June 2022), online (pdf): https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2022/au/bgrd/backgroundfile-228367.pdf.}

_{[83] TPSB, “Minutes of Public Meeting: June 22, 2022” (22 June 2022) at 11, online (pdf): https://tpsb.ca/jdownloads-categories?task=download.send&id=747&catid=62&m=0.}

_{[84] TPA, “Toronto Police Association Supports Findings by City of Toronto Auditor General: TPA Agrees Members Have Become ‘Default Response’,” Globe Newswire (22 June 2022), online: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2022/06/22/2467469/0/en/Toronto-Police-Association-Supports-Findings-by-City-of-Toronto-Auditor-General.html.}